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RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

Periodic report based
on monitoring materials from
selected regions of Ukraine

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This report was drafted by the team of the Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Research (UCIPR) as part of the activities of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion (National Platform). This civic initiative was launched in February 2018 (formerly known as the National Platform “Dialogue on Peace and Secure Reintegration”).

The National Platform’s activities are geared towards strengthening the national resilience of Ukraine. This could be done through establishing dialogue practices in society, providing the authorities with proposals for developing relevant policies, in particular, those on resilience and social cohesion, as well as ensuring public awareness of these processes. The initiative has been implemented with the financial support of the European Union as part of “Building Resilience in Conflict through Dialogue” project.

The report is based on data on events in 12 oblasts of Ukraine which are important for shaping a policy of national resilience. The project target oblasts were selected based on analysis of changes in cohesion of local populations due to the outbreak of military operations and include Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv, and Zakarpattia oblasts. For data collection, we distinguish between the temporarily occupied areas, frontline and deoccupied areas, and rear areas.

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The report was drafted by Svitlana Gorobchyshyna (text), Olha Kovalenko (coordinator of the Regional Platform of National Platform), Valeriia Skvortsova (coordinator of the project), Svitlana Kononchuk (editor)

Translated by Svitlana Krylova
Edited by Mariana Doboni
Designed by Serhii Buravchenko

The product content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

The text of the report is available for download on the websites of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion <http://national-platform.org/> and UCIPR www.ucipr.org.ua.

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SUMMARY

Destruction of Kakhovka Dam

On the night of 5–6 June 2023, the Russian occupiers blew up Kakhovka dam, causing a large-scale environmental and humanitarian disaster. Massive flooding of population centres of the Dnipro River estuary downstream, in the basins of the Ingulets, Ingul, Southern Buh, Kosheva, and Vysun rivers has been reported in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts.

[As of the morning of 12 June](#), 32 population centres of the right-bank part of Kherson oblast were completely or partially flooded, including 20 populated areas in the temporarily occupied part of the oblast. In Mykolaiv oblast, 31 population centres [were flooded](#).

Dozens of people died or went missing. [According to](#) the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, 21 people were reported to have been killed in the right-bank areas of Kherson oblast as of the evening of 20 June. 28 people, including 16 liquidators of the consequences of water damages, were wounded. 109 people were considered missing. The situation in the non-government controlled areas remained unclear.

Some 10,000 hectares of agricultural lands on the right bank and 30,000 hectares of agricultural land on the left bank of the Dnipro were flooded. [A total of](#) 600 square kilometres of Kherson oblast were flooded, including 32% in the right-bank and 68% in the left-bank part of the oblast.

[According to preliminary estimates](#), the destruction of Kakhovka reservoir has stopped the operation of 31 irrigation systems in Ukraine's south: 94% of all irrigation systems in Kherson oblast, 74% of irrigation systems in Zaporizhzhia oblast, and 30% of irrigation systems in Dnipropetrovsk oblast have been left without a source of water. Large-scale inundation of [agricultural lands](#) and the subsequent problem of field irrigation may lead to crop failures and have adverse effects on food security.

Many helpless domestic and wild animals have been wounded or killed. The flooding of landfills and animals' death have affected the epidemic situation. A threat of detonation of river anchor mines and ammunition has been recorded.

After the water receded, the authorities had to tackle new tasks: pump water, dispose of garbage, organise damage recording, monitor the sanitary and epidemiological situation, provide victims with drinking water, foods, clothing, and basic necessities.

Experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who were at Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP) [have reported](#) no risk to the plant's nuclear safety following the breach of Kakhovka Dam by Russians. However, IAEA Director General, Rafael Grossi, [has stated](#) that the "overall situation with nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhia NPP is extremely unstable". IAEA is aware of mines laid near the cooling pond, although none were found during Mr Grossi's visit.

The situation at the front line

In June, the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine were on the offensive in the directions of Melitopol and Berdiansk in Zaporizhzhia oblast. [On 19 June](#), the village of Piatykhvatky and seven other population centres were liberated. A series of offensive operations continued near Bakhmut, but Ukrainian forces were exposed to areas completely mined by the enemy.

The front lines in Donetsk oblast have not changed significantly in May–June; the fiercest battles have been raging around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar. At the same time, Ukrainian forces near Krasnohorivka [have liberated](#) several positions occupied by the Russians back in 2014. The Ukrainian militaries

have liberated almost 60 square kilometres and taken control of the [village of Blahodatne](#), an important point on the way to the Azov Sea.

In late June, 14 populated areas have been liberated in Luhansk oblast. “This is approximately 5–7% of the total area of Luhansk oblast, including territories occupied in 2014,” Artem Lysohor, Head of Luhansk Oblast Military Administration, [underscored](#). Within that period, the enemy attacked primarily in the direction of Bilohorivka and Kreminna forests which were once called the “lungs of Luhansk oblast”.

Russian forces have continuously shelled and bombed frontline population centres. Specifically, they shelled Kherson during the evacuation of people from the flooded part of the city following the collapse of Kakhovka HPP. In May and June, Russian troops regularly attacked Odesa oblast with missiles and kamikaze drones. Many communities of Kharkiv oblast, including those of Kupiansk, Vovchansk, Chuhuiiv, and Zmiiv, have been continuously shelled. Civilian facilities in Kharkiv were destroyed by strikes of the Russian army. The aggressor has started to extensively use guided aerial bombs which mostly fell on residential areas in cities and towns, causing a large amount of destruction and casualties among the civilian population. The Russian army has attempted to [advance](#) on Kupiansk raion, but did not make much progress on it.

[The Kinburn Spit](#) has remained the only still-occupied area in Mykolaiv oblast. After the occupiers blew up Kakhovka HPP, the water spill has turned it from a peninsula into an [island](#) as the Spit appeared cut off from land masses. However, the Russian militaries stationed there have continued attacks on communities of Kutsurub and Ochakiv.

In the evening of 13 May, the occupiers [carried out a missile strike](#) on the city of Ternopil. Early next morning, they attacked the oblast again. As a result of the strike, commercial warehouses, private houses, and trade facilities were damaged. Two people have been wounded. The first strike on the city was carried out a few minutes before Ternopil’s band, TVORCHI, which represented Ukraine at Eurovision 2023 in Liverpool, went on stage. The musicians have responded to the attacks on their hometown.

[According to](#) the UN figures, from the outbreak of the full-scale armed attack by the Russian Federation on Ukraine to 30 June 2023, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has recorded 25,170 civilian casualties, including 9,177 killed and 15,993 injured.

Temporarily occupied areas

The Russia-installed authorities have scheduled the so-called elections in the temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine – in the non-government controlled parts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts and in one district of Simferopol, Crimea, for 10 September 2023. They provided for the possibility to vote even if martial law is imposed. In its [resolution](#) “On the illegitimacy of the organisation of the preparation to and holding of any elections in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine by the Russian Federation” of 7 July 2023, the Central Election Commission of Ukraine has emphasised that these actions of Russia are “not only a gross violation of rules of Ukrainian and international law, but also another irrefutable evidence of criminal activities of the Russian Federation and its political leadership”.

In June, the State Duma of the Russian Federation [has adopted a decision](#) on the creation of a so-called free economic zone in the non-government controlled areas of the four Ukrainian oblasts. Tax and customs benefits, subsidies and loan reimbursement, special town-planning and land regulations are expected to be “in place” there until 31 January 2050.

The Russian occupiers have intensified pressure on locals to force them to accept Russian citizenship. Specifically, in Zaporizhzhia oblast, the locals [could not](#) receive social benefits and health care services without Russian passports. In Kherson oblast, the enemy took advantage of the difficult situation of residents of flooded populated areas. Representatives of the occupying administration [issued](#) the so-called housing certificates and made social payments for the purchase of residential property only to those affected residents of the non-government controlled areas who obtained Russian citizenship. In temporarily occupied Donetsk, they have started to issue foreign passports which could formerly be received only on the territory of Russia.

The situation in the temporarily occupied areas has remained critical. Massive bribery of citizens, restrictions on access to free information, continuous brainwashing of the locals, targeted work with school

children, policy of terror and intimidation, and total control of all spheres of life – all those factors eroded the capacity to resist. The Russian occupiers have continued to [use](#) health care facilities for military purposes.

In early June, 19,453 children were known to have been taken to Russia, as [reported](#) by the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmytro Lubinets. The figure included only identified cases of deportation, whereas the total number of children removed from Ukraine's non-government controlled areas has remained unknown. Furthermore, the Russian occupiers have deported more than 27,000 adults.

[According to](#) the Acting Chairman of the *State Atomic Energy Regulatory Commission*, Oleh Koriukov, the Russian invaders have continued to put pressure on the personnel of Zaporizhzhia NPP, resort to intimidation, and search the homes of employees of nuclear power plant. They banned communication with residents of the Ukrainian government-controlled areas and did not allow the personnel to leave the non-government controlled area.

The occupying authorities have demonstrated the resumption of operation of schools despite the proximity to the front lines, making it one of the main examples of the return to normal life in Russia-controlled areas. At the same time, Russian curricula and education standards have been immediately launched in schools.

Frontline and deoccupied areas

The Ukrainian government has started to partly reimburse people for the housing loss. On 10 May 2023, the *eVidnovlennia (eRecovery)* programme [was launched](#) under which a person could receive up to UAH 200,000 in reimbursement for the recovery of housing destroyed or damaged due to the war. These funds can be spent on construction materials or services of contractors participating in the programme.

The problem of a large spread of mines in the deoccupied areas has been a focus of attention for the Ukrainian authorities and international partners. This hinders the development of agricultural production and sparks challenges for food security and employment of the locals in agriculture. Demining operations have been conducted slowly, under the fire of Russian artillery.

In May–June, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a number of decisions to resume the operation of public authorities in the deoccupied areas and their reintegration. Specifically, the [Resolution](#) “On preparing for actions to stabilise the situation in the deoccupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and their reintegration” has been passed.

