


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RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

Periodic report based on monitoring materials
from selected regions of Ukraine



2026



**NATIONAL PLATFORM FOR
RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL COHESION**

UCIPR



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This report was drafted by the team of the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) as part of the activities of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion (National Platform). This civic initiative was launched in February 2018 (formerly known as the National Platform ‘Dialogue on Peace and Secure Reintegration’).

The National Platform’s activities are geared towards strengthening the national resilience of Ukraine. This could be done through establishing dialogue practices in society, providing the authorities with proposals for developing relevant policies, particularly those on resilience and social cohesion as well as ensuring public awareness of these processes. The initiative has been implemented with the financial support of the European Union as part of the ‘Sustaining Ukrainian Resilience and European Security through Dialogue’ project.

The report is based on data on events in 12 oblasts of Ukraine that are relevant to shaping a policy of national resilience. The project target oblasts were selected based on analysis of changes in the cohesion of local populations due to the outbreak of military operations and include Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Kherson, Chernivtsi, and Chernihiv oblasts. For data collection, we distinguish between the temporarily occupied areas, frontline and deoccupied areas, and relatively rear areas.

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The text of the report is available for download on the websites of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion <http://national-platform.org> and UCIPR www.ucipr.org.ua.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFU	Armed Forces of Ukraine
ASC	Administrative Services Centre
CMA	City Military Administration
DPR	Donetsk People's Republic
EW	Electronic Warfare
GAB	Guided Aerial Bomb
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IO	Influence Operation
LPR	Luhansk People's Republic
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
OCU	Orthodox Church of Ukraine
OMA	Oblast Military Administration
OR	Oil Refinery
RF	Russian Federation
ROC	Russian Orthodox Church
SAPO	Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office
SESU	State Emergency Service of Ukraine
SMO	Special Military Operation
TOA	Temporarily Occupied Area
TPP	Thermal Power Plant
TRSSC	Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centre
UGCC	Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
UN	United Nations Organization
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UOC (MP)	Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate

SUMMARY

The situation at the front line

In May–June 2026, Russian forces continued to launch intensive strikes, while heavy fighting persisted along the entire front line. In Donetsk oblast, Russian forces did not achieve a significant breakthrough but maintained pressure along the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad, Kostiantynivka, and Kramatorsk axes. In some areas, they expanded the grey zone, while the main urban areas remained under the control of the Ukrainian Defence Forces. The enemy continued attempting to infiltrate in small groups and gain a foothold in built-up areas.

In Zaporizhzhia oblast, active hostilities continued, with Russian forces attempting to advance in the areas of Huliaipole, Orikhiv, and Stepanohirsk and striking the oblast centre and communities across the oblast. Russian forces used guided aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, strike drones, and FPV drones. Attacks on public transport, bus stops, commercial facilities, and residential areas became more frequent. In late June, attacks caused large-scale power outages in Zaporizhzhia and Zaporizhzhia raion.

Along the Prydniprovsk axis in the Ukrainian-controlled part of Kherson oblast, the intensity of Russian ground operations decreased to a certain extent. A large-scale crossing of the Dnipro remained unlikely because of intensified Ukrainian strikes on Russian military supply routes on the left bank. The main threats to the right-bank communities were FPV drones, remote mining, and strikes on civilian infrastructure. In Kherson and riverside communities, Russia continuously attacked residential areas, transport, health care facilities, and humanitarian sites with drones. Because of the persistent danger, the authorities changed transport routes and evacuated residents and some institutions, while remote mining made movement around the city increasingly difficult.

In Kharkiv oblast, Russian forces increasingly used guided aerial bombs and strike drones against residential areas and civilian infrastructure. The situation remained most difficult in Vovchansk and other parts of the Southern Slobzhanskyi axis, where Russian units attempted to infiltrate in small groups and establish positions near the state border. Along the Kupiansk and Lyman–Sloviansk axes, the enemy continued its attacks but did not achieve a significant breakthrough.

In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, regular attacks spread from the Nikopol area to Synelnykove raion. Nikopol communities were regularly struck by drones and artillery, while intensified air strikes on Vasylykivka prompted some residents to leave. Individual strikes on Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih targeted logistics and economic infrastructure important for maintaining supplies to both the oblast and the front.

In Chernihiv oblast, border communities continued to come under daily shelling. Attacks on filling stations emerged as a separate trend: on 30 June alone, strikes were recorded at four filling stations. By late June, the possible expansion of ground hostilities had become a separate risk. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine [Oleksandr Syrskyi](#) described the prospect of a Russian offensive from Bryansk region as a realistic scenario. Such an offensive could have stretched the front line and diverted Ukrainian reserves from other axes. No signs that such an offensive had begun were recorded within the monitoring period.

In Odesa oblast, energy facilities, civilian vessels, residential buildings, health care institutions, and transport were targeted alongside port infrastructure. The Danube area of Odesa oblast remained a particular target of Russian attacks because of its importance for exports and international logistics.

The Ukrainian Defence Forces intensified strikes on Russian logistics in occupied areas and on oil refining facilities in Russia. Roads, bridges, and transport interchanges that supported the supply of Russian forces and the land corridor to Crimea remained under fire control. Strikes on oil refineries and fuel infrastructure reduced fuel production and disrupted supplies to the Russian military.

I. TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS

In May–June, the occupying authorities began using previously developed control mechanisms more extensively. They held United Russia primaries in preparation for the elections scheduled for September 2026, accelerated the re-registration of Ukrainian real estate, and transferred housing declared ‘ownerless’ to employees of occupying institutions.

Administrative control intensified, while the occupying authorities continued to fail to meet the population’s everyday needs. Electricity and water supply disruptions became more widespread, as did fuel shortages, rising fuel prices, delayed salary payments, deteriorating infrastructure, and shortages of health care workers. These problems increasingly affected areas beyond the most vulnerable frontline communities. Access to some services depended on possession of Russian documents, while digital surveillance increased the risk of persecution for pro-Ukrainian activity. The occupying structures acknowledged some of these problems but blamed Ukraine for them.

The humanitarian situation remained most acute in Oleshky, Hola Prystan, and nearby population centres in Kherson oblast. In May, evacuation was discussed with international organisations. However, the organised evacuation of civilians had still not begun by June because no ceasefire had been agreed.

Risks to nuclear and radiation safety at Zaporizhzhia NPP increased significantly. Four complete blackouts during June demonstrated a further deterioration in the reliability of the plant’s off-site power supply and its dependence on emergency power sources.

Pressure on children and young people also increased. ‘Education advisers’, new textbooks, oversight of history teaching, and the expansion of military-patriotic programmes further entrenched propaganda within the education system.

Administrative and ideological control intensified as living conditions deteriorated, access to services declined, and safe evacuation became increasingly difficult.

II. FRONTLINE AND DE-OCCUPIED AREAS

Local governance continued to function in frontline and de-occupied areas, although the zone of constant risk was expanding. Intensified attacks in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts increasingly blurred the distinction between frontline and relatively safe areas. Access to public utility, transport, postal, and health care services declined in the communities facing the greatest danger. Meanwhile, oblast centres and communities farther from the front continued to receive evacuees and maintain critical infrastructure.

In May and June, backup measures prepared during the previous monitoring period began to be implemented. Anti-drone protection was expanded, autonomous heat and power sources were installed, shelters were prepared, and backup water supply projects were implemented. The restoration of Mykolaiv’s water supply system was completed, marking one of the most notable results of the monitoring period. In frontline communities, these measures did not compensate for the loss of regular services.

Continuity of governance was largely ensured by military administrations. The role of local councils in representing the interests of residents further diminished: some councils did not hold meetings, lost councillors, or were unable to adopt the necessary decisions. Staff shortages, which had previously affected health care institutions, public utility services, and administrative bodies most severely, also became apparent in law enforcement. Ongoing investigations into possible abuses in recovery projects, shelter construction, and infrastructure development undermined trust in the authorities.

For many communities in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, evacuation became a permanent function of governance rather than an emergency measure. Evacuation was hampered by unsafe routes, damaged infrastructure, the refusal of some residents to leave, and uncertainty over whether any housing would be available after evacuation. Repeat displacement became a more acute problem for people who had already experienced evacuation, while pressure on transit centres and receiving communities also increased.

Housing programmes, compensation for destroyed property, modular housing, and housing vouchers gave some groups more options for resettlement. For most IDPs, however, long-term housing remained out of reach, with rented accommodation, dormitories, and temporary accommodation facilities being the main options. Employment programmes, compensation for employers, and grants for starting a business produced tangible results but reached only some displaced people. Shortages of housing and employment exacerbated demographic decline in frontline communities and made it more difficult for people to settle permanently in their new places of residence.

Support for persons with disabilities, women, children, and older people remained largely targeted. Social taxi services, crisis rooms, assistance delivery, and mobile services continued to operate. Clearer prioritisation of UNHCR payments meant that assistance was channelled primarily to recently evacuated people and those affected by shelling.

A decline in the number of schoolchildren in Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts led to school mergers or temporary closures. Safe face-to-face and blended learning expanded where shelters and underground educational spaces were available but remained inaccessible to a significant proportion of children in communities that regularly came under shelling.

Local initiatives and new forms of commemoration played a greater role in the politics of memory. Alongside the memorialisation of those killed, new initiatives included projects focused on the families of missing persons and prisoners of war, digital remembrance platforms, cultural publications, and measures to protect monuments in cities exposed to danger.

International support remained one of the main resources for recovery. Some agreements had yet to progress beyond memoranda, and their results would therefore depend on further funding and implementation.

III. RELATIVELY REAR AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

In Odesa oblast, port, transport, and energy infrastructure remained under regular threat of attack. Meanwhile, in the central and western oblasts, the priorities remained the same: backup power generation, protecting critical infrastructure and modernising life-support systems. Concurrently, tariff revisions in Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Vinnytsia placed additional pressure on household budgets.

