

Index

Civil Society Organization Sustainability in Ukraine

REPORT
2025



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UCIPR
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UKRAINIAN CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL RESEARCH

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

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CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

This report is based on the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) methodology, which assesses the sustainability of civil society organizations (CSOs). The CSOSI methodology was developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and, as of 2022, was implemented by FHI 360 in partnership with the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) in 73 countries.

Since 2023, CSOSI reports for Ukraine have been prepared by the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index) covers the following seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability:

- 1) legal environment,
- 2) organizational capacity,
- 3) financial viability,
- 4) advocacy,
- 5) service provision,
- 6) sectoral infrastructure,
- 7) public image.

Expert panel members from different oblasts of Ukraine and representing various areas of CSO activity discuss changes in each dimension during the year under review, assess them against the previous year, and propose scores for each dimension. The seven dimension scores are then averaged to produce a preliminary overall CSO sustainability score. The CSOSI uses a scale from 1, representing the highest level of sustainability, to 7, representing the lowest. The minimum score change is 0.1 point, while changes of up to 0.5 point may be proposed in cases of significant developments with a substantial impact on the sector.

The expert panel's assessments are supplemented by desk research covering each of the seven dimensions and by focus group discussions conducted by UCIPR experts with representatives of CSOs from different oblasts of Ukraine and different areas of activity.

This report draws on data from six focus groups involving representatives of 31 civil society organizations and an online survey completed by representatives of 40 CSOs.

Further details on the findings of previous studies are available through the [Interactive Dashboard of the Civil Society Organizations Sustainability Index in Ukraine](https://dashboard-cso-index.ucipr.org.ua)¹.

1 <https://dashboard-cso-index.ucipr.org.ua>

ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
ASC	Administrative Services Center
CF	Charitable Foundation
CO	Charitable Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization Relations
EU	European Union
HOA	Homeowners Association
HR	Human Resources
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IREX	International Research & Exchanges Board
KIIS	Kyiv International Institute of Sociology
LGBTIQ+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, Queer, and Other People with Diverse Sexual Orientations, Gender Identities, Gender Expressions, or Sex Characteristics
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSCE	Національне антикорупційне бюро України
PIT	Personal Income Tax
PO	Public Organization
PR	Public Relations
PU	Public Union
SAPO	Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office
SMM	Social Media Marketing
UHF	Ukraine Humanitarian Fund
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	Value-Added Tax

In 2025, Ukraine continued to suffer from Russia's armed aggression. The fourth year of the full-scale war saw the highest number of civilian casualties since the outbreak of the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion: 2,514 civilians were killed, and 12,142 were injured.² Attacks on critical infrastructure across the country also intensified, resulting in longer emergency power outages than in the previous year. In 2025, Russia used approximately 60,000 guided aerial bombs, 2,400 missiles of various types, and around 100,000 attack drones against Ukraine.³ Russia also made limited advances along the front line. Despite sustaining enormous losses, Russian forces took control of approximately 4,670 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory in 2025, representing about 0.77 percent of the country's total area.⁴ Hostilities continued to significantly affect the work of CSOs and activists, particularly those operating near the line of contact, and remained the primary source of danger and threat to their lives.

The year was also marked by an intensification of negotiations aimed at ending the war between Ukraine and Russia, largely facilitated by U.S. President Donald Trump, who took office in 2025, and his administration