However, at the time of writing of the report, there has been no public discussion about the future of Donetsk oblast, the situation of its industrial businesses, prospects for the reconstruction of population centres, and post-war economic and social models. Because of that, people can say nothing about their place and role in a new Donetsk region.

Furthermore, their sense of cohesion has been affected by the closed nature of military administrations which are not interested in involving community members in management decision-making. Moreover, most military administrations did not even consider it necessary to report or explain the already-made decisions. Specifically, they have failed to make public their decisions, even those that did not pertain to military secrets.

The public has drawn attention to the need to ensure transparency in the distribution of humanitarian aid and that officials should systematically report what aid was received and from whom; what, when and how it was distributed; what were the plans for the next reporting period, contact details, etc.

The governments of many countries have provided, through international and governmental organisations, including the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (SIDA), the Danish Refugee Council, the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), the Norwegian People's Aid, numerous organisations from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Poland, the International Organization for Migration, etc., immense assistance and various types of support for demining and reconstruction planning. Various types of cooperation between Ukrainian cities and cities in European countries have been established and developed. All of this has been geared towards strengthening Ukraine's capacity to survive and develop even in times of adversity.

Ukrainian-government controlled areas

Within May–June 2023, local authorities of the western and southern parts of Ukraine, in particular Zakarpattia, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, and Odesa oblasts, have focused their activities on the performance of key social, humanitarian, and economic tasks, actualised by the conditions of martial law. In general, the situation in the oblasts has remained stable.

International interaction both in terms of establishing cooperation and partnership and strengthening / maintaining the previous level of humanitarian support to Ukraine has been one of the priority areas of work of public authorities and local self-government bodies. Local authorities sought to define their role and place in the oblasts' recovery and development plans.

The population and authorities of the oblasts have demonstrated a high level of cohesion and efficiency, helping the locals of Kherson and Mykolaiv following the destruction of Kakhovka HPP by the Russian militaries. Local authorities have developed an algorithm for receiving people who managed to evacuate from the flooded populated areas. The locals have organised the collection of necessary equipment, foods, and the like for the victims. Everyone who had the opportunity have joined the collection campaign, in particular public organisations, business community, and the government.

The population of the oblasts have continued to provide the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and victims of war with systematic assistance. Targeted assistance to individual AFU units has remained widespread.

The issue of creating decent living conditions and workplaces for internally displaced persons (IDPs) has remained acute. Large amounts of grants and budget funds needed to be raised in order to solve housing problems. The provision of psychological and the promotion of effective socialisation in territorial communities, along with financial and material aid, have become cornerstones for the work with internally displaced persons.

On 6 June 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine [adopted](#) a decision that newly created businesses could take advantage of the government's employer support programme if they provide internally displaced persons with jobs. Specifically, a company set up following a full-scale invasion can receive reimbursement; the employer is provided with reimbursement for the employment of internally displaced persons who received the IDP status following the imposition of martial law.

In April 2022, the government has launched a programme to encourage entrepreneurs to employ internally displaced persons. For each employed IDP, the government reimburses the employer for two months in the amount of the minimum wage or UAH 6,700. In 2022, more than 10,000 entrepreneurs benefited from the programme. They received reimbursement from the government worth a total of UAH 200 million for the employment of almost 18,000 internally displaced persons.

Civil society's activities have remained an important factor of strengthening resilience. Communities that synergised the capabilities of local activists and those who relocated due to the war have turned out to be especially promising in terms of innovation.

Various international, regional and local organisations and funds have continued operating in the oblasts. Their activities covered various spheres of life, ranging from humanitarian to educational one.

The psychological fatigue of many volunteers has been recorded. Some of them declared a decrease in their activities. This is a natural process of burnout. Volunteers need psychological support for their mental well-being on a regular basis.

Mobilisation challenges, primarily those related to an increase in the number of killed, have remained relevant. At the same time, draft-dodging has posed a systematic problem.

I. TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS

1. Changes in the system of governance

1.1. Decisions of occupying authorities

>> PREPARATIONS FOR THE SHAM ELECTIONS

Russian Federation authorities have scheduled the so-called elections in the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine – in the Russia-controlled parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as in the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR for [10 September](#). [It is about](#) “elections” to “representative and legislative bodies of the new regions” – to the so-called people’s councils in the breakaway DPR and LPR, and to the so-called legislative assemblies in the non-government controlled areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The oblast centres, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, remain under the control of Ukraine, therefore the “central authorities” should be established in Melitopol and Henichesk respectively. It will be possible to vote only on party lists.

In view of military operations, a draft law has been submitted to the State Duma which gives the “new regions” special rights regarding the organisation and conduct of voting. Local authorities may allow citizens to “vote not only on passport, but also on any identification document”, and enable election commissions to set up extraterritorial polling stations (outside the oblasts). Furthermore, those willing to vote will be able to use the Russian [“Mobile Voter”](#) system.

The Russia-appointed “Zaporizhzhia election commission” has allegedly compiled a list of territorial election commissions (hereinafter referred to as TECs) and approved a continuous numbering of polling stations. In the non-government controlled areas of Kherson oblast, only the list and quantitative composition of TECs was approved as of early May – 14. The self-proclaimed LPR also approved the list of TECs – 31, the so-called DPR – 36 TECs.

The breakaway Russian executive authorities of the occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are already represented in the Federation Council by appointed senators. As the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR, according to Russia, have managed to “shape” two branches of power, the executive and the legislative, they are represented by two senators from each Republic.

The next stage is the “election” of State Duma deputies from “new regions”.

On 14 May, the Kremlin media said that the Chairperson of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, Ella Pamfilova, [visited](#) the left-bank part of Kherson oblast and inspected the work of “election commissions”.

[According to](#) the National Resistance Center of Ukraine, the local population that ignored the so-called referendum in 2022 has no intention to participate in the “elections” in the non-government controlled areas. The terrorists are therefore going to repeat the last year’s practice and hold “field elections”, stretching the voting process to several days. “From August 31, it will be possible to “vote” early; on 8–9 September, Russians will start knocking on doors and carry out voting at places of residence; and only on 10 September, the “classical voting” should take place at polling stations,” the National Resistance Center said.

The Ukrainian Central Election Commission [has recognised](#) all decisions on the elections in the non-government controlled areas “legally null and void”, saying that they are going to be another evidence of international crimes of the Russian Federation for which all the organisers and those involved would be brought before a court and lawfully punished.

The European Union has condemned Russia’s plans to hold so-called elections in the temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine. In his statement, the spokesperson for foreign affairs and security policy of the European

Commission, Peter Stano, [called](#) sham elections “another futile attempt by Russia to give legitimacy to its illegal military control and attempted annexation” of Ukrainian territories. He emphasised that such Russia’s decision seriously violates the UN Charter, as well as the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and that all those involved in organising these illegal sham elections would be held accountable for their illegal actions.

[What is known about the sham referenda in the temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine](#)

On 20 September 2022, the so-called public councils, established in the non-government controlled areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, spread information about the need to hold “referenda” on the inclusion of the said areas into the Russian Federation. Later, the self-proclaimed LPR and DPR supported the idea. Neither Ukraine nor the international community recognised the outcomes of the sham voting. In the resolution of 12 October 2022, participants in a meeting of the UN General Assembly also [condemned](#) the attempted illegal annexation of Ukraine’s territories.

On 30 September 2022, Vladimir Putin signed “agreements” on the “inclusion into Russia” of the self-proclaimed LPR and DPR as well as Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. At the same time, the front lines were not stable, and Russia, despite its ongoing efforts, could not occupy and illegally annex completely any of the above four areas of Ukraine.

On 5 October 2022, Vladimir Putin signed “laws” on the so-called “inclusion” of the four areas of Ukraine into Russia. He appointed Denis Pushilin as Acting Governor of the DPR and Leonid Pasechnik as Acting Governor of the LPR. Volodymyr Saldo – in the non-government controlled areas of Kherson oblast and Yevgeny Balitsky – in the non-government controlled areas of Zaporizhzhia oblast were appointed as interim Governors.

On 29 May 2023, Vladimir Putin signed a [decree](#) according to which Russia can hold referenda and elections in the territories where martial law is in place, or, in other words, according to Putin’s [decree](#) of 19 October 2022 “On the introduction of martial law in the territories of the DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions”, the matter concerns the Russia-occupied and illegally annexed parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts. This law also offers the opportunity to set up “polling stations” outside the non-government controlled areas.

Russian occupying forces [have conducted](#) a so-called preliminary vote in the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine to “nominate candidates” from the United Russia party for their further participation in the “elections”. The preliminary vote took place on 22–28 May 2023.

>> **FORCED PASSPORTING**

People who had stayed in the temporarily occupied areas and rejected Russian passports faced problems with their document processing, receiving social benefits and health care services. Also, they have limited opportunities to leave the occupied areas without such documents.

For example, in temporarily occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia oblast, the occupiers have threatened parents of school graduates that their children who rejected Russian passports would be unable to get school leaving certificates.

In Stanytsia Luhanska, employees of one of the budget institutions [were warned](#) that only those who had reopened their accounts in a Russian bank could receive their salaries in June. In Rubizhne, the Russian invaders have started issuing passports to spontaneous vendors. They threatened that without Russian passports the latter would not be allowed to work. The similar pressure was exerted on individual entrepreneurs. They had to have their individual entrepreneurship re-registered until 30 June, which requires Russian passports. It was emphasised that the timeframe of the registration procedure was specified by federal law and would not be extended.

However, unprecedented low rates of passporting among the elderly [have been recorded](#) in the so-called LPR. To increase those indicators, the Russia-installed authorities have created mobile teams and even involved volunteers who processed all the necessary documents at provided addresses. However, for exam-

ple, less than 200 out of more than 600 members, aging 80 years and above, of Milovka community, Luhansk oblast, occupied at the onset of the full-scale invasion, received Russian passports as of May. Besides, only 25% of the population of the self-proclaimed LPR filed applications for the revision of pensions under Russia's legislation, because Russian passports with relevant registration marks are needed for the revision procedure.