Supporting the Ukrainian Defence Forces was still a major focus for local authorities, civil society, and businesses. Communities provided the military with vehicles, drones, and equipment, organised fundraising campaigns, and secured international assistance. International agreements also covered energy, health care, rehabilitation, and local economic development. Small and medium-sized businesses received grants, loans, and advisory support, but their operations were hampered by staff shortages, high resource costs, power supply disruptions, and security risks.

Social programmes for war veterans, their family members, IDPs, and persons with disabilities were expanded. Adaptive sports, psychological support, veteran entrepreneurship, social support services, inclusive transport, and vocational training were further developed. New housing solutions for displaced people emerged in relatively rear areas but met only a part of their needs. High rents, shortages of affordable housing, and uneven access to services across communities remained the main problems.

The reassessment of local history, language policy, and memorial spaces continued. Language practices, interpretations of historical heritage, the transfer of religious communities between denominations, and differing experiences of the war remained subjects of public debate. The rights of the Hungarian and Romanian minorities persisted as a topic of discussion through interstate dialogue and Ukraine's EU accession negotiations.

Reports of violations during mobilisation and high-profile corruption cases had the greatest impact on public trust in national and local institutions. Public criticism focused on possible abuses of authority, failures to follow procedures, corrupt intermediation, and the treatment of citizens. Communities continued to provide basic services and implement social programmes, but tensions lingered over the cost of living, housing, mobilisation, and certain decisions by the authorities.

I. TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS

(DONETSK, ZAPORIZHZHIA, AND KHERSON OBLASTS)

1. Changes in the system of governance

In May and June 2026, the occupying authorities continued to integrate the temporarily occupied areas into the administrative, legal, and political framework of the RF. Their decisions concerned the restructuring of staff within occupying authorities, the redistribution of property, the subordination of education and social services to Russian rules, and preparations for elections to the State Duma of the RF.

The system of governance operated amid a socio-economic and humanitarian crisis. The occupying administrations were forced to acknowledge problems with electricity and water supplies, fuel availability, shortages of health care workers, and the provision of basic necessities. However, they blamed these problems on the hostilities and Ukraine. Administrative control and pressure on local residents also intensified.

1.1. Decisions of occupying authorities

>> PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA OF THE RF

In May, preparations for elections to Russia's State Duma in the occupied areas entered the preliminary voting stage, with the ruling United Russia party holding its primaries. The primaries took place in the occupied parts of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts and were accompanied by propaganda events and claims that the electoral infrastructure was ready.

In the occupied part of Donetsk oblast, 55 prospective candidates [were reported](#), although the full list was not published. Meanwhile, representatives of the occupying administration [inspected](#) polling stations. [Following](#) the preliminary vote held in Kherson oblast from 25 to 31 May, Olena Dmytruk, First Deputy Chair of the occupation-imposed Kherson oblast Duma, was declared the winner in the single-member constituency, while Yevhen Soboliev, Head of the Russia-installed directorate of the Federal Penitentiary Service in occupied Kherson oblast, led the party list.

Within the same period, 20 candidates took part in online preliminary voting in the [occupied](#) part of Zaporizhzhia oblast, including in Melitopol. They included representatives of occupying authorities, local collaborators, Russian military personnel, and officials sent from the RF.

The composition of the candidate pool and the controlled manner in which the primaries were conducted indicated that candidates loyal to the occupying administrations were being selected. The campaign was intended to demonstrate the incorporation of the occupied areas into the Russian political framework and create an appearance of representation for the local population.

>> ZAPORIZHZHIA NPP

Within the monitoring period, the situation at Zaporizhzhia NPP deteriorated significantly. Previously, the main risk had been the instability of individual off-site power lines. In June, however, the plant completely lost its off-site power four times—on [3](#), [6](#), [10](#), and [20](#) June. This brought the total number of complete losses of off-site power at Zaporizhzhia NPP since the start of the full-scale invasion to twenty.

The longest outage [occurred](#) on 6 June and lasted more than 15 hours. During this period, emergency diesel generators powered the cooling systems for all six shutdown reactors. The other outages were linked to damage to substations and to off-site and on-site power lines.

The risks were compounded by shelling near Zaporizhzhia TPP, which played an important role in supplying power to Zaporizhzhia NPP. On 3 May, a drone [struck](#) the External Radiation Control Laboratory. In early June, IAEA observers [reported](#) heavy shelling near the TPP.

Repeated losses of off-site power and reliance on emergency diesel generators kept risks to nuclear and radiation safety high.

>> 'NATIONALISATION' OF HOUSING

The occupying authorities accelerated the incorporation of Ukrainian real estate into the Russian property registration system. According to the head of Rosreestr, the number of properties in the occupied areas entered in the Russian register [more than tripled](#) over 18 months, rising from 2 million to almost 7 million. The process covered the occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts. The mass inventory made it easier for properties to be subsequently declared 'ownerless' and transferred to occupying authorities.

The deadline for mandatory re-registration of property under Russian rules [was also brought forward](#) from 1 January 2028 to 1 July 2026. [Long queues](#), excessive workloads at the so-called multifunctional centres, and delays in processing documents made the procedure more difficult. Owners who had left the occupied areas, did not hold Russian documents, had not completed inheritance procedures, or had lost their title documents during the hostilities faced the greatest risk of losing their homes.

During the monitoring period, previously established mechanisms for seizing housing began to be applied more widely in practice. In the occupied part of Kherson oblast, more than 100 flats and houses declared 'ownerless' [were given](#) to specialists whom the occupying authorities were seeking to recruit to work in the area. The recipients included 31 health care workers. In this way, the occupying administration was creating a housing stock for doctors, teachers, and other workers using properties belonging to people who had left the occupied area.

>> DECLARED DEVELOPMENT AMID DEEPENING SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The occupying authorities maintained the appearance of socio-economic activity by announcing funding for urban improvements, health care institution repairs, and the construction of recreational areas and sports facilities. Specifically, in the occupied part of Kherson oblast, they [announced](#) that more than RUB 500 million would be allocated to such projects in six so-called municipal districts.

These announcements did not reflect the actual condition of essential services. Power supply disruptions persisted in Kherson oblast, the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky, Hola Prystan, and other riverside population centres deepened, and public utility infrastructure deteriorated further.

Problems were also reported at industrial enterprises. [According to](#) the National Resistance Center, some employees of the Dniprorudne Iron Ore Plant, Zaporizhzhia oblast, had not received their salaries since mid-April 2024. The occupying authorities reported that RUB 93 million in wage arrears had been paid, but employees said that the money had not reached their accounts. The National Resistance Center suggested that the funds may have been embezzled and that reports that the arrears had been settled may have been falsified.

Fuel supply problems worsened in the occupied part of Donetsk oblast. In Donetsk, the price of a litre of A-98 petrol reached RUB 200, while at some filling stations in Mariupol it reached RUB 350. In some places, fuel disappeared from sale altogether. The occupying authorities [attributed](#) the rising prices and supply disruptions to logistical difficulties, blaming the AFU.

Delayed salary payments, rising fuel prices and shortages, and infrastructure disruptions contrasted with claims of development in the occupied areas. The announced projects also served a propaganda function by presenting Russian governance as supposedly effective.

>> DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE

In May, further expansion of digital surveillance came to light. [Under Roskomnadzor Order](#) No. 1174 of 16 December 2025, more than 1,350 telecommunications operators were required to provide users' IP address data and track changes to devices' so-called 'digital passports'. Formally, these requirements were presented as measures to counter cyberattacks and telephone fraud. In practice, they enabled tighter control over internet

traffic, the identification of individual users, and restrictions on tools used to circumvent blocking. For residents of the occupied areas, this increased the risk of surveillance and persecution for pro-Ukrainian activity or the use of independent sources of information.

2. Humanitarian situation

The humanitarian situation in the temporarily occupied areas continued to deteriorate. In Kherson oblast, problems previously concentrated mainly in riverside communities also spread to areas farther from the line of contact. Disruptions to electricity and water supplies, shortages of fuel, food, and certain goods, unstable communications, and transport disruptions restricted access to basic services.

The situation remained most acute in Oleshky, Hola Prystan, Stara Zburivka, Nova Zburivka, and the surrounding villages. Much of the critical infrastructure had been destroyed, stable electricity and gas supplies were unavailable, and the delivery of food, medicines, and humanitarian assistance was severely restricted. According to the Ukrainian authorities, around 6,000 people [remained](#) in the affected communities, including almost 200 children.

In May, the evacuation of residents from occupied Kherson oblast was discussed during [talks](#) with the Russian side and consultations with international organisations. Ukrainian government agencies [received](#) more than 220 evacuation requests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Coordination Headquarters [launched](#) consultations with the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross on possible arrangements for evacuating residents.

The evacuation had not begun by June because [Russia](#) had not agreed to a ceasefire that would allow civilians to leave safely. Residents continued to leave dangerous areas on their own. Almost no food [was delivered](#) to Oleshky, health care services remained difficult to access, and, at the beginning of the month, a convoy transporting food and humanitarian assistance [hit](#) a mine. For the first time, a representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [publicly acknowledged](#) the severity of the situation, but the Russian side blamed Ukraine.

In the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia oblast, [disruptions](#) to water and electricity supplies, [fuel shortages](#), and difficulties obtaining certain medicines persisted. Logistics disruptions and restrictions on fuel sales impeded residents' movement, transport operations, and the supply of goods. Access to free health care and certain social payments [remained](#) conditional on possession of a Russian passport and other Russian documents.