In temporarily occupied Donetsk, the Russia-installed authorities [have started](#) to issue foreign passports which could formerly be received only on the territory of Russia for a term of five years. These documents are issued to those who received internal Russian passports and paid a RUB2,000 fee, as claimed by the occupying administration.

>> **PROPERTY, BUSINESSES**

On 24 June 2023, Vladimir Putin [signed](#) a law on the creation of a so-called free economic zone in the non-government controlled areas of the four Ukrainian oblasts. The document provides for various tax and customs benefits, subsidies and loan reimbursement, special town-planning and land regulations expected to be "in place" there until 31 January 2050.

The leadership of the occupying administration boasted about the participation of the so-called DPR as an "entity of the Russian Federation" in St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2023. The occupying media outlets [have reported](#) that 31 investment agreements worth RUB4.4 billion were concluded in the framework of the Forum, allowing for the creation of nearly 700 new jobs in the non-government controlled areas. The full list of agreements and initiatives has not been made public.

>> **DEPORTATION / FORCIBLE TRANSFERS**

In early May, the occupiers announced the evacuation of at least 15 population centres of the non-government controlled areas of Zaporizhzhia oblast. People were taken to Kyrylivka and Berdiansk. "For the past two weeks, we have been talking about the beginning of the evacuation. Yesterday, the enemy announced the evacuation from the temporarily occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia oblast, that time by force. This means that the evacuation has been announced from at least 15 population centres, and white buses have started to run in those places, offering the locals to leave. The transfers are forcible for children. The enemy is attempting to take away children from Vasylivka, Tokmak, Molochansk, Enerhodar and is attempting to do it under the pretext of taking the children on "vacation". The enemy says that it is for a few weeks until the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces runs out of steam," the Melitopol Mayor, Ivan Fedorov, [claimed](#).

The Head of Luhansk Oblast Military Administration (hereinafter referred to as OMA), Artem Lysohor, noted that the Russian occupiers assembled groups to take 750 children out of the non-government controlled areas of Luhansk oblast. "In June, the Russians took 150 children from Starobilsk raion to the Russian Federation, allegedly for rehabilitation. Up until now, there is no information about their return," he said. The OMA Head emphasised that Russian doctors had found "pathologies" in 70% of school children in the non-government controlled areas of Luhansk oblast to send them for "treatment" to the Russian Federation. In case of refusal, the occupiers intimidated the children with denial of access to education.

In early June, 19,453 children were known to have been taken to Russia, as [reported](#) by the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmytro Lubinets. The figure included only identified cases of deportation, whereas the total number of children taken from Ukraine's temporarily occupied areas has remained unknown. Furthermore, the Russian occupiers have deported more than 27,000 adults. "It is unclear how many people were taken out of the non-government controlled areas. Their number will be higher following the de-occupation," the Ombudsman underscored.

However, the Ukrainian authorities expected the return of the abducted children, as they received offers of help from international organisations and ombudsmen. Dmytro Lubinets pointed out that the details of the children's return were not disclosed, but confirmed that a mediator was involved in the process.

At the same time, the Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Rights of Children and Children Rehabilitation, Daria Herasymchuk, reported that approximately 200,000–300,000 children remained in Russia and Belarus and that they were continuously being transported. According to open sources of the Russian Federation, 744,000 Ukrainian children were deported so far.

371 deported children have been returned to Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale war.

1.2. Access to public information

The Russians have continued to extensively integrate the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk oblast into the information environment of the Russian Federation. Starting 1 July 2023, digital broadcasting [should have been launched](#) there according to Russian standards. Residents were offered a package of services of 20 television channels, of which eight were local and the rest federal ones, and 3 radio stations.

Furthermore, the Crimean mobile communications operator, [Miranda-media](#), with a 20% stake owned by Russia's state telecommunications giant, Rostelecom, was preparing to enter the occupied areas and was actively deploying a network of base stations in the south of Donetsk oblast. The company became the second trunk communication operator which has provided the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk oblast with Internet services since May 2023.

2. Humanitarian situation

In the temporarily occupied territories, the Russians [have continued to use](#) health care facilities for military purposes. The resistance movement network of Luhansk oblast received information about the forced alienation of one of health care facilities of Luhansk. Specifically, one of the city district hospitals was repurposed into a military hospital, and health care workers from Russia were involved in its operation. The alienation of that health care facility has resulted in a shortage of health care workers, a decrease in the number of beds, and a deterioration of health care and sanitary conditions for the civilian population of Luhansk.

In the cities and towns of Luhansk oblast occupied in 2022, the invaders have been in no hurry to launch reconstruction works. Rubizhne, Lysychansk, and Sievierodonetsk have been under the occupation for almost a year. Within that period, the Russians did not care too much about civilians: they carried out reconstruction works only in Sievierodonetsk and only for the sake of propaganda. In Lysychansk, problems with electricity and gas supply [had not been resolved](#), some districts were left without water and there also were difficulties with mobile communication. "Nothing has changed in the occupied city for a year, the occupying authorities have not kept any promises to the local population. ...For example, only two or three thousand subscribers have electricity. The situation of gas supply is better, though due to significant destruction, some five thousand subscribers are being supplied with gas," the Head of Lysychansk City Military Administration, Valerii Shybiko, said.

2.1. Filtration measures of occupying authorities

The invaders [have tightened](#) the access control in Russia-occupied parts of Luhansk oblast. In search of partisans, they increased the number of crossing points and brought soldiers of the Russian Guard. The latter inspected equipment and checked documents at crossing points on a 24/7 basis. Moreover, throughout May, they searched 1,500 households in Luhansk oblast where, according to local collaborators, partisans could hide. 45 suspects have been reported to be allegedly identified. Residents of Rubizhne who remained in the city were warned by the occupying administration that everyone could move into empty apartments for a term of one year. If the owners returned during this term, they would have to wait until the end of the period of stay. Otherwise, the illegal settlers will live there for another three years.

2.2. Actions of occupying authorities regarding recruitment into armed formations

[According to](#) the National Resistance Center, the Russian aggressors have re-established "military commissariats" in the non-government controlled areas of Luhansk oblast, because the former military institutions failed to implement the forced mobilisation plan. Instead of the so-called Military Commissariat of the LPR, the oc-

cupiers established a new body, Federal State Institution Military Commissariat of the LPR, whose leadership was appointed not from local traitors, but from the Russians brought to the oblast. The institution has already been entered into the Russian registers under the tax number different from that of the former “commissariat”.

The Russian invaders [have started](#) to mobilise “employees of budget-funded institutions” in temporarily occupied Mariupol, Donetsk oblast. “Recruitment commissions have started working in Mariupol. The occupiers are already looking for citizens who do not fulfil their “military obligations”. The enemy plans to conscript men until August,” Mariupol mayor, Vadym Boichenko, said. The City Council published the so-called medical examination referrals from the military commissariat”, which was received by one of the residents of Mariupol. Employees of budget-funded institutions were the first to be mobilised.

Also, the Russian invaders [planned to create](#) special camps for men of military age. According to the National Resistance Center, the government of the Russian Federation discussed amendments to the resolution “On the procedure for evacuating the population, material and cultural values to safe areas”. One of the issues discussed was the process of “evacuation” of conscripted men. As reported by the Center, the Russians planned to filter the population in the non-government controlled areas in the process of the so-called evacuations and to take conscripted men to special camps to subsequently transfer them to military commissariats.

On 14 May 2023, the occupying administration [announced](#) recruitment for the so-called volunteer battalion which “performs combat tasks on the front lines in Kherson oblast”. People aged 21 to 50 who had good physical fitness and no bad habits were offered to join the armed formation. They were promised to receive a “RUB205,000 military pay plus bonuses and allowances”, “official employment and employment records”, “health and life insurance, guarantee of all payments”, “up-to-date military clothing and gear”. “Volunteers” will reportedly be involved in the “protection of the infrastructure facilities of Kherson oblast and fighting against the AFU saboteurs”.

2.3. Evacuation

The evacuation from the non-government controlled areas has not been carried out since the end of 2022, when the Russian militaries blocked the crossing point in Vasylivka, Zaporizhzhia oblast, and allowed people to move only within the non-government controlled areas.

3. Work on identity

[According to](#) the Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine, Hanna Maliar, the aggressor state has attempted to influence the change in the ethnic composition of the population of the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine. Russia’s special emphasis was on Luhansk oblast. The government of the Russian Federation has initiated the large-scale relocation of a significant number of people of different ethnicities, primarily from low-income groups, from remote regions of Russia.

The local occupying administration in the non-government controlled areas have helped people relocated from Russia in every possible way, through providing the newly arrived households with immediate accommodation, employment, affordable (soft) loans for the purchase of housing, business development, etc. At the same time, the Russian occupiers have continued to deport locals, especially those suspected of pro-Ukrainian views, to the Russian Federation under various pretexts. In this way, the enemy has sought to destroy Ukrainian statehood and the national self-identification of society.

Also, the Russian authorities, represented by the Head of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs of the Russian Federation, Igor Barinov, have claimed that next year, they plan to allocate a single subsidy to the “new entities of the Russian Federation” for measures to strengthen the all-Russian civic identity. Barinov added that for the purpose of facilitating Russian traditional spiritual and moral values, [it was planned](#) to create two “spiritual and educational” centres in the cities of Rovenki and Luhansk.

On 19 May, the youth wing of the All-Russia People’s Front [was opened](#) on the basis of the so-called Ministry of Youth Policy in the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia oblast. It has become the sixteenth youth or-

ganisation of the Russian occupiers operating on the territory of the non-government controlled areas of the oblast. The goal of such organisations is to destroy the Ukrainian identity. Their large number evidences that the Russian occupiers have great hope for shaping a Russian identity in the Ukrainian youth.