Staff shortages in the health care system worsened in the occupied part of Kherson oblast. The occupying authorities [reported](#) an overall shortage of more than 1,800 staff, while only 47% of doctors' posts in health care institutions were filled. The Russian Zemstvo Doctor and Zemstvo Paramedic programmes were used to recruit specialists, but only 40 workers were expected to be recruited through them in 2026. Shortages of staff, equipment, and the necessary facilities meant that some patients had to be referred to other health care institutions, including cancer patients who were sent to occupied Melitopol. The local health care system did not meet existing needs and depended on specialists and resources from the RF and neighbouring occupied areas.

2.1. Actions of occupying authorities regarding recruitment into armed formations

In spring, the occupying authorities began to involve local businesses more actively in military recruitment campaigns. The Yellow Ribbon movement [reported](#) that entrepreneurs in Berdiansk, Zaporizhzhia oblast, were forced to pay for and display so-called 'public service advertisements' promoting contract service in the Russian army on building façades, advertising structures, and in other public spaces. Those who refused were threatened with inspections, problems with permits, and other forms of administrative pressure.

3. Work on identity

3.1. Changes in education standards

In May and June, the occupying authorities continued to restructure the educational environment in line with Russian standards. A new development was the [introduction](#) of so-called education advisers in schools and colleges under the Navigators of Childhood project. Their role was to involve schoolchildren in Russian youth organisations, conduct educational and propaganda activities, and foster loyalty to the RF. Ideological work was thus effectively established as a distinct component of the activities of educational institutions.

From 1 September, schools in the occupied areas [planned to introduce](#) new Russian history textbooks for fifth to seventh graders, along with a new subject entitled 'My Family' for [first graders](#). The materials were designed to promote the Russian interpretation of history, so-called traditional values, and a sense of belonging to Russian society.

Control over learning outside school also intensified. In Melitopol, [private history tutors](#) were forced to undergo 'retraining' and teach exclusively using Russian curricula. Inspections were carried out with the involvement of the occupying education department and representatives of Russia's Federal Security Service. Meanwhile, parents faced obstacles when attempting to [transfer](#) their children from schools with cadet classes to other educational institutions.

The militarisation of education also expanded through camps and youth organisations. More than 900 teenagers from the occupied areas [underwent training](#) at the Russian Time of Young Heroes camp, where they were taught basic military skills, drone operation, and tactical medicine. In Melitopol and Berdiansk, children aged 12 to 17 were also [involved](#) in the Yunflot project and so-called naval training camps. The [transfer](#) of orphaned children to Russia under the guise of recreation remained a separate risk, as they were subsequently involved in military-patriotic programmes.

Ideological influence was exerted simultaneously through curricula, teachers' activities, extracurricular events, and youth organisations. Military training for children and teenagers was central to this system.

3.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum affairs, holidays and their celebration

Ahead of 9 May, which Russia marks as the anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in what it calls the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45, public-sector employees and students in Melitopol were required to wear ribbons of Saint George. The date was used to promote Russian historical narratives and compel public displays of loyalty, while the ribbons symbolised Russian imperial military glory. The Yellow Ribbon movement [reported](#) that residents were threatened with fines for refusing to comply or wearing the ribbon 'incorrectly'.

The redesign of public space continued in the occupied part of Kherson oblast. The occupying administration [announced](#) a competition to design new entrance signs featuring Russian state and local symbols. These structures were intended to be installed at the entrances to cities to reinforce the visible Russian presence and create the impression that the occupied areas belonged to the RF.

II. FRONTLINE AND DE-OCCUPIED AREAS

(DNIPROPETROVSK, DONETSK, ZAPORIZHZHIA, MYKOLAIV, KHARKIV, KHERSON, AND CHERNIHIV OBLASTS)

1. Changes in the system of governance

In May–June, the system of governance in frontline and de-occupied areas remained operational. In Donetsk oblast, continuity of governance was ensured through a system of military administrations at oblast, raion, and local levels. The oblast authorities and the administrations of communities in Ukrainian government-controlled areas continued to operate within Donetsk oblast, while the administrations of occupied communities and some oblast-level authorities worked through hubs in Dnipro and Kyiv. Personnel changes also took place within the monitoring period: a new Head of Avdiivka City Military Administration [was appointed](#), along with new heads of the oblast departments of [economy](#) and health care.

Staff shortages also became apparent in the law enforcement system in Kherson oblast. Previously, shortages had been felt most acutely in health care, public utility services, and local government bodies. In June, however, they were cited as one of the reasons for delays in investigations into possible abuses during the construction of underground schools. Slow progress in high-profile investigations risked undermining trust in government institutions.

The war continued to place pressure on representative bodies. Kherson Oblast Council held no plenary sessions in June, while 11 out of the 34 members of Kakhovka City Council had already [resigned](#) before the end of their terms. Because of the occupation, restrictions imposed under martial law, and the inability of members of local councils to perform their duties fully, local councils had progressively less influence on decision-making.

Problems also arose in the work of the local council in Pivdennoukrainsk community, Mykolaiv oblast. The prolonged failure to hold council sessions and the growing backlog of unresolved issues prompted discussion of [establishing](#) a city military administration.

Military administrations maintained continuity of governance in frontline and de-occupied areas. However, staff shortages, the diminishing role of local councils, political instability in some communities, and reports of possible abuses gradually widened the gap between residents and decision-making authorities.

1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

>> SECURITY

One of the new features of the security situation in Kherson oblast was the spread of FPV drone attacks to areas previously considered relatively far from the line of contact. In response, the oblast authorities [strengthened](#) protection for roads, public transport, bus stops, and critical infrastructure.

In May, the authorities in Zaporizhzhia oblast [announced](#) the testing of a new air defence system. The network of anti-drone tunnels was also expanded: as of mid-May, their total length exceeded 200 km. These structures were installed in Bilenke community, among other locations, to protect logistics routes and civilian movement.

In Zaporizhzhia, anti-drone netting also began to be [installed](#) at public transport stops, and there were plans to [install](#) 50 modular concrete shelters. Vehicles operated by Kushuhum community [were being equipped](#) with electronic warfare systems, drone detectors, and surveillance equipment.

Mine contamination remained a major challenge. On 24 June, a Russian [strike](#) on a Norwegian People's Aid facility in Kherson oblast killed two Ukrainian employees of the organisation and injured four others. Following the attack, Norwegian People's Aid suspended its ongoing demining operations in Ukraine to assess staff safety. A prolonged suspension of this work could slow the clearance of contaminated areas and the recovery of affected communities.

Since the launch of the government programme, more than 29,500 hectares of agricultural land had been cleared of [mines](#) in Kharkiv oblast. Priority was given to energy and critical infrastructure facilities, housing, agricultural land, roads, and utility networks. As of late June, pyrotechnic units of the [SESU](#) had found and disposed of 32,561 pieces of explosive ordnance in Mykolaiv oblast. Overall, around 38% of the oblast's territory, or 1.2 million hectares, was considered potentially hazardous, with agricultural land accounting for 22%.

The number of protective structures also continued to grow. Around 5,000 civil protection shelters [were registered](#) in Kharkiv oblast. A further 52 facilities had been registered since the beginning of 2026, while local budgets provided for expenditure of more than UAH 689 million on the construction, reconstruction, and repair of protective structures.

In Mykolaiv, access to shelters remained a pressing issue because of regular air attacks. Information on their locations was available on the official website of the City Council. In Dnipro, an interactive shelter map was added to the [eDnipro](#) mobile app, helping residents find the nearest protective structure more quickly during an air-raid alert. However, shelter maps and lists alone did not show whether there were enough shelters or whether the individual facilities were in adequate technical condition.

>> OPERATION OF ESSENTIAL MUNICIPAL SERVICES

Access to basic services declined in frontline communities, while preparations for the heating season in relatively safer cities moved into the implementation phase, with work under way and additional equipment being installed.

As of 30 June, the average readiness of facilities in Donetsk oblast for the heating season [stood](#) at 44%, with 762 of the planned 1,748 facilities prepared. The oblast authorities reviewed challenges affecting preparations in Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Oleksandrivka, and Novodonetske communities.

By contrast, access to services in Druzhkivka declined markedly during June. Systematic Russian shelling led to the suspension of gas supplies in Druzhkivka, Kindrativka, and Druzhkivske. The last permanent [Nova Poshta](#) and [Ukrposhta](#) branches in the city also closed. With no regular public transport available, many residents found it difficult to access postal services in neighbouring population centres.

A total of 67 Points of Invincibility continued to [operate](#) in Donetsk oblast to support residents: 25 operated around the clock, 36 followed set schedules, and a further six were held in reserve. They had recorded almost 100,000 visits since the beginning of the year, indicating considerable demand for backup power, communications, and other basic services.

In late May, rising tariffs and public utility costs placed an additional financial burden on the population alongside existing security and humanitarian pressures. In Zaporizhzhia, a decision was adopted to increase tariffs for water supply and wastewater services, while fares on municipal transport rose to UAH 25 on 16 May. In Dnipro, a public utility company reported [disconnecting](#) water supplies to some customers with outstanding debts, while a substantial [increase](#) in water tariffs was under discussion in Kryvyi Rih. Access to services therefore depended not only on the condition of the networks but also on whether households could afford them.

Preparations for the next heating season increasingly involved the use of autonomous heat and power sources. Some of these measures were included in comprehensive resilience plans for oblasts and cities. Several cogeneration units were to be [commissioned](#) in Kherson oblast, and an additional modular boiler house was to be purchased. In Kharkiv, work continued to [create](#) 'energy islands', install modular boiler houses, and equip educational and health care institutions with solar panels and energy storage systems. In Mykolaiv, a project to [install](#) 18 modular boiler houses remained under way. The work plan of Chernihiv Oblast

Administration for Q3 [provided for](#) the installation and connection of modular boiler houses and cogeneration units.

In June, the comprehensive recovery of Mykolaiv's water supply system [was completed](#), including the construction of a new main water pipeline, pumping stations, and water treatment facilities. According to the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, almost 500,000 residents gained access to safe drinking water.

>> EVACUATION

Evacuations from frontline and border communities continued and expanded to cover more areas. Unsafe routes remained the main obstacle to leaving because of shelling, drone attacks, and damaged infrastructure.

Donetsk oblast continued to see the largest-scale evacuations, with around 9,500 people [leaving](#) during June. Most were evacuated from Kramatorsk and Sloviansk communities. In some population centres where roads and critical infrastructure had been destroyed, evacuations could be carried out only by emergency workers, the police, or the military.

In [Kherson oblast](#), evacuation efforts for families with children were stepped up. In [Kharkiv oblast](#), the list of communities covered by mandatory evacuation was expanded, while the transit centre in Lozova received between 150 and 250 people per day on average.

In [Chernihiv oblast](#), the Defence Council decided to launch the mandatory evacuation of residents from a further 12 border villages on 1 July. However, some residents [refused](#) to leave. The reasons cited included reluctance to relocate again, a perception that the security situation was relatively stable, and the absence of clear guarantees of housing and support after evacuation.

In [Zaporizhzhia oblast](#), evacuations mainly involved small groups of people from frontline population centres. In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, evacuation efforts focused on communities in the east and south-east of Synelnykove raion, notably [Shakhtarske](#) and [Mezhova](#) communities, while Pavlohrad served as a transit hub. In some communities, evacuation had already become a routine administrative function: decisions were made to evacuate children, the police urged residents to leave dangerous areas, and humanitarian routes operated regularly.

>> HOUSING RECOVERY

Compensation payments under the [eRecovery](#) programme continued in frontline areas. In [Kramatorsk](#), more than 6,000 claims for damaged and destroyed housing were approved, with a total value of over UAH 1 billion, or approximately EUR 19.5 million. Claims relating to homes in occupied communities, including [Siversk](#) community, also continued to be processed.

In [Kharkiv oblast](#), almost 48,100 claimants received more than UAH 4.8 billion, or approximately EUR 94 million, for repairs to damaged housing. More than 11,000 housing certificates for destroyed property, worth almost UAH 15 billion, or approximately EUR 295 million, were issued across 45 communities. Some recipients purchased new homes in the oblast, while others bought housing in other parts of Ukraine.

In [Chernihiv oblast](#), residents submitted almost 9,500 claims, of which 71% were approved. The total compensation awarded amounted to UAH 2.9 billion, and 873 homes were purchased using housing certificates. In border communities, homes were inspected remotely.

>> INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026 in Gdańsk provided an important platform for concluding new agreements. Kharkiv City Council [signed](#) loan and grant agreements with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development worth EUR 47 million to support municipal services and modernise the heat supply system. Also, a memorandum [was signed](#) with UNICEF on the development of social, education, health care, and infrastructure projects.

Zaporizhzhia [signed](#) a memorandum with Advantage Ukraine on the provision of modular boiler houses. The city was also negotiating with international partners on support for energy, water supply, civil protection, and social infrastructure.



Mykolaiv CMA and NEFCO [signed](#) a memorandum providing for more than EUR 40 million in grant support from Denmark and Sweden. The funding was to support energy efficiency, renewable energy, the modernisation of water and heat supply systems, street lighting, and other projects in communities across the oblast.

Chernihiv OMA and Enabel [signed](#) a memorandum on the implementation of 13 education and health care projects worth almost EUR 20 million. Chernihiv community continued to develop its long-term partnership with the Belgian municipality of Grimbergen.

Kherson oblast [concluded](#) a grant agreement with UNICEF on a groundwater study and the preparation of a map of water resources in its communities. Kherson also [signed](#) a partnership agreement with the Polish city of Gdynia, while the oblast signed a memorandum on the provision of modular boiler houses.

The Conference gave communities an opportunity to present their projects and conclude agreements specifying areas of cooperation and funding amounts. However, many of the agreements remained at the memorandum stage and required further preparation, approval of funding, and practical implementation.

>> COUNTERING FAKE NEWS

Within the monitoring period, a Russian narrative alleging the mass resettlement of labour migrants to Ukraine [became](#) widespread. AI-generated videos and tens of thousands of near-identical social media posts claimed that '4 million migrants' were set to 'replace Ukrainians'. The campaign sought to heighten fear, fuel xenophobic sentiment, and undermine trust within Ukrainian society. According to the Institute of Mass Information, some Ukrainian media outlets also contributed to the spread of this narrative through emotionally charged and clickbait headlines. Against this backdrop, Dnipro's official Telegram channel, Stop Fake Dnipro, [continued to operate](#). It debunked false reports, provided information from official sources, and urged residents to verify the information they received.

In May, false reports [circulated](#) in Kharkiv oblast claiming that Borova had been captured and that Russian forces were advancing towards Shevchenkove. Propaganda outlets supported these claims with video footage that had in fact been recorded in Luhansk oblast and was unrelated to Borova community. Representatives of the local military administration dismissed the reports as false.

2. Work on identity

2.1. Changes in education standards

In May and June, the education network was reorganised in response to declining numbers of schoolchildren and preparations for the reform of specialised secondary education. Communities also continued to expand opportunities for safe face-to-face and blended learning.

Transformation of the education network. Kherson community continued its large-scale restructuring of the education network. Starting 1 September 2026, 71 preschool, general secondary, and extracurricular education institutions [were due](#) to suspend operations, with children transferred to other institutions. The city authorities [attributed](#) the changes to declining enrolment and the specialised secondary education reform, stressing that the measures were intended to adapt the education network rather than permanently close schools. Nevertheless, the scale of the planned suspensions indicated a substantial reduction in the community's education network.

In Zaporizhzhia, draft decisions [were prepared](#) to merge seven schools, gymnasiums, and lyceums with other education institutions. Their average enrolment rate was around 42%, and none had more than 300 schoolchildren. However, the future employment of teaching staff and the use of the vacated premises remained uncertain.

A decline in the number of schoolchildren was particularly pronounced in Donetsk oblast. Most of the oblast's 215 schools continued to operate remotely, while the number of schoolchildren had fallen by more than half, from 168,000 at the end of the 2021/2022 academic year to 64,000 in 2026. Following the sharp decline in 2022, the oblast lost approximately 10,000 schoolchildren each year.



Safety and learning formats. Access to face-to-face learning continued to depend on the availability of shelters. Classes [were suspended](#) in Kushuhum community, Zaporizhzhia oblast, because of the deteriorating security situation. In Zaporizhzhia, work began on applying [shatter-resistant film](#) to around 6,000 windows in education institutions.

Kharkiv [had](#) 22 safe learning sites, including underground schools, radiation shelters, and learning spaces in metro stations. Of the 54,000 schoolchildren living in the city, around 22,000 were enrolled in blended learning. In Mykolaiv oblast, [work continued](#) to equip schools and kindergartens with shelters using funding from local budgets and [international partners](#).

Distance learning remained in place in communities without sufficient protective structures. The situation was most difficult in areas regularly subjected to shelling, including Nikopol and Synelnykove raions in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

New curricula. In Chernihiv oblast, more than 11,000 schoolchildren [completed](#) two years of study under the updated Defence of Ukraine curriculum. More than 30 practical training hubs were established across the oblast and equipped with training devices, simulators, and equipment for teaching first aid, mine safety, and civil protection.

2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum affairs, holidays and their celebration

Politics of memory focused primarily on commemorating the experience of resistance, preserving cultural heritage, and developing new commemorative practices.

Commemorative dates and practices. A specialised committee of Kherson Oblast Council [supported](#) the proposal to designate the 5th of March as Kherson Oblast Resistance Day. Kherson community also [presented](#) its first Book of Remembrance dedicated to fallen defenders. A memorial 'The Heart That Waits', dedicated to the families of prisoners of war and people missing in action, [was unveiled](#) in Chornobaivka community. Unlike traditional military memorials, it highlighted waiting, hope, and support for families who continued to search for their loved ones. Such initiatives broadened commemorative practices beyond honouring those killed to include the experiences of families facing an uncertain wait for news of their loved ones.

Preservation of cultural heritage. Preserving the memory of Kherson oblast's cultural heritage became a separate area of work. A graphic novel entitled 'Walls' [was presented](#) in Kherson. The project offered a new way of presenting local history and the community's connection with the cultural heritage of areas that remained occupied or had suffered destruction. It featured the home of artist Polina Raiko, renowned for its naïve-style artwork inspired by Ukrainian folk culture, which was lost in the flooding caused by Kakhovka dam destruction in June 2023. The graphic novel also covered Tiahyn Fortress, Nova Kakhovka's 'stone embroideries', and the researchers and activists who had worked to preserve these heritage sites.



Figure 1. The lost murals of artist Polina Raiko's house museum in Oleshky, which was submerged following the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam by Russian forces.

Source: <https://ukraineartnews.com/news/news/budinok-muzej-polini-rajko--pid-vodoju>

In Kramatorsk, Donetsk oblast, the evacuation of smaller monuments and sculptural compositions **began** because of the deteriorating security situation. Monuments to Taras Shevchenko, Leonid Bykov, and Vasyl Stus, along with several garden sculptures, were removed from the city. Ways of protecting other objects without dismantling them were being considered.

Local and digital forms of commemoration. An exhibition entitled 'The Heart That Raised a Hero', dedicated to the mothers of fallen defenders, **was opened** on Khortytsia. In Orikhiv, the city entrance sign destroyed by Russian shelling **was restored**, marking an important symbolic step for the frontline community.

In Dnipro, work **continued** to expand the city's WAR (ВІЙНА) platform, which, as of June, contained information on 742 fallen local service members. In Pokrov, Nikopol raion, a memorial bench honouring a fallen defender **was installed** at a lyceum.