3.1. Changes in education standards

In the non-government controlled areas of Kherson oblast, school-age children have remained the focus of the Russian propaganda machine. The occupiers attempted to ensure attendance of schools by children. They bribed their parents or threatened them. When it comes to bribery, each family whose child goes to school received RUB4,000 per month, and the child got free lunches. Conversely, those who did not let their children go to school received threats that the children would be deprived of their parents. The occupiers planted Russian curricula and paid special attention to outreach activities, in particular, delivered lectures on the history of the Great Patriotic War, the crimes of Nazism, malignance of Ukrainian nationalism, conducted outreach activities, etc.

According to the occupying authorities, 153,000 children have studied in schools in the occupied areas of Donetsk oblast this academic year. Although lessons were held in various formats, the majority of school children, despite the security challenges, were enrolled full-time at schools. In general, the occupying authorities have used the resumption of operation of schools, despite the proximity to the front lines, as one of the main examples of the return to normal life in the Russia-controlled areas.

In the non-government controlled areas of Luhansk oblast, troops of the Russian Federation **were stationed** in schools. According to Luhansk OMA, in Lubiianka, Svatove raion, the “personnel is housed in the buildings of educational facilities, whereas the occupiers force teachers to continue the educational process with compulsory attendance by children”.

3.2. Freedom of religion

During the full-scale invasion, 43 priests have been persecuted in the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine, Russia’s media outlet, Verстка, **said** with reference to the media data and reports by human rights defenders. According to the outlet’s estimations, priests were forced to flee the city, hide, or stop their activities in 18 cases, whereas in 12 cases they were expelled. Five priests were killed and eight captured. Verстка has found a total of at least 109 cases of crackdown on churches and religious figures. The Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Muslims have been persecuted by Russian troops and the Russia-installed authorities.

According to the monitoring data on Zaporizhzhia oblast, Berdiansk diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (hereinafter referred to as the UOC MP) **has become** canonically and administratively subordinated to the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. As noted by the Russian Orthodox Church, the reason for this decision was based on the appeals of 76 out of 86 priests of Berdiansk diocese of the UOC MP, because the head of the diocese, Metropolitan Yefrem, left temporarily occupied Berdiansk and allegedly refused to fulfil his duties. The Russians appointed Bishop Luka of Iskitim and Cherepanovo as new head of the diocese. The Information and Education Department of the UOC MP **reported** that priests of Berdiansk diocese, who appealed to the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Kirill, would be banned from carrying out divine services.

On 12 May, priests of Luhansk diocese of the UOC MP took part in the events of the All-Russian forum, World Russian People’s Council, which resulted in a call for the “triunity of the Russian people” (i. e., Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians). **According to** sources of LB.ua, participants in the action came up with the initiatives to legally enshrine “Russian traditional” values and prevent the distortion of “historical truth”. Moreover, they provided “justification” for the so-called special military operation, calling it a “national liberation war of the Russian people”, and defined the “Ukrainian ideology” as “Russophobia and a kind of extremism”.

II. FRONTLINE AND DEOCCUPIED AREAS

1. Changes in the system of governance

1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

>> RESTORATION OF HOUSING

On 10 May, the eVidnovlennia (*eRecovery*) programme [was launched](#) under which a person can receive up to UAH 200,000 in reimbursement for the recovery of housing destroyed or damaged due to the war. These funds can be spent on construction materials or services of contractors participating in the programme.

In Kharkiv oblast, the largest number of applications for reimbursement came from Iziium, Chuhuiv, and Kupiansk raions. As of the end of June, more than six thousand applications [have been filed](#).

In the deoccupied areas (e.g., in Iziium), qualified inspections of houses damaged as a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation [have been carried out](#). The main goal is to quickly assess the possibility of their recovery. The preparations of the deoccupied communities for the upcoming [heating season](#) intensified, in particular, the purchase of mobile boiler houses.

The deoccupied communities of Kharkiv oblast, including that of Tsyrykuny, [have received](#) modular houses intended for people whose homes were damaged or destroyed. The houses were installed either in the central part of the community or in the yards. People are allowed to live in the houses until the end of 2023, and this term can be extended.

The population started to return to Dvorichne community due to a decrease in the intensity of shelling, though the process [has slowed](#) when the attacks by the Russian Federation intensified again. Destroyed houses were not rebuilt, critical infrastructure was poorly maintained. In deoccupied frontline communities and small population centres that remained in the line of fire, the infrastructure has been almost totally destroyed.

>> DEMINING

Continuous mining of large areas remained an important problem of Kherson oblast. The issue has been the focus of attention of not only local and central authorities, but also international partners. Agricultural production cannot develop under such circumstances which poses a challenge for food security and employment of the local population. Demining operations took place very slowly, under Russia's artillery fire. Cases of deaths of pyrotechnicians and local residents as a result of shelling have been recorded.

The deoccupied areas of Kharkiv oblast [have also remained](#) extremely contaminated with various explosive devices. The UN representatives announced their intention to [help](#) demine the oblast – first to analyse the condition of affected agricultural lands in the oblast by satellite, and then to examine the territory for the presence of explosive devices. At the beginning, it was about 700 hectares of fields in Iziium and Balaklia communities. Kharkiv OMA said that they would work with each farm individually. Later, the condition of the soil will be assessed, and Ukrainian specialists will be involved in the assessment process. In general, fields in Kharkiv, Chuhuiv, Iziium, Kupiansk, and part of Bohodukhiv raions of the oblast needed demining.

“Luhansk oblast is littered with enemy shells, but we will quickly start conducting [mine clearing operations](#) following the deoccupation. To this end, the appropriate forces and means are being accumulated, Luhansk oblast is enlisting the support of partners, including international ones,” Artem Lysohor, Head of Luhansk OMA, pointed out.

“Mine clearing is a matter of ongoing discussion at the state level. Today, we have agreed on cooperation in conducting training on the risks associated with explosive remnants of war and measures to be taken to avoid danger to the life and health of the population. We have considered the issue of interaction and coordination of demining operations in the territory of Luhansk oblast by units of the State Special Transport Service,” the Head of Luhansk OMA said in a commentary on the outcomes the meeting with the Head of the Administration of the State Special Transport Service of Ukraine, Major General Bohdan Bondar. The parties signed the Memorandum of Cooperation based on the meeting outcomes.

Mine clearing operations [have continued](#) in the territory of Mykolaiv oblast. Groups of The HALO Trust (USA) and the Representative Office of the Danish Refugee Council, representatives of the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and the Norwegian People’s Aid participated in humanitarian survey. Also, groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the National Police, and other specialists have also been engaged in mine action. There has been a total of 21 groups, and that number should have become higher. The Ukrainian agricultural company, Nibulon (JV Nibulon LLC), received a permission for commencement of work. At the time of writing the report, 51,000 hectares have been demined. Yet, a total of more than 288,000 hectares had to be surveyed and demined.

>> EVACUATION

The mandatory evacuation of the population of the government-controlled areas of Donetsk oblast has been under way. Since 18 April 2023, people have been evacuated to [Zhytomyr oblast](#). The evacuation train ran from Pokrovsk once every four days. All those willing to evacuate were brought from communities of the oblast to the train by free buses from. In Zhytomyr oblast, the train arrived in the city of Berdychiv where evacuees were provided with housing in places of compact residence of internally displaced persons (hereinafter referred to as IDPs), social benefits, health care and social assistance. Over recently, it was possible to [gather some 200](#) people willing to evacuate from Donetsk oblast per bus trip. These are primarily members of communities close to the front line. In general, the population of the oblast did not actively evacuate to other oblasts of the country. Notwithstanding a kind of internal migration being in place, the available population has remained practically unchanged, according to representatives of authorities.

Throughout May, the process of evacuating children from the four frontline communities of Kharkiv oblast [has been completed](#). All families in need of housing were housed in free accommodation. Both social workers and psychologists worked with the children, providing support and easing traumatic memories. Centralised evacuation was carried out only in communities that were under ongoing artillery and mortar shelling. Non-government organisations operating on a volunteer basis were engaged in evacuation from other population centres. Not only disadvantaged people, but everyone else could use those services. Due to the intensification of shelling in Kharkiv oblast in June, local authorities decided to consider additional [evacuation](#) of the population from the frontline communities.

>> HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Due to ongoing shelling in Donetsk oblast, the water supply system [did not operate](#) in full capacity. In most population centres, residents had water according to schedule at best. Karlivka reservoir is one of the main sources of water. Karlivka water filtration station, Pokrovsk raion, has however been under ongoing fire and thereby operated with interruptions since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The communities that received water from the station have started to create alternative sources of water supply: drilling wells, installing water treatment facilities on community water systems, and developing a project for the mine water treatment system of Myrnohrad-based Trentralna mine, Pokrovsk raion.

>> REINTEGRATION

In May–June, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a number of decisions aimed at restoring as soon as possible the functioning of public authorities following the deoccupation of Ukraine’s territories and ensuring their accelerated reintegration.

In May, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine [has adopted](#) the Resolution “On preparing for actions to stabilise the situation in the deoccupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and their reintegration”. In

compliance with the document, coordinating bodies are to be established under Donetsk and Luhansk OMA to prepare for actions right after the liberation of the temporarily occupied areas. What is meant here is the development of detailed action plans, creation of human resources reserve and accumulation as well as reserve and material and technical reserves.

The Cabinet of Ministers has also defined the mechanism for creating a reserve of employees for work in the deoccupied territories in accordance with the [Resolution](#) “On the implementation of an experimental project on the creation of a reserve of employees of state bodies for work in the deoccupied territories of Ukraine”. This will help provide military administrations and other public authorities with staff. War veterans, IDPs, persons who formerly held these positions, and persons who have work experience in the field of reintegration of the non-government controlled areas will be given a priority for appointment to positions.

According to Artem Lysohor, Head of Luhansk OMA, the Center for Recovery and Development of Luhansk Oblast Communities [will open its doors](#) in Dnipro to help coordinate efforts of the government, business community, and international organisations to rebuild Luhansk oblast following the deoccupation. In particular, this was discussed at a meeting with the United Nations Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme Manager, Nils Christensen. “We call it “recovery offices”. We consider four oblasts for their establishment, including Luhansk oblast. They will drastically differ from other Ukrainian oblasts once the project is launched,” Nils Christensen said.

Infrastructure companies relocated to other Ukraine’s oblasts which are ready to return are supposed to be involved in the implementation of recovery projects in the deoccupied areas. Following the deoccupation and stabilisation measures, the Center is to be moved to one of the communities of Luhansk oblast. It should be emphasised that military administrations of Luhansk oblast have continued operating at the oblast and community levels outside their territories, since Luhansk oblast is almost completely occupied by Russian troops.

Sievierodonetsk, Luhansk oblast, is the [only city](#) in Ukraine selected to participate in RESPONSE project, geared towards studying and implementing state-of-the-art energy-saving technologies and urban recovery. In June, the second meeting of the project participants took place in the city of Turku, Finland. Since 2020 up until now, Sievierodonetsk community together with Volodymyr Dahl East Ukrainian National University have been actively participating in the project to implement sophisticated solutions on energy efficiency and boost investment attractiveness of the city.

>> HUMANITARIAN HUBS

A network of humanitarian hubs for persons displaced from Luhansk oblast has been operating throughout Ukraine. According to Luhansk OMA, not only they can receive humanitarian aid and expert counselling there, but they also [use](#) services of administrative service centres of Luhansk oblast. These centres are gradually resuming operation outside their territorial communities, namely at the location of humanitarian hubs and military administrations in safer oblasts of Ukraine. At the time of writing of the report, ten administrative service centres have been reopened and nine remote workplaces have been created for their administrators. Residents of Luhansk oblast have been provided with administrative services on the basis of 18 humanitarian hubs in the cities of Vinnytsia; Dnipro; Zhytomyr; Kyiv; Poltava; Rivne; Uzhhorod; Kharkiv; Cherkasy; Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Cherkasy oblast; and the village of Bohdanivka, Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

>> INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION

The Head of Luhansk OMA, Artem Lysohor, has taken part in the [opening](#) of the first Resource Centre of Luhansk and Dnipro youth councils. According to the organisers, the Centre’s activities will increase the capacity to influence youth policy, build a dialogue between young people from among the displaced and local self-government bodies, and involve members of IDP youth councils in decision-making processes. The pilot Centre is equipped with up-to-date video and photo equipment, powerful computers, because the core “high-light” of this space is the creation of youth content which, as the organisers hope, will become an “information bridge” for Ukrainians living under the occupation. Another two similar centres will soon be opened in Chervivtsi and Ivano-Frankivsk for several displaced youth councils of Luhansk oblast.

1.2. Access to public information / information security

Within the reporting period, the system of governance of the controlled part of Donetsk oblast has not changed significantly. Military administrations at a variety of levels have continued functioning. However, despite their effectiveness in wartime conditions, they remained an extremely non-transparent system, with a lot of corruption risks.

First, the city military administrations practically did not publish official documents they adopted during their activities. For example, since the beginning of the year, Kramatorsk City Military Administration has published only four orders by the Administration Head, including two on budget issues and another two on renaming streets and a city park, although with regard to their numbering, there were more than 300 official documents during that period. At the same time, all the powers of city councils, including disposal of land resources and community property, were delegated by law to military administrations. Along with the closed public access to various data registries since February 2022, this opens up a playing field for corruption.

Second, the large number of procurements were conducted under the simplified procedure, without open auctions. Furthermore, city councils did not operate, a large part of the population fled and faced other problems, and most information was not published because of martial law.

Given the absence of the stable power supply in frontline population centres of Donetsk oblast and in some de-occupied villages, local residents could not use television or the Internet. Besides, Russian troops purposefully destroyed the network of communication relay stations. Following the outbreak of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine lost several powerful television towers at once in Mariupol from which broadcasting was carried out to the entire southern part of the oblast, Volnovakha which broadcasted to Russia-occupied Donetsk, and Bakhmut from which the television signal spread to the eastern part of the oblast. In fact, the oblast still had the powerful television broadcasting centre in Kramatorsk and much less powerful ones in Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka. For this very reason, the eastern and southern parts of the oblast were actually left without stable Ukrainian broadcasting.

At the time of writing of the report, the authorities [have been attempting](#) to solve that problem through speeding up the launch of the national multiplex MX-7 in the oblast. Due to the use of meter waves, it has a larger coverage area and is less vulnerable to enemy electronic warfare. According to the plan, several transmitters should be deployed in the territory of the oblast which could operate at high power and expand their Ukrainian-language television broadcasts to even the non-government controlled areas.

As for the areas where it is impossible to watch television or use the Internet because of the absence of electricity, the OMA has attempted to quench the hunger for information by [publishing](#) an information leaflet with a circulation of 2,000 copies twice a week, which was distributed in de-occupied population centres.

2. Work on identity

In Kherson oblast, the Programme for the Development and Functioning of the Ukrainian Language until 2025 [has been approved](#). According to the State Language Protection Commissioner, Taras Kremen, Kherson oblast is the first to launch the programme of this kind. [Its key objectives](#) are to expand the network of language courses, create 20 electronic libraries in educational facilities, carry out activities to promote reading, replenish library funds with the best national and world works of literature, etc.

In the process of the implementation of the programme, it is also planned to hold a literary festival, language and literature competitions, language and educational activities in schools, activities to popularise reading among the population of the oblast, etc. A total of UAH 3.305 million hryvnias has been earmarked to fund the programme, including UAH 735,000 this year. Hence, the first steps have been taken in the oblast for the implementation of public policy for strengthening the Ukrainian identity, promoting the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life, decolonising and de-Russifying the public space.

2.1. Changes in education standards

In the Ukrainian government-controlled areas of Donetsk oblast, children have studied online only. First, this was due to the fact that up to 75% of the population lived outside the oblast. Second, it was impossible even for those children who remained in cities to be enrolled full-time at schools for the reasons of their safety and security, because the occupiers systematically attacked schools of the oblast, as evidenced by the huge number of destroyed educational facilities.

Due to the impossibility of resuming full-time education in the past academic year, almost 10,000 school children from the controlled part of Donetsk oblast have moved to schools in other oblasts of the country. This tendency was observed most among junior school children. 18,000 children in the oblast went to the first grade in 2018, whereas during the full-scale war, the oblast schools managed to enrol only 5,000 first-graders in 2022. To reverse this trend, oblast authorities considered the possibility of partially resuming offline education in relatively remote communities. To this end, a certain number of kindergartens and schools in some communities were planned to be equipped with shelters. The oblast has even received a special subvention from the state budget for that purpose.

In order to overcome the disadvantages of online education, the leadership of the oblast actively created education and consulting centres. At the time of writing of the report, 21 centres of this kind have been set up in the oblast, and another 52 have operated on the basis of humanitarian hubs in different oblasts of the country. An emphasis was also placed on the fact that the centres were not an alternative to full-time learning. Their task was to provide school children with additional advice, taking into account the security requirements.

Notwithstanding an increase in the dynamics of military operations, Kharkiv oblast has continued to [prepare](#) for the new academic year. The total number of school children was higher compared to the same period a year earlier. Starting 1 September, Kharkiv schools will operate according to the [combined](#) form of education, as this will help meet, as much as possible, the educational needs of school children and ensure the necessary level of their security. Kharkiv City Council [has allocated](#) funds in the amount of UAH 49 million for the repair and construction of shelters for schools. Some shelters have already been [repaired](#) in the places that were attacked.

2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum work, holidays and their celebration

Kharkiv oblast has remained the largest in term of the number of Soviet-era place names subject to renaming. However, the pace of [renaming](#) was low which has triggered public discontent. One of the reasons for the delay was the absence of expert public council dealing with professional selection of new place names.

In March, the city renaming commission started operating in Kherson. The commission has established a working group of experts who prepared a list of place names in Kherson urban territorial community that, in their opinion, needed to be de-Russified or decolonised. On 10 May, the first group for renaming was announced. Among the proposed new place names were those in honour of the Heroes of Kherson, Bakhmutska, Mariupolska, Bandery, and some historical names were returned. The discussion of the proposed place names was supposed to last until 10 July.

3. Joint action

3.1. Cooperation at the community–authorities level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

>> LOCAL INITIATIVES

Although military operations caused a lot of destruction of civilian infrastructure, people have gradually returned to Kharkiv. It was decided to [resume](#) renew the city's target programme for the construction (purchase) of housing for young people. The programme will offer an additional opportunity to meet the needs of internally displaced persons who have relocated from other populated areas of the oblast or from other oblasts of the country.

III. UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AREAS

1. Changes in the system of governance

Within May–June 2023, authorities and local self-government bodies of rear areas operated in the following focus areas: organisation of community life; establishment and development of cooperation with Western partners and donors; and provision of assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

At a meeting on 13 June, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decided to **create** positions of deputy heads for recovery in eight ministries and twelve oblasts. Positions of deputy heads of oblast state administrations **have been introduced** in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Chernihiv Oblast State Administrations.

In Odesa oblast, the appointment of a new OMA Head was a key political event in May–June. During a working visit to Odesa oblast on 31 May, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, personally **introduced** the newly appointed Head of Odesa OMA, Oleh Kiper, who had, until that moment, led Kyiv City Prosecutor's Office. The former OMA Head, Maksym Marchenko, was dismissed back in mid-March.

1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

>> INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

According to the monitoring data on Zakarpattia oblast, Hradec Králové Region of the Czech Republic will join the construction of a rehabilitation centre for the wounded in Uzhhorod. A total of six regions of the Czech Republic can participate in the centre's co-funding. The total cost of the project has been set at around UAH 60 million.

In Chernivtsi oblast, attention has been paid to the development of customs infrastructure. At a regular meeting of the international technical group for the development of customs infrastructure on 22 June, the need to improve the network of railway crossing points, in particular, Vadul-Siret – Vicșáni, **was the focus** of debate. Certain steps have also been taken towards improving customs cooperation with the Republic of Moldova: a relevant agreement **was signed** on the construction of a new bridge on the Ukrainian-Moldovan state border across the Dniester between Yampil, Ukraine, and Cosăuți, Moldova, which is also important in view of interregional interaction.