2.3. Freedom of religion

The situation of religious communities in parishes across frontline areas deteriorated primarily because of Russian attacks on places of worship. In Kherson oblast, the Church of Saints Borys and Hlib of the UOC (MP) in Darivka community was completely **destroyed**, while the Holy Spirit Cathedral in Kherson, which also belonged to the UOC (MP), was **damaged** once again.

On 17 May, a mosque in Dnipro **sustained** extensive damage in a Russian strike. Around 50 windows and ten doors were shattered, while the façade and interior structures were damaged. No one on the mosque premises was injured, and the religious community stated that the mosque would remain open.

Russian attacks on churches and mosques made life more difficult for religious communities. Damage to places of worship restricted religious services and deprived believers of familiar spaces for social interaction and mutual support.

3. Joint action

3.1. Cooperation at the community–authorities level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

>> NEEDS OF WAR VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES

In May–June, communities strengthened cooperation between institutions and organisations supporting war veterans. In Kherson oblast, the Obiednannia Charitable Foundation [held](#) strategic sessions in six communities. Their readiness for veteran reintegration was assessed against 46 indicators, key gaps were identified, and action plans were developed for the next two years. Particular attention was given to the veteran pathway and coordination between the authorities, health care and social institutions, and civil society organisations.

In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, war veterans could [receive](#) vouchers worth more than UAH 30,000 to train for a new profession. Training and sports activities were held under the TytanyUA project, which also provided information on employment and business start-up support.

Marun Hub, a space for military personnel and civilians, [opened](#) in Dnipro. The hub was intended to host veteran and educational events, meetings, technology training, and joint projects involving civil society organisations and young people.

Veteran-led civic and business initiatives were supported in Mykolaiv oblast. In Voznesensk community, organisations [were being selected](#) for a grant programme covering the establishment of veteran-owned businesses, employment, and service development. In Mykolaiv, veteran Viktoriia Zavodskova [opened](#) the Happy Kids Child Health and Development Centre, having secured a UAH 500,000 government grant and additional funding.

>> SUPPORT FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND ECONOMIC RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES

Within the monitoring period, platforms for communication between the authorities and entrepreneurs continued to operate. In Zaporizhzhia oblast, the Dialogue Between Government and Business project included [discussion](#) of ways to bring people aged 50 and over into the labour market as a means of reducing staff shortages. In Mykolaiv oblast, the platform was used both for consultations and to provide information on financial support. In June, entrepreneurs [were presented](#) with updated terms of an oblast programme offering up to UAH 200,000, including funding for equipment that had yet to be purchased. Other meetings covered the [requirements](#) of environmental legislation and the rules for [employing](#) seasonal and part-time workers.

As the role of representative bodies diminished, the authorities of Kherson sought to develop alternative mechanisms for involving stakeholders in governance. The [formation](#) of an Entrepreneurs' Council of Kherson community was the clearest example. Business representatives were expected to participate in discussions on local economic recovery and measures to support entrepreneurship. The Council's significance would depend on whether decision-makers took its proposals into account.

>> HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

UNHCR [changed](#) its approach to providing multipurpose cash assistance. Priority was given not simply to people with IDP status but to those recently evacuated because of shelling or evacuation orders, households affected by attacks, and the most vulnerable IDPs and residents of frontline areas. Evacuees were required to apply within 45 days of leaving their homes. In other cases, eligibility was determined based on income, household composition, living conditions, and additional vulnerability factors. This approach made it possible to prioritise support for those who had suffered the greatest losses, while limiting access to payments for some other applicants.

4. Changes in the social structure

4.1. Challenges related to the situation of women, children, and people with disabilities

The delivery ward at Sloviansk [Maternity Hospital](#) had not reopened following a Russian strike. The hospital's other two wards continued to operate, allowing women to receive consultations and other health care services. For planned deliveries, women were advised to contact health care institutions in safer parts of Ukraine in advance, although medical staff could provide the necessary assistance locally in emergencies.

Since the beginning of the year, around 2,700 people affected by [domestic violence](#) had received support in Dnipro. A mobile team made more than 1,000 visits, 433 people sought assistance from the day centre, and 16 women and 11 children were temporarily accommodated in the crisis room.

Free [social taxi](#) services continued to operate in Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Kamianske, and Pokrov, Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Almost 800 persons with disabilities had used the services since the beginning of the year. In Mykolaiv, a [specialised vehicle](#) for transporting wheelchair users was added to the social transport fleet. The vehicle, donated by the International Rescue Committee, was transferred to the municipal Territorial Centre for Social Services.

The distribution of [food parcels](#) started in Zaporizhzhia under the Care Nearby project. More than 700 people aged 60 and over received assistance on the first day, while more than 20,000 residents of the oblast registered for the programme overall. Home delivery was arranged for recipients with limited mobility and persons with disabilities.

4.2. Needs of displaced persons. Response

In May and June, housing remained one of the main needs of IDPs. The housing voucher scheme for IDPs from temporarily occupied areas entered the implementation phase nationwide. As of 20 June, 3,000 families [had purchased](#) homes under the programme. A total of 342 vouchers worth UAH 682.8 million, or approximately EUR 13.4 million, were issued in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. More than 100 housing vouchers had already been used in Mykolaiv and Kharkiv oblasts. During the initial phase, however, the programme was available only to war veterans and persons with war-related disabilities who had left the occupied areas.

For most displaced people, the main options continued to be rented flats, dormitories, modular homes, and temporary accommodation facilities. The housing stock in Mykolaiv oblast was gradually expanded, with the first 14 modular homes installed in [Pervomaisk](#). The initiative envisaged the construction of 50 such homes together with the necessary infrastructure. In Kharkiv oblast, new waves of evacuation placed additional pressure on transit centres and dormitories. In June, the transit centre in [Kharkiv](#) received around 120 people daily. Overall, the available options mainly provided temporary accommodation, while affordable long-term housing remained scarce.

Particular attention was also given to employment and self-employment among displaced people. In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, more than 200 IDPs [received](#) grants to start or develop their own businesses. Between December 2024 and June 2026, Ukrainian Energy Machines employed 44 IDPs in [Kharkiv oblast](#), while compensation for their wage costs exceeded UAH 1.2 million. As of 19 May, the employment service helped 60 IDPs find jobs in [Chernihiv oblast](#), including in retail, agriculture, food services, health care, accounting, and other sectors. However, these figures reflected the results of individual programmes only and did not provide a basis for assessing the overall employment needs of displaced people.

4.3. Mobilisation processes. Response

In May, the government [updated](#) the rules for reserving employees of critically important enterprises

from mobilisation. To confirm an enterprise's status and reserve an employee, the employee was required to earn an average monthly salary of at least UAH 25,941, equivalent to three minimum wages. A lower threshold of UAH 21,618 remained in place for enterprises in frontline areas. Employees who already had a deferment, as well as those working more than one job, would be counted at only one place of employment. Ministries, other central authorities, and oblast military administrations were required to review their criteria for critically important enterprises within one month and, over the following three months, verify the status of enterprises already designated as critically important. Existing enterprise statuses and employee reservations remained valid until the review was completed.

On 25 June, Donetsk OMA [amended](#) its oblast-level criteria. The main list of requirements remained unchanged. However, the nature of the amendments meant that enterprises previously granted critically important status were not guaranteed automatic renewal of that status.

As of 1 May, 213 enterprises, institutions, and organisations in Donetsk oblast held critically important status [granted](#) by Donetsk OMA, ten more than in early April. These included public utility companies, health care and social institutions, education and sports institutions, transport operators, and private companies. The list did not cover every critically important enterprise in the oblast, as some decisions were made by the relevant ministries and other public authorities.

For public utility companies, health care institutions, and other organisations vital to the operation of frontline communities, employee reservation remained one way of retaining the necessary staff despite regular shelling.

III. RELATIVELY REAR AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

(VINNYTSIA, ZAKARPATTIA, LVIV, ODESA, AND CHERNIVTSI OBLASTS)

1. Changes in the system of governance

On 6 May, Chornomorsk Mayor Vasyl Hulciaiev [announced](#) his decision to join the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He stressed that he did not intend to step down from office. However, combining military service with leading the community created uncertainty over how administrative responsibilities and accountability would be divided in practice. This was particularly significant given Chornomorsk's role as a port community important to maritime logistics, exports, and the oblast's economy.

1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

>> CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENERGY RESILIENCE

In Vinnytsia community, the total capacity of solar power plants [increased](#) from 25.36 MW in early May to 26.25 MW in June. The city authorities continued to [partly cover](#) businesses' costs for equipment used to generate electricity from renewable sources. On 25 June, Vinnytsia's experience in decentralised power generation, equipment redundancy, and the rapid restoration of power grids [was presented](#) at the European Energy Transition Conference in Dijon, France. City representatives also discussed seeking new partners and implementing joint projects to maintain the operation of critical urban systems amid wartime threats.

Zakarpattia oblast authorities supported the development of wind farms as an additional source of electricity and revenue for community budgets. However, these projects also prompted debate over their impact on natural areas, compliance with environmental requirements, and the transparency of project approval procedures.

In Bukovyna, organisational arrangements [were being made](#) for a new electricity link between Ukraine and Romania. The project envisaged the construction of the 110 kV Porubne–Siret overhead power line, which would enable Ukraine to import electricity from Romania in the event of a shortage.

>> PRISONERS OF WAR, MISSING PERSONS AND SUPPORT FOR THEIR FAMILIES

Prisoner exchanges continued in May and June. [On 15 May](#), 205 Ukrainian defenders returned from Russian captivity, of whom 194 had been held since 2022. A further 186 people were released [on 5 June](#): 185 service members and one civilian. More than half had been captured during the defence of Mariupol. [On 26 June](#), another 160 defenders returned home. All had been held since 2022, including 115 who had been captured during the defence of Mariupol. Following their return, those released underwent medical examinations, treatment and rehabilitation, and had their documents restored.

Public rallies also continued in support of those who remained in captivity or were considered missing. In Chernivtsi, the Don't Be Silent! Captivity Kills! rally was held every Sunday in Central Square. Participants raised awareness of prisoners of war and missing persons and drew attention to the situation of their families.

Bukovyna OMA [expanded](#) its Mandroterapiia (travel-based therapy) project to include new groups of participants. While its activities had previously focused mainly on war veterans and service members, families of fallen and missing defenders joined the programme in June. The programme was intended to provide emotional respite and support to women coping with loss or uncertainty over the fate of their loved ones.

>> INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026 in Gdańsk, discussed in the previous section, also became an important platform for relatively rear areas. Their representatives used the Conference to conclude new agreements, secure funding, and present community development projects.

Lviv signed six agreements with partners from Lithuania, Sweden, Czechia, Germany, and France. They [provided for](#) more than EUR 2.5 million in support for Saint Nicholas Children's Hospital, UNBROKEN University programmes, the modernisation of the heat supply system, and the installation of heat pumps. Separate memoranda concerned the establishment of a German Desk, preparing communities for investment projects, and the possible expansion of foreign companies' operations in Lviv. Oblast representatives also [discussed](#) cooperation with Warmian–Masurian Voivodeship on veteran rehabilitation, health care, humanitarian support, and security.

Zakarpattia OMA [signed](#) a memorandum with KUNBA, a South Korean organisation, on the implementation of a Smart Village model. The model envisaged the use of digital and energy-efficient solutions and modern technologies in agriculture, health care, education, and local infrastructure. The next stage was to identify communities in which the project would be piloted. Specific funding amounts had not yet been determined.

International forums in Odesa. In May, Odesa remained an important international platform for discussions on security in the Black Sea area. On 29–30 May, the third [Black Sea Security Forum](#) brought together more than 1,200 participants from Ukraine, European countries, and the US. Discussions focused on Black Sea security, international support for Ukraine, and the future security architecture of the wider Black Sea area.

The [Ukrainian Danube Conference 2026](#), dedicated to the development of Ukraine's Danube area, was held in Odesa on 29 May. Representatives of governmental agencies, businesses, the expert community, and international partners discussed transport corridors, Danube ports, shipping, water resources, energy, environmental security, and the area's integration into EU logistics networks.

Cross-border infrastructure. Work [continued](#) in Vinnytsia oblast to develop the Bronnytsia–Unguri border crossing point between Ukraine and Moldova. As of 24 June, more than half of the planned work had been completed, modular service facilities and a passenger-processing pavilion for bus travellers had been installed, and the government had earmarked more than UAH 150 million for the project.

>> INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION

A new area of interregional cooperation was a pilot project entitled '[Carpathian Change](#)', which brought together 13 oblasts. In June, Zakarpattia, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Chernivtsi oblasts hosted children aged 9–12 from frontline areas. Overall, the programme was expected to reach more than 1,700 children and combined safe recreation, psychological support, sports, and team activities.

Cooperation also continued under the Shoulder to Shoulder: Cohesive Communities initiative. Khotyn community hosted children from Polohy community, Zaporizhzhia oblast, [for the second time](#), while [Velykyi Kuchuriv](#) community hosted children from Sartana community, Donetsk oblast. Zastavna community, Chernivtsi oblast, and Chornomorsk community, Odesa oblast, formally [established their partnership](#) through a memorandum. Pustomyty community, Lviv oblast, and Andriashivka community, Sumy oblast, [signed](#) a new cooperation agreement. Education, cultural, and recreational programmes for children from border areas remained an important focus of the partnership.

>> TARIFF POLICY AND ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICES

In May and June, public transport and public utility tariffs were revised or came under review in several cities. The reasons cited included higher electricity, fuel, and material costs, rising expenditure on network maintenance, and losses incurred by utility companies.

Public transport fares in [Lviv](#) increased from 16 May. The fare was UAH 23 with a LeoCard or via the mobile app, UAH 26 with a bank card, and UAH 30 in cash. Students using a personalised LeoCard paid UAH 11.50. In June, [Vinnytsia authorities](#) published draft new fares for municipal transport. The proposal provided for a single fare of UAH 25 on trams, trolleybuses, and buses from 1 August, compared with the existing fares of UAH 12–15. It also envisaged approximately doubling the cost of monthly travel passes. As of late June, the decision had not yet been approved.

Water supply and wastewater tariffs also rose. In [Chernivtsi](#), the combined tariff reached UAH 63.56 per cubic metre from 1 June. Chernivtsivodokanal [said](#) the tariff revision was necessary because electricity, fuel, and labour costs had risen substantially, while households had continued to pay a tariff approved in 2021 since the beginning of 2022. Despite the higher tariff, emergency water supply interruptions continued across the city, and the company still required significant support from the municipal budget. Chernivtsivodokanal also continued to disconnect [customers in arrears](#). To have the service restored, customers had to clear the arrears in full and pay a separate reconnection fee.

On 19 June, [Vinnytsia](#) Oblast Council approved new tariffs for the municipal enterprise Vinnytsiaoblvodokanal, which took effect on 1 July. The combined cost of water supply and wastewater services more than tripled, rising from UAH 25.62 to UAH 81.01 per cubic metre. The company explained that the revision reflected higher electricity and chemical reagent prices, as well as the growing cost of maintaining ageing networks.

>> HIGH-PROFILE CASES

One of the most high-profile developments in Odesa oblast was the [detention](#) of Kiliia Mayor Viacheslav Cherniavskiy on 26 May. According to investigators, he was suspected of demanding USD 35,000 from a representative of a foreign-invested company that planned to build a wind farm. In return, he allegedly promised to ensure that the necessary permits were approved without obstruction. On 28 May, the [court](#) remanded him in custody with bail set at UAH 41.6 million. The case attracted particular attention because it concerned an energy project important for the development of local power generation.

The situation surrounding former Odesa Mayor Hennadii Trukhanov also remained in the public spotlight. On 7 May, the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine [examined](#) the circumstances in which he had been stripped of Ukrainian citizenship. Trukhanov claimed that the decision had been politically motivated. The case remained part of the oblast's political and public agenda.

In May and June, law enforcement agencies in Bukovyna issued a series of notices of suspicion concerning the alleged misuse of public funds and state property. These included [investigations](#) into possible abuses during the construction of a bridge across the Prut in Marshyntsi, where the alleged losses exceeded UAH 2.5 million, and the [reconstruction](#) of the Krasnoilsk border crossing point, where the cost of the work may have been overstated by UAH 3.2 million. One of the largest cases concerned [alleged abuses](#) in the forestry sector. Investigators suspected that officials from Chornivske Forestry of the State Specialised Forest Enterprise 'Forests of Ukraine', together with a private entrepreneur and transport operators, used locals as nominal purchasers to obtain firewood under a preferential scheme and then resold it at a higher price. The proceeds from the alleged scheme were estimated at almost UAH 3 million. The officials were also suspected of transferring forest resources to favoured entrepreneurs without holding the mandatory auctions. The resulting environmental damage exceeded UAH 19 million. Nine people were served with notices of suspicion, while the total losses to the state and the environment were put at almost UAH 22 million. The investigation remained ongoing.

2. Work on identity

On 25 June, the Coordination Council on the Promotion of Ukrainian National and Civic Identity [met](#) in Vinnytsia oblast. Participants reviewed the activities carried out in 2025 and discussed further work on national-patriotic and civic education. Representatives of public authorities, educational institutions, civil society organisations, and the expert community took part in the discussion.



The findings of the [ODESA ID study](#) were presented in Odesa. The study examined residents' self-identification, language practices, civic participation, memory politics, and social attitudes. It found that the identity of Odesa residents was multilayered, with attachment to the city and a broader Ukrainian identity generally complementing rather than opposing one another. The full-scale war strengthened residents' identification with Ukraine, enhanced the importance of the Ukrainian language, and brought greater attention to the rethinking of urban space, although different groups experienced the changes brought about by the war in different ways. The city's multi-ethnic character was largely seen as an integral part of Ukrainian civic identity, while its imperial and Soviet legacies, language policy, and specific approaches to decolonisation remained subjects of debate. There was considerable support for commemorating those killed, although decisions on specific forms of memorialisation required the involvement of families, experts, and the wider community.

2.1. Changes in education standards

In Chernivtsi community, competitions for the positions of lyceum and gymnasium principals generated the greatest public controversy. The situation surrounding [Lyceum No. 9](#) was particularly contentious, with members of the school community challenging the outcome of the selection process. Following protests and public appeals, the city authorities [reconsidered](#) their earlier decision. The debate centred on the transparency of the competitions, confidence in the selection panels, and the training of new school management staff.

Preparations for the specialised secondary education reform also continued. Four lyceums in Chernivtsi oblast [were to receive](#) over UAH 30 million from the education subvention to create modern learning spaces. Meanwhile, the numbers of general secondary schools, schoolchildren, and teachers in Bukovyna continued to [decline](#). Compared with the 2021/2022 academic year, the number of schools fell from 349 to 331, the number of schoolchildren from 108,000 to 101,000, and the number of teachers from 12,000 to 11,300.

[Digitalisation](#) was a prominent area of development in Zakarpattia. 209 schools joined the Mriia educational ecosystem, and its services were used by around 30,000 students, parents, and educators.

[For the first time](#) in the 22-year history of Bukovynian Military Lyceum, eleven female cadets graduated from the institution. They had begun their studies in 2024.