On 13 June, a delegation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees **visited** Mykolaiv. During the meeting, the parties discussed the issue of meeting the priority needs of IDPs, as well as the provision of humanitarian aid for the reconstruction of damaged housing in the form of construction materials worth USD2.2 million. Michelle Alfaro, UNHCR's Senior Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Coordinator, said that it was possible to use the resources of one of Japanese non-governmental organisations to rebuild multi-storey residential buildings damaged by Russian attacks.

On 26 May, Mykolaiv city authorities signed the Memorandum of Understanding to launch a partnership of solidarity with the Danish city of Aalborg. The document provides for cooperation in economic development, construction, deployment of green technologies, etc. According to the Mayor, the city cooperates with the Danish government on heat and water supply, development of the master plan and the reconstruction project of Mykolaiv.

The Ministry of Energy of Ukraine **has handed over** five JCB3CX excavators, a Hyundai backhoe loader, and an XCMG 25 mobile crane to Mykolaiv TPP. The equipment was purchased with the support of the Federal

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, the Secretariat of the Energy Community, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programme.

Mykolaiv will be the first among European cities where water will be [purified](#) by innovative installations. The city will receive five installations of this kind from Germany.

>> INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION

As a result of the destruction of Kakhovka dam by the Russian terrorists, 400 facilities for permanent accommodation and food [have been deployed](#) in Ternopil oblast. “The rescuers of Ternopil oblast are ready, if necessary, to urgently go to the place of destruction to help eliminate the consequences of flooding. Also, our Emergency Department collects the necessary equipment to provide an environmental emergency response. We are talking about motor pumps and boats,” Volodymyr Trush, Head of Ternopil OMA, said. He also noted that Ternopil oblast sent 50 tons of drinking water to Kherson oblast.

On 6 June, Lviv City Council quickly [convened](#) a meeting of the city evacuation commission which created an algorithm for receiving people evacuated from the flooded populated areas. In June, a coordinating centre for the support of the civilian population [has been established](#) under Lviv OMA. Lviv Regional Center of Emergency Medical Care [has passed on](#) humanitarian aid to Kherson oblast.

According to Zakarpattia OMA, Zakarpattia oblast had a regional emergency response plan and was ready to receive evacuated residents of Kherson oblast. Representatives of authorities say that as of June, there were about [two thousand places](#) for long-term accommodation in the oblast. Where necessary, up to another 10,000 temporary accommodation places can be arranged in social institutions in the shortest possible time.

[According to](#) Oleksandr Sienkevych, Mayor of Mykolaiv, two collection points for refugees from Kherson oblast were deployed in Mykolaiv on 6 June: one at the railway station and the other at the bus station. Then they were evacuated to other regions. The Head of Mykolaiv OMA, Vitalii Kim, said that for the evacuation of the population, local authorities of Mykolaiv allocated 10 buses that transported people around the city, and 10 vehicles that delivered water to Kherson. “Snihurivka can accommodate up to 200 displaced persons. 350 additional beds for evacuees have been deployed,” Mykolaiv OMA Head said.

As of 15 June, some 1,000 people [used](#) the services of one of evacuation reception centres in Mykolaiv. Together with volunteers, there worked representatives of international and public organisations, including the Red Cross of Ukraine, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Danish Refugee Council, the French Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), and the 10th of April public organisation. They provided humanitarian kits, hot meals and registered evacuees for financial aid.

“The Danish Refugee Council paid UAH 6,660 per displaced person, for which it allocated UAH 2.7 million; Ukrposhta also paid UAH 2,000 per adult and UAH 3,000 per child or person with disabilities,” Vitalii Kim [claimed](#).

On 16 June, the Head of Ivano-Frankivsk OMA, Svitlana Onyshchuk, [announced](#) preliminary results of assistance provided to the flooded areas following the collapse of Nova Kakhovka dam. In a week, it was possible to collect and send to the affected region some 100 tons of drinking water, 20 tons of foods, 5 tons of hygiene products and household chemicals, 400 kilograms of clothes, animal feeds and water containers, and two cars of slate provided by Ivano-Frankivsk-DAH LLC.

On 15 June, the 36th [meeting](#) of Ivano-Frankivsk City Council took place. Deputies decided to help frontline population centres of Huliaipole, Zaporizhzhia oblast, and Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk oblast, where soldiers of the 102nd Brigade of the Territorial Defence Forces from Ivano-Frankivsk oblast were fighting. Deputies decided to earmark a subvention of UAH 500,000 to each community for the purchase of fuels and lubricants, and rehabilitation equipment.

>> ACCESS TO SHELTERS

On the night of 1 June, Russia carried out another massive attack on Kyiv. Three people [have been killed](#) as a result of the fall of fragments of a downed missile in front of the closed entrance to the shelter. On the same day, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, instructed to check all shelters in Ukraine.

Shelter inspections [have showed](#) that 26% of facilities were not suitable for use and another 9.3% were closed. At a special meeting, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine has instructed local

authorities and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to refit shelters within a month, as well as to strengthen accountability for their improper maintenance and refusal to provide access.

Specifically, during the inspection in Chernivtsi oblast, it [has been found](#) that 65 private and municipal shelters were closed. At a briefing, the Mayor of Chernivtsi, Roman Klichuk, [emphasised](#) that all city shelters would not only be open, but also comfortable. Nevertheless, at the time of writing of the report, there has been no information on the state of the fulfilment of this promise. Tenders for the repair of shelters [have been completed](#). The winners have been determined. The total expected cost [is](#) around UAH 3.5 million. The deadline for the completion of works is 31 August 2023.

[There is](#) a total of 1,785 protective structures in the oblast. However, not all of them are properly equipped, despite that the owners and tenants of the premises had to ensure their appropriate condition on the allocated subventions.

1.2. Access to public information

On 8 May, a new app, TurBOTa for IDPs, [was launched](#). The chatbot will help Ukrainians displaced from Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Chernivtsi find housing in a new oblast, find out what documents are required to register the IDP status, how and where to get help, addresses and phone numbers of administrative service centres, legal counselling, etc. The project is implemented by the Crimean Tatar Resource Center as part of the Enhance Non-Governmental Actors and Grassroots Engagement (ENGAGE) activity funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

2. Work on identity

On 25 May, Lviv City Council [approved](#) the Programme for Promoting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language. The Programme deals with formal, non-formal, and informal education, the educational mission in the deoccupied territories, the promotion of the culture of reading and the Ukrainian language through ambassadors, i. e., influential representatives of contemporary culture, education, sports, and the like, support for the creation and distribution of up-to-date Ukrainian-language media content, literary activities, and book publishing, rethinking of the literary heritage of the totalitarian regime, etc.

2.1. Changes in education standards

All schools of Chernivtsi community [have refused](#) mass celebrations of the Last Bell ceremony. Among the positive developments are: 1) [transition](#) of all 15 vocational institutions of Bukovyna to study according to international education programmes, 2) opportunity of [tuition-free education](#) for people aged 45+, 3) Chernivtsi oblast has become one of the eleven participants in the UN [programme](#) providing financial support to general secondary educational institutions in the 2023/2024 academic year.

Among the negative changes are: 1) prospects for the [closure](#) of small schools due to the absence of funds for salaries, 2) corruption [accusations](#) of the management of Chernivtsi Law College.

School nutrition reform, initiated by First Lady Olena Zelenska, [has continued](#) in Ukraine. The reform is implemented through the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Embassy of Switzerland in Ukraine. Its idea is to make school meals healthier. One of the stages of the reform implementation is the creation of culinary hubs – educational and practical centres established on the basis of technical and vocational institutions to provide training, retraining, advanced training of school cooks and retraining of school canteen workers.

Last year, the first culinary hubs were launched in Kyiv oblast and in Lviv, while in 2023, such centres are supposed to be also created in Ternopil, Odesa, and Poltava oblasts where 60 agents of change with up-to-date skills are to be trained.

In Ternopil oblast, the first 20 culinary masters of Chortkiv Higher Vocational School [have learnt](#) new approaches to cooking for school children. In the future, they will help other school canteen workers master these approaches.

2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum work, holidays and their celebration

On 26 May, a meeting of the working group on decommunisation with representatives of 11 communities of Lviv raion [was held](#) in Lviv OMA. The working group identified more than 240 sites of the Soviet-era totalitarian heritage. 52 of them have already been dismantled.

In Odesa, from 25 April to 25 June, a public discussion was held on the renaming of toponymic objects in the city. At a meeting on 22 May, the historical and toponymic commission of Odesa City Council [agreed on](#) agreed on the renaming of 80 streets, lanes, etc.

Mykolaiv City Council [has approved](#) a new regulation on renaming toponyms – local authorities plan to get rid of all names associated with narratives of the imperial, totalitarian regime. Mykolaiv Mayor Oleksandr Sienkevych stressed that any changes would be discussed by the public and only then approved by the City Council. Furthermore, a commission of 15 persons is expected to be set up to study the expediency of renaming. An electronic survey on street renaming [has been launched](#) in Mykolaiv in mid-June. All city residents who reached the age of 14 years and have registered or actual place of residence, including those registered as IDPs, are to participate in the discussion. The vote by filling out the electronic form lasted until 15 July.

2.3. Freedom of religion

Since the Tomos of autocephaly was granted to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the OCU) in January 2019, 1,370 religious communities announced their [conversion](#) from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) to the OCU. The fewest number of UOC MP parishes remained in Halychyna, including 17 in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, 27 in Lviv oblast, and 74 in Ternopil oblast. Besides, these oblasts have the highest percentage of conversions from the Moscow Patriarchate to the OCU. The Moscow Patriarchate lost 46% of its parishes in Lviv oblast, 43.75% in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, and 36% in Ternopil oblast.

623 religious communities of the UOC MP [operated](#) in Zakarpattia oblast. After 24 February 2022, none of them filed an application for conversion to the OCU with the Oblast State Administration. However, conflicts between religious communities of the UOC MP and the OCU over the right to use the temple building sparked from time to time and lasted for more than a year in some places. As the bishop of Uzhhorod and Zakarpattia OCU Varsonofy (Rudnik) reported, there were three OCU dioceses in the oblast, with a little more than 50 religious communities.

Albeit slowly, the conversion of OCU communities has continued in Chernivtsi oblast: the community of the St. Archangel Michael Church of Chorny Potik village, Zastavna raion, unanimously [voted](#) in favour of that decision. At the time of writing of the report, relevant documents were being prepared for registration. Within May, the communities of [Pohorilivka](#), [Samushyn](#), [Rososhany](#), [Novi Broskivtsi](#) villages have converted to the OCU.

On 23 May, believers of the UOC MP [went on](#) a procession to Bancheny Holy Ascension Monastery, despite the postponement of the event announced on the Facebook page of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna Diocese. Notwithstanding reports drawn up on the organisers, their names have not been released.

The day before, on 22 May, the police, based on the materials by the Security Service of Ukraine, [served](#) a notice of suspicion on [Metropolitan Longinus \(Zhar\)](#), Head of Bancheny Holy Ascension Monastery of the UOC MP, for inciting ethnic hatred. Mykhailo Zhar has been known for his anti-Ukrainian statements since the time of the Revolution of Dignity. Now, there is [information](#) that the Metropolitan is reorienting himself towards the Romanian Orthodox Church, which is confirmed by publications in the Romanian-language media.

On 13 May, a forum of Christian volunteers [was conducted](#) in Chernivtsi, with the participation of more than 300 Evangelical Christians from different parts of Ukraine. The event was organised by We Are Close charity fund and Mission Eurasia, which since the first days of the war has been helping Ukrainians both in the east and those forced to leave their homes and relocate to other populated areas.

3. Joint action

3.1. Cooperation at the community–authorities level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

>> RELOCATION OF BUSINESSES

In early June, a study on the problems and prospects of relocated business in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, by the Center for Public Expertise, [has been presented](#). Entrepreneurs from Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts currently working in Ivano-Frankivsk who participated in the study, noted that local authorities understand their problems and help solve them. Cooperation and support on the part of Ivano-Frankivsk Chamber of Commerce and Industry, partner to an intensive training programme for local and relocated businesses implemented with the financial support from the United Nations Development Programme, was important for business representatives. They also underscored the convenience of registration procedures via Diia mobile app. Among the most important problems of relocated businesses the following have been listed: shortage of qualified and responsible employees; high housing rent for employees; weak development of local business clusters; “invisibility”, with active “support” from city bodies, of oblast authorities in matters of assistance to relocated businesses. In general, representatives of the business community stressed, with regard to local authorities, that the main things were “not to interfere” with doing business and make compromise decisions. This also applied to documentary checks, the use of cash registers, etc. Many entrepreneurs noted that following the deoccupation of their territories, they plan to preserve and develop relocated businesses in Ivano-Frankivsk, while resuming operations in their cities.

230 relocated businesses were registered in Lviv oblast as of 11 June. On 16 June, the Centre for Relocated Businesses [was opened](#) on the territory of the Saint Panteleimon Hospital of the First Territorial Medical Association of Lviv. The UNDP-supported Centre will serve as new headquarters for businesses relocated from war-affected oblasts to place their production facilities there on preferential terms. The UNDP has awarded the project a UAH 5.5 million grant, and another UAH 1.5 million was co-financed by Lviv City Council.

Following the outbreak of the full-scale war, Friendly Wind Technology LLC, the only manufacturer of the Multi-MW class wind power plants in Ukraine, [has relocated](#) from Kramatorsk to Perechyn, Zakarpattia oblast. The construction of the company’s new production plant, which would become part of the future industrial park, has begun. However, local residents complained, saying that the company seized the community land, and that production is harmful; that jobs were created for relocated workers only, and that locals were not employed; and that wages for IDPs and locals were allegedly different.

However, 800 people already worked in production, and the company was building housing for them at its own expense in Perechyn. In general, the company plans to create about three thousand new jobs. At the meeting of Perechyn City Council, Friendly Wind Technology [has initiated](#) the creation of a working group with community representatives to jointly respond to all the problems.

>> LOCAL INITIATIVES

The primary tasks of the Programme for the implementation of priority infrastructure projects, notably the reconstruction and upgrade of facilities which are used or can be used for accommodation of IDPs, [have continued to be accomplished](#) in Lviv oblast. [According to](#) the Finance Department of Lviv OMA, the pro-

programme implementation will help create 1,283 additional accommodation places for IDPs in 23 institutions, complete the construction and reconstruction of ten educational institutions, and provide favourable conditions for education of about 3,000 children in preschool institutions.

At the meeting of Lviv City Council on 25 May, City Heals, a social and cultural recovery programme for the militaries for 2023–2024 [was approved](#). As part of this initiative, free tours around the city were held for the militaries undergoing treatment or rehabilitation in health care facilities of Lviv city territorial community.

3.2. Cooperation at the level of society. Initiatives. Trust between groups

>> AID FOR THE ARMY

On 9 May, the hundredth drone was [sent](#) to Donetsk oblast as part of the twelfth humanitarian mission of the International Headquarters for Aid to Ukrainians and 1,000 Drones for Ukraine initiated by Dignitas with the support of Lviv and Donetsk OMAs. The hundredth drone for the militaries was purchased by the International Association of Ukrainian Women which raised funds through Greening of the Planet tree-planting campaign. Also, male and female defenders received vehicles from Forpost UA and humanitarian cargo, including food products, tactical medicinal items, hygiene products, and the like, from the International Headquarters for Aid to Ukrainians, Diia NGO, Business Woman Pro Canada, Nadiia Yashan.

On 22 May, within the framework of Birds of Victory charity initiative, 70 drones were [handed over](#) to male and female defenders of AFU brigades from Lviv oblast. Birds of Victory charity initiative unites socially responsible businesses, philanthropists, benefactors, and all those willing to support the Ukrainian army.

On 22 May, Ivano-Frankivsk-based [#SaveUkraineNow](#) (SUN) purchased and handed over to the militaries communications equipment and components estimated at a total of over UAH 680,000. The defenders from Prykarpattia received 20 kits of Motorola vehicle radios with headsets, fasteners and cables, as well as 50 additional batteries for Hytera hand-held radio transceivers. The equipment went to one of the hottest frontline spots. Since the outbreak of a full-scale invasion, SUN has provided the militaries with digital radio communications systems worth over UAH 23 million. [#SaveUkraineNow](#) (SUN) Coordination Center was created after 24 February 2022 by public organisations and businesses, together with the militaries to ensure comprehensive support for the defence forces from Ivano-Frankivsk oblast on the front lines.

Deputy of Mykolaiv City Council, Yurii Stepanets, [has made](#) a charity drive on a wheelchair from Mykolaiv to Kherson to raise funds for a vehicle for the separate reconnaissance platoon of the 409th Rifle Battalion. According to him, the drive was successful and with no technical difficulties. As planned, the man [has raised](#) UAH 200,000 for a vehicle on his way to Kherson.

>> HUMANITARIAN AID

Members of Snihurivka, Horokhivka, and Bereznehuvate communities of Mykolaiv oblast who suffered from flooding as a result of the destruction of Nova Kakhovka dam by the Russians, are entitled to one-time monetary assistance worth UAH 5,000 from the government and UAH 6,600 per family member from the [International Organization for Migration](#).

>> HEALTH CARE

The [UNBROKEN](#) National Rehabilitation Center has continued to operate in Lviv. This is a unique place where adults and children affected by the war can receive comprehensive qualified medical care, including reconstructive surgery, orthopedics, and robotic prosthetics. Here, prostheses are not only fitted but also manufactured. In addition, the Center provides physical, psychological, and psychosocial rehabilitation of the injured militaries and civilians. According to Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, sister cities of Lviv, including Vilnius, Freiburg, and Wrocław, have already supported the project. The German government has earmarked EUR10 million for the support of the Center, and Warsaw City Council will [provide](#) charitable aid worth EUR431,406.38. On 25 May, UAH 9 million hryvnias [were allocated](#) by Polish MPs from Gdansk to support the construction of the Rehabilitation Center.

Construction of social housing for patients of the UNBROKEN Center [has begun](#) in Lviv. It is planned to build eight houses for temporary accommodation of 700 people. The European Commission will give EUR19.5 million for the project.

4. Changes in the social structure

4.1. Challenges related to the situation of women and children, people with disabilities

In Ivano-Frankivsk, the humanitarian centre for IDPs of the Community of Sant'Egidio was actively [operating](#) where displaced persons could receive humanitarian aid once a month. Displaced persons from Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Dnipro worked as volunteers there. Volunteers received about 300 IDPs a day. A Peace School for children functioned at the centre. A children's playroom was set up there, so that children, together with volunteers, could do school homework, participate in interesting competitions, quizzes, and tours, learn foreign languages, and draw.

On 19 June, the charitable children's summer camp, Happy Holidays, [started operating](#) on the basis of the Mykolaiv Volunteer Centre at the House of Navy Officers. Three sessions of 25 people each have been formed. All participants are children from IDP families.

On 22 May, Mykolaiv Oblast Library for Youth [hosted](#) an interactive theatrical event, Ukrainians Without Barriers, whose aim was to familiarise Mykolaiv residents with the problem of social barriers. Taking into account the European experience of explaining social issues to the general public, the organisers chose theatrical performance as the main method of influencing the audience.

4.2. Needs of displaced persons. Response

More than 30% of displaced persons, or about one hundred thousand people, [planned to stay](#) in Zakarpattia. This is evidenced by the data of a sociological survey ordered by Zakarpattia OMA. The results obtained actualised the need to provide people with housing.

In Uzhhorod in May, the took stock of the [monitoring](#) of the status, needs and future intentions of IDPs living in the oblast. The study had been planned and implemented by the International Organization for Migration, in cooperation with Zakarpattia OMA, Zakarpattia Regional Charitable Organisation Edelweiss, and the National Institute for Strategic Studies. The Reforms Delivery Office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine also participated in the development of data collection tools. The study was conducted in all six raions of the oblast from 9 to 27 November 2022.