2.2. Language policy

In the previous monitoring period, Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi community became the first in Odesa oblast to introduce a moratorium on the public use of Russian-language cultural products. In June, a similar initiative began to be considered in Odesa. Odesa City Council member Olha Kvasnitska [tabled](#) a proposal to restrict the public use of Russian-language music, films, theatrical productions, and literature in municipal, educational, and cultural institutions, on public transport, and in other public spaces. Private establishments were advised to refrain from using such content. As of late June, the decision had not been adopted and was scheduled for consideration in July.

In Odesa, the initiative fed into a broader debate about language policy and the decolonisation of public space. The city has long been shaped by complex interactions between language, culture, and identity, with Russian deeply embedded in everyday communication and in Odesa's urban mythology. The discussion also raised broader questions about the city's public identity during the war, particularly in the context of decolonisation and ongoing Russian attacks on Odesa and the oblast.

Checks and inspections on compliance with language legislation also continued. Following an [inspection](#) of the Odesa-based Masks Theatre, a representative of the State Language Protection Commissioner drew up four administrative offence reports. The violations included serving customers in Russian, selling Russian-language books when no Ukrainian-language editions were available, publishing Russian-language content on social media, and displaying Russian-language signs inside the theatre. Some of these issues were addressed during the inspection.

2.3. Politics of memory: place names, museum affairs, holidays and their celebration

Commemorating fallen service members remained the main focus of memory-related initiatives. In [Lviv](#), the installation of 23 memorial plaques in line with the approved municipal design was authorised. Communities in Bukovyna continued to unveil memorial plaques, [expand](#) their Alleys of Heroes, and install portraits of fallen service members. Chernivtsi also [launched](#) the Embroidered Ribbon of Remembrance campaign, inviting participants to leave embroidered ribbons at memorial sites and at places associated with fallen service members.

Another strand of this work focused on reassessing local history. On 19 May, a [procession](#) was held in Odesa to mark the 611th anniversary of the first written reference to the port of Khadjibey. The organisers emphasised the city's pre-imperial past and the need to move away from Russian interpretations of its history. The Odesa Archaeological Museum [announced](#) the revival of the Odesa Society of History and Antiquities, whose work was to focus on researching and promoting the history of the Northern Black Sea area.

In June, differing views of historical figures [affected](#) cooperation between Vinnytsia and its Polish sister city, Kielce. The dispute arose over the planned transfer of 15 decommissioned buses to Vinnytsia. Some members of Kielce City Council opposed the transfer, with one of them citing the existence of Stepan Bandera Street in Vinnytsia as one of his objections. After the issue attracted public attention, Vinnytsia withdrew its request to prevent the proposed assistance from becoming part of a political dispute or damaging relations between the two cities.

2.4. Freedom of religion

Disputes over religious communities transferring from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC (MP)) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) continued in Chernivtsi oblast. The situation in [Serbychany](#) was particularly prominent: supporters of joining the OCU and those wishing to [remain](#) under the jurisdiction of the UOC (MP) held separate meetings and adopted conflicting decisions. This reflected divisions within the community and the risk of further tensions over property, organisational, and symbolic issues.

Religious processions held despite a ban imposed by the Defence Council of Chernivtsi oblast in 2022 became another source of tension. Following a procession to Bancheny Monastery on 20–21 May, the police [filed](#) administrative offence reports against the organisers. In June, a similar report [was drawn up](#) against the organiser of a pilgrimage from Storozhynets to a monastery in Krasnoilsk, during which participants walked around 30 kilometres. The Romanian-language outlet [BucPress](#) questioned whether the ban was being applied consistently to different types of public gatherings.

An interfaith [solidarity event](#) held in Lviv following an attempted arson attack on the Hidayet Mosque provided a positive example of cooperation between religious groups. Representatives of Muslim communities, the OCU, the UGCC, the city authorities, and human rights organisations took part in the event and jointly condemned religious hatred.

2.5. National minorities

In May–June, the rights of the Hungarian minority were discussed against the backdrop of a change of government in Hungary. The Tisza Party's victory ended Viktor Orbán's 16-year tenure as prime minister, although Budapest continued to focus on the situation of Hungarian communities abroad. Péter Magyar's government continued to regard the linguistic, educational, and cultural rights of Hungarians in Zakarpattia as an important issue in relations with Ukraine, while the two sides [stepped up](#) expert consultations.

Ukraine [maintained](#) that the rights of the Hungarian community should be addressed within the framework of the Action Plan for the Protection of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities

(Communities) of Ukraine. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine [approved](#) the Action Plan on 14 May 2025 as part of Ukraine's commitments under the negotiating cluster 'Fundamentals of the Accession Process'. It covered all national minorities whose languages were official languages of the EU, rather than the Hungarian community alone. Following the talks, Hungary agreed to continue cooperation within this framework. Ukraine planned to implement some of the measures in 2026, particularly in education.

The resulting compromise enabled the first negotiating cluster, Fundamentals of the Accession Process, to [be opened](#) in June. On 23 June, however, Budapest [withheld](#) its support for the common position needed to open the next negotiating clusters swiftly. The rights of the Hungarian community therefore continued to influence Hungary's position on the pace of Ukraine's EU accession negotiations.

Education for the Romanian minority also remained on the bilateral agenda. At a meeting in Brussels, the Ukrainian and Romanian education ministers [discussed](#) maintaining access to Romanian-language upper secondary education in places where Romanian communities are concentrated. At the local level, cooperation [continued](#) in Boiany, where the Association of Teachers of the Romanian Ethnic Community in Ukraine entered into a partnership agreement with a school in Suceava County.

3. Joint action

3.1. Cooperation at the community–authorities level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

>> AID FOR THE AFU

Support for the Defence Forces remained a priority for local budgets and civic initiatives. On 19 June, [Vinnytsia](#) allocated an additional UAH 12 million for National Guard and Air Force units. Overall, more than UAH 1 billion, or approximately EUR 20 million, was earmarked in the community budget for the Security and Defence priority area. In early June, [Chernivtsi](#) allocated a further UAH 21.5 million, or approximately EUR 421,000, to support the security and defence forces.

In Lviv, support drew on both budget funding and volunteer initiatives. As part of the Lion's Revenge initiative, military units received vehicles, drones, charging stations, and other equipment worth a total of approximately UAH 15.5 million on [5](#) and [12 June](#). The international charity Pickups for Peace [delivered](#) more than ten vehicles, generators, and medical equipment to Lviv oblast.

The way in which this assistance was communicated also drew attention. In May, the [CHESNO Movement](#) noted that posts about military support on the social media pages of some mayors were framed in a highly personalised way. In Vinnytsia, assistance funded from the community budget was often presented jointly on behalf of the community and the Interregional Coordination Humanitarian Headquarters, which was publicly associated with local politicians. This made it difficult to distinguish between reporting on the use of community funds and personal political messaging.

>> NEEDS OF WAR VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES

In Lviv oblast, assistance for war veterans and their families included rehabilitation, adaptive sports, psychological support, support for veteran-owned businesses, and targeted payments. The Executive Committee of Lviv City Council [approved](#) UAH 6 million in annual targeted assistance for children of fallen defenders, persons with war-related disabilities in Group I, and children of the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred who took part in the peaceful protests on Kyiv's Maidan in 2014. Payments of UAH 50,000 were granted to 86 children for 2026 and a further 34 for 2025. The funds could be used for education, health-related needs, and other purposes. As of 1 June, Lviv community had 1,115 children officially recognised as family members of fallen defenders, of whom 700 were minors.

Lviv also launched another grant competition under the city's [Courage to Do Business](#) initiative, offering up to UAH 300,000 to start or develop a business. The project was intended for war veterans and members of their families.

In June, 20 veterans and service members took part in a ten-day [League of the Unconquered](#) camp. The programme combined adaptive sports, physical recovery, and psychological support.

In late June, the [UNBROKEN ANIMALS](#) programme was presented in Lviv. The initiative provided emotional support for war veterans, service members, and their families through interaction with specially trained dogs. After completing training and certification, ten handler-and-dog teams were to begin visiting patients at the UNBROKEN centre.

In [Vinnytsia oblast](#), multidisciplinary teams continued to receive training to provide social adaptation support for war veterans and their families in communities. In June, 16 psychologists, social workers, and veteran support specialists from Hnivan, Lypovets, and Nemyriv communities completed a three-day course. Under the [Strength of Two](#) programme, veteran couples worked with psychologists and trauma therapists to address the effects of combat experience and restore family relationships. In parallel, [Vinnytsia](#) launched the second stage of its veteran business support programme. Five vouchers worth UAH 250,000 each were earmarked for war veterans and their families to start or develop a business.

In Bukovyna, veterans' hearings served as a forum for direct dialogue between war veterans and public authorities. In May and June, meetings were held in [Chernivtsi](#) and in [Novoselytsia](#), [Kelmentsi](#), Hlyboka, and Vyzhnytsia communities. Veterans and their families raised issues concerning social protection, medical and psychological assistance, employment, housing, legal support, and access to public services. Veterans and combatants with disabilities were also eligible for quarterly payments of UAH 1,500 under the [Veteran Sports](#) initiative to cover the cost of sports activities.

>> SUPPORT FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES

Credit, grant, and advisory programmes for small and medium-sized enterprises continued to operate across the oblasts in May and June. In [Vinnytsia oblast](#), an expert commission approved a register of 60 agricultural enterprises eligible for additional compensation for the interest payable on 94 investment loans issued under the Affordable Loans 5–7–9% programme. The compensation rate was 5% per annum, up to a maximum of UAH 500,000 per enterprise each year.

In [Lviv oblast](#), 65 small and microbusiness owners secured approval for microgrants following the ninth round of the Vlasna Sprava (Own Business) programme. The grants, totalling UAH 19.7 million, were intended to support the launch or expansion of businesses and were expected to create 104 jobs.

Economic activity in Odesa oblast remained heavily dependent on the security situation, the condition of port infrastructure, logistics, and energy supplies. These risks were particularly acute for entrepreneurs in Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pivdenne, Izmail, and Reni. At the [Made in Odesa](#) forum, representatives of public authorities, the business community, and international partners discussed the challenges facing enterprises during the war, support for local producers, the operation of relocated companies, and cooperation between businesses and the authorities. They also highlighted entrepreneurs' limited awareness of the support programmes available to them.

Labour shortages remained a separate challenge for enterprises in Odesa oblast. Representatives of the government, the employment service, the business community, young people, and civil society [discussed](#) at a meeting at Odesa OMA staff shortages, the mismatch between jobseekers' skills and employers' needs, the difficulties young people faced in securing their first job, the launch of a programme for people aged 50 and over, and changes to the Vlasna Sprava grant programme.

3.2. Cooperation at the level of society. Initiatives. Trust between groups

Volunteer, charitable, and civic initiatives in the relatively rear areas continued to focus primarily on supporting the Defence Forces. Fundraising efforts involved schoolchildren and their parents, as well as charitable foundations, civil society organisations, educational institutions, and local producers.

In [Bukovyna](#), the Artaniia Ukraine charity organised a fair in support of the military, with the participation of the Oblast Military Administration, educational institutions, civil society organisations, and local producers. [Valerii Monarkha](#), a volunteer, launched his sixth Marathon of Resilience to raise funds for the Defence Forces. In April, [volunteers](#) from the Ukrainian People's House in Chernivtsi made more than 440 square metres of camouflage netting and [handed it over](#) to the military. In June, benefactors provided service members of the 160th Separate Brigade with a Land Rover off-road vehicle purchased for USD 3,300. The funds had been raised through charity marathons and volunteer fundraising campaigns.

During the [Lviv](#) City Day celebrations, schoolchildren, teachers, and parents raised UAH 7.8 million for the military in a single day. Charity fairs were held at 22 schools.

4. Changes in the social structure

4.1. Challenges related to the situation of women, children, and people with disabilities

The Action Plan for implementing the Strategy for Creating a Barrier-Free Environment until 2030 [remained in effect](#) in Lviv. The 2026 plan, approved in late April, provided for improved access to municipal, educational, and health care institutions; the [installation](#) of ramps and wheelchair platform lifts; the modernisation of existing lifts; the purchase of low-floor public transport; and the creation of a [barrier-free route](#). The need for such measures became more pressing as the numbers of war veterans, people with disabilities, and people affected by the war continued to grow.

Lviv [restored](#) free travel on public transport for people with disabilities in Group I or II, children with disabilities, and children from large families living in the 12 member communities of the Lviv Agglomeration Association but not registered in Lviv community. Lviv community covered the cost of their travel.

The programme [reimbursing](#) the cost of travel in Uklon's Inclusive vehicles also remained in place. It was available to adults and children with disabilities, IDPs, and service members who used wheelchairs and were registered in Lviv community. The maximum reimbursement was UAH 800 per month. As of June 2026, 14 people had used the programme, receiving 36 payments totalling UAH 22,700.

In [Vinnytsia oblast](#), six accessible school buses were provided to Tyvriv, Hlukhivtsi, Turbiv, Chechelnyk, Murovani Kurylivtsi, and Illintsi communities. The buses were equipped with lifts, designated spaces for the safe transport of children who use wheelchairs, additional handrails, and accessible interiors. From 1 May, social manager posts [were introduced](#) within the Social Policy Department of Vinnytsia City Council. Social managers were to identify the needs of people in difficult life circumstances, help them apply for social benefits, and coordinate support from different services.

Some measures focused specifically on women affected by the war or facing difficult life circumstances. In Lviv oblast, a mobile psychological support project [was launched](#) primarily for women, children, and families in communities with large IDP populations. In Bukovyna, the Coordination Council discussed measures to [combat](#) domestic violence, ensure equal rights for women and men, and protect children. Between January and April, the police received 552 reports of domestic violence, including 175 on violence against children.

Other measures in [Bukovyna](#) focused on the social adaptation of people with disabilities. At Chernivtsi Vocational Construction Lyceum, 17 evacuated residents of Popasna Psychoneurological Care Home completed

a free course in basic plumbing skills. The course was intended to help participants develop practical household skills, prepare for more independent living, and broaden their future employment opportunities.

4.2. Needs of displaced persons. Response

Housing programmes for IDPs remained in operation in May–June. In [Lviv oblast](#), IDPs received housing assistance and partial compensation for interest on mortgage loans, while in [Odesa](#), several families who had lost their homes because of the war were provided with flats. [Chernivtsi](#) opened western Ukraine's first social housing facility for displaced people from Mariupol, with a capacity for 140 residents. The complex included living accommodation, children's play areas and sports grounds, a canteen, offices for a psychologist, a doctor, and a veteran support specialist, as well as an I Am Mariupol support centre. Prospective residents included families of service members, prisoners of war, people released from captivity, and fallen defenders. These measures reached only a proportion of IDPs, while high rents, unstable incomes, and the limited availability of long-term housing programmes remained the main challenges.

4.3. Mobilisation processes. Response

Mobilisation was still one of the most sensitive issues. Reports of violations during mobilisation activities, possible abuse of authority by Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres (TRSSCs), corruption schemes, and attempts to cross the border illegally continued to fuel public tension.


In [Odesa oblast](#), law enforcement agencies reported that district TRSSC officials and representatives of a civil society organisation were suspected of unlawfully detaining people liable for military service, holding them against their will, and subjecting them to ill-treatment. In a separate case, a TRSSC official was suspected of [demanding](#) USD 7,500 from a service member who was wanted in connection with absence without leave. Investigators believed that the official had promised in return to arrange the service member's transfer to another military unit and influence a military medical commission's decision to declare him unfit for service.

In Bukovyna, public discussion focused on [staffing changes](#) at TRSSCs and [reports](#) of possible violations of citizens' rights during document checks and while people were being taken to recruitment centres. In one case, the prosecutor's office [opened](#) criminal proceedings over possible abuse of authority by police officers and TRSSC staff. Some complaints submitted to the Ombudsman's oblast office [concerned](#) the treatment of people with disabilities. In border areas, schemes facilitating illegal border crossings by men into Moldova, Romania, and Hungary also continued to be uncovered.

DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

Conceptual framework of the approach of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion

RESILIENCE means a social practice at the national, oblast, and local levels that offers opportunities to overcome challenges and adapt to transformations.



We measure resilience in the following three dimensions:

- **adaptive capacity** of social systems and institutions to crises and sudden environmental changes,
- **self-recovery** that means mobilisation of citizens, institutions to jointly solve various humanitarian, social, and security tasks,
- **resistance** means stabilisation of models of cooperation between the government, business community, and civil society which contributes to increasing the level of cross-sectoral trust in the course of transformation.

SOCIAL COHESION means the state of relationships in society between social groups (horizontal cohesion) and between society and the authorities (vertical cohesion). It is measured by the levels of trust and norms of reciprocity (development of positive social capital); the strength of civil society; and conflict management institutions being in place (e.g., responsible democracy, independent judiciary, etc.).

RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL COHESION ARE BASED on common approaches, shared values, and versatile models of cooperation.

>> **FOCUS:**

on actors, changes in governance, assessment of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and transformation as opposed to return to the previous state.

>> **DATA COLLECTION:**

- temporarily occupied and frontline areas – Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts,
- Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place – Vinnytsia, Odesa, Lviv, Zakarpattia, and Chernivtsi oblasts.

DATA SOURCES: publications in the media, decisions of authorities, draft decisions of authorities, data of surveys and public opinion polls, data of social networking sites, reports of non-governmental organisations, and any other publicised information. The data are collected by coordinators of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion in 12 oblasts, based on data sources, their own understanding of the state of affairs and involvement in local cohesion processes.

>> PROBLEMS

In the temporarily occupied areas:

- **Dynamics of occupation.** The advance of Russian troops, the situation in occupied population centres; opinions of the population of the oblast / community / political forces regarding Russia's occupation and military actions.
- **Changes in the system of governance.** Decisions and information of the occupying authorities; cases of collaborationism; seizure of property; expropriation of products by the occupying administrations.
- **Humanitarian situation.** Filtration measures of the occupying authorities; forced deportation and its routes; hostage taking; recruitment into armed formations; nature of evacuation; destruction; access to health care services.
- **Work on identity.** The operation of educational facilities; relocation of school children, students, and teachers; forced Russification; Russian state education standards; politics of memory: place names, museum work, holidays and their celebration; activities of religious organisations.
- **Changes in the social structure.** Challenges related to the situation of women, children, and people with disabilities.

In the Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place:

- **Dynamics of military operations.** Shelling and attacks / weapons used against the civilian population; destruction.
- **Changes in the system of governance.** The organisation of activities of authorities and citizens' access to decision-making at the local level; access to public information; coordination of actions of volunteers and authorities, as well as actions between authorities at a variety of levels, authorities and the military, volunteers and the military, etc.
- **Humanitarian situation.** The accessibility of drinking water, food, communication, electricity; access to health care services; provision of humanitarian assistance at the oblast level.
- **Changes in the social environment.** Attitudes in communities towards changes in symbols, calendars (holidays, memorial days); renaming of streets and other public places; operation of educational facilities, relocation of schoolchildren, students, and teachers; civil society and business community, labour market.
- **The situation of internally displaced persons.** The availability of housing and employment; integration into the host community; networking.

>> THE PUBLISHING FREQUENCY OF THE REPORT

The initial monitoring report covers the first four months of the large-scale invasion (from February through June), starting on 24 February 2022; the monitoring reports Nos. 2–9 have a two-month timeframe, while those beginning with Report No. 10 have a three-month timeframe; beginning with Report No. 15, the timeframe returns to two months.



ABOUT UKRAINIAN CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL RESEARCH

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RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

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