The main results are as follows: a) the majority of IDPs have moved to Zakarpattia from Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, b) IDPs and Zakarpattia residents primarily mention financial support as their key need, c) almost 90% of IDPs were able to access necessary health care, social, educational, and other services and types of support, d) more than 30% of IDPs are employed (full-time / part-time). Most local residents positively assessed the changes that had taken place in their communities since the arrival of IDPs. An increase in demand for local services was most often mentioned (60%), a change in their attitude towards other oblasts of Ukraine (34%), and a feeling of strengthening public cohesion around a common problem (28%).

New IDP associations were emerging. Specifically, on 16 June, the IDP council [was established](#) in Kolyomyia community in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. Its major activities will be aimed at protecting the rights of IDPs, employment, housing, assistance in the development of relocated businesses and their general adaptation in another city. An IDP from Mariupol and lawyer, Nataliia Nipliukhina, has come up with the above initiative. In her opinion, it is necessary first to set up effective communication between authorities and citizens.

>> HOUSING FOR IDPS

On 21 June, a coordination meeting dedicated to the implementation of the housing project by the International Organization for Migration, in cooperation with Lviv and Luhansk OMAs, [was held](#). The project was launched in 2020 in Luhansk oblast. However, due to the full-scale invasion, it was relocated to Lviv oblast. It is planned to construct three residential complexes in Kamianka-Buzka and Drohobych communities and to renovate housing in the city of Staryi Sambir for the accommodation of 1,326 to 1,668 IDPs. In total, 442 to 556 apartments should be created.

In Mykolaiv oblast, a design project of a 26-section building for more than 1,700 apartments for IDPs was developed. *"We have set ourselves an ambitious goal – we have made a design project for the construction of a 26-section building for more than 1,700 apartments for IDPs in the city of Pervomaisk. I invite all donors and international institutions to join and help us complete this project,"* Oleksandr Traitli, Deputy Head of Mykolaiv OMA, [emphasised](#). He also added that the problem of provision with housing was very urgent at the moment, as many residents of the oblast had lost their homes due to shelling.

In Svaliava raion, Zakarpattia oblast, preparations to open housing for more than 100 displaced persons [have been under way](#). A modular town was to be opened in the territory of Svaliava Vocational Construction Lyceum where ten modular houses were being built, with a lyceum dormitory being also refitted for housing. The works were carried out with the financial support from Caritas Czech Republic.

In early May in Chernivtsi oblast, the aggregated information on the number of residential facilities arranged for displaced persons in 2022–2023 [was published](#): 40 facilities were selected for the construction of new housing and the improvement of existing living quarters; repair works on twenty facilities were completed; others were under repair (11); there were also pending tenders to procure contractors' services.

>> EMPLOYMENT OF IDPS

[According to](#) the Deputy Director of Zakarpattia Oblast Employment Centre, Beatrysa Biletska, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, almost 640 displaced people have found jobs in the oblast, and since the beginning of this year, their number is 118.

Grant programmes aimed at preserving the labour potential and business development were also in place in the oblast. Specifically, employers were granted reimbursement for each person employed from among IDPs, and there was a grant programme for war veterans, persons with disabilities and their family members under which they could receive an amount from UAH 250,000 to UAH 1 million to start up or develop their business.

In June, the Head of Ivano-Frankivsk OMA, Svitlana Onyshchuk, [summed up](#) the results of the employment of displaced persons in the oblast: during the full-scale war, 842 IDPs had been employed in Prykarpattia; 4,700 IDPs had used services of employment centres, including 2,600 who had been granted the status of unemployed; this year, 5 IDPs have received vouchers for training and professional development, 20 persons have been involved in public and temporary works, 24 persons have been engaged in socially useful works under martial law; and the Oblast Employment Centre has provided reimbursement to 405 employers for the employment of 679 IDPs.

4.3. Needs of volunteers of Territorial Defence Forces. Response. Mobilisation

The organisation of military conscription of citizens has remained a serious problem. There was a trend of mobilisation evasion by people of draft age. Specifically, [according](#) to the preliminary report by the Verkhovna Rada Temporary Commission of Inquiry into Possible Violations of Legislation of Ukraine Governing Receipt, Distribution, Transportation, Storage, and Intended Use of Humanitarian and Other Aid, there is a significant number of draft-age men who, following the expiration of duration of their stay abroad, have not returned to Ukraine. *"The number of such persons is 9,373, or 11.17% of the total number,"* the document reads. Most of such cases have been recorded in Kharkiv, Ternopil, and Volyn oblasts.

Institutions responsible for mobilisation were looking for new approaches to fulfil their tasks. On 13 June, the Head of Ivano-Frankivsk Territorial Centre of Recruitment and Social Support, Roman Plytus, signed the [order](#) “On general mobilisation”. The document, in particular, says that the draft-age men of Ivano-Frankivsk community should contact the Territorial Centre of Recruitment and Social Support within 10 days. In particular, the [document](#) provides for human resource and vehicle mobilisation and imposes the ban on changing the place of residence by the draft-age men without prior permission of the Centre’s Head.


The [statement](#) by the Head of Kolomyia Raion Military Administration, Liubomyr Hlushkov, about the suspension of scheduled hospitalisation of men aged 18 to 59 in Prykarpattia area without prior consent of the Territorial Centre of Recruitment and Social Support has also been a focus of public attention. *“In view of the state of martial law, the decision to suspend scheduled hospitalisations of draft-age patients without prior agreement with the Territorial Centre of Recruitment should be drafted and brought to the notice of health care facilities of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. Communication of information about the hospitalisation of draft-age men aged 18 to 59 should be ensured,”* the official said.

The deputy Head of Ivano-Frankivsk OMA, Vitalii Ilchysyn, [said](#) that no decision banning hospitalisation had been adopted by the Defence Council. The Department of Health was tasked with working out and coming up with its decision on whether or not to impose a ban. *“Ivano-Frankivsk OMA operates in strict accordance with the applicable legislation and will not violate human rights, because everyone has the right to quality health care under the Constitution. I agree that this issue as presented at a meeting of the Defence Council was not detailed which caused ambiguities in its interpretation by the general public. All residents and guests of Prykarpattia are now receiving aid, as usual,”* he said.

DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

Conceptual framework of the approach of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion

RESILIENCE means a social practice at the national, oblast, and local levels that offers opportunities to overcome challenges and adapt to transformations.



We measure resilience in the following three dimensions:

- **adaptive capacity** of social systems and institutions to crises and sudden environmental changes,
- **self-recovery** that means mobilisation of citizens, institutions to jointly solve various humanitarian, social, and security tasks,
- **resistance** means stabilisation of models of cooperation between the government, business community, and civil society which contributes to increasing the level of cross-sectoral trust in the course of transformation.

SOCIAL COHESION means the state of relationships in society between social groups (horizontal cohesion) and between society and the authorities (vertical cohesion). It is measured by the levels of trust and norms of reciprocity (development of positive social capital); the strength of civil society; and conflict management institutions being in place (e.g., responsible democracy, independent judiciary, etc.).

RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL COHESION ARE BASED on common approaches, shared values, and versatile models of cooperation.

>> FOCUS

- on actors, changes in the governance, assessment of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and transformation as opposed to return to the previous state.

>> DATA COLLECTION:

- temporarily occupied and frontline areas – Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv oblasts, Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place – Odesa, Mykolaiv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Zakarpattia, and Chernivtsi oblasts.

DATA SOURCES: publications in the media, decisions of authorities, draft decisions of authorities, data of surveys and public opinion polls, data of social networking sites, reports of non-governmental organisations, and any other publicised information. The data are collected by coordinators of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion in 12 oblasts, based on data sources, their own understanding of the state of affairs and involvement in local cohesion processes.

>> PROBLEMS

In the temporarily occupied areas:

- Dynamics of occupation. The advance of Russian troops, the situation in occupied population centres; opinion of the population of the oblast / community / political forces regarding Russia's occupation and military actions.
- Changes in the system of governance. Decisions and information of the occupying authorities; cases of collaborationism; seizure of property; expropriation of products by the occupying administrations.
- Humanitarian situation. Filtration measures of the occupying authorities; forced deportation and its routes; hostage taking; recruitment into armed formations; nature of evacuation; destruction; access to health care services.
- Work on identity. The operation of educational facilities; relocation of school children, students, and teachers; forced Russification; Russian state education standards; politics of memory: place names, museum work, holidays and their celebration; activities of religious organisations.
- Changes in the social structure. Challenges related to the situation of women, children, and people with disabilities.

In the Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place:

- Dynamics of military operations. Shelling and attacks / weapons used against the civilian population; destruction.
- Changes in the system of governance. The organisation of activities of authorities and access of citizens to decision-making at the local level; access to public information; coordination of actions of volunteers and authorities, as well as actions between authorities at a variety of levels, authorities and the militaries, volunteers and the militaries, etc.
- Humanitarian situation. The accessibility of drinking water, food, communication, electricity; access to health care services; provision with humanitarian aid at the oblast level.
- Changes in the social environment. The attitudes in communities to changes in symbols, calendars (holidays, memorial days); renaming of streets and other public places; operation of educational facilities, relocation of school children, students, and teachers; civil society and business community, labour market.
- The situation of internally displaced persons. The availability of housing and employment; integration into the host community; networking.

>> THE PUBLISHING FREQUENCY OF THE REPORT

The initial monitoring report covers the first four months of the large-scale invasion (from February through June), starting 24 February 2022; and each of the follow-up reports has a two-month timeframe.



ABOUT UKRAINIAN CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL RESEARCH

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RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

Periodic report based on monitoring materials from selected regions of Ukraine
Issue No. 7. May – June 2023

Gorobchyshyna Svitlana Anatoliivna
Kovalenko Olha Serhiivna
Kononchuk Svitlana Hryhorivna
Skvortsova Valeriia Olehivna

Edited by Doboni Mariana Ivanivna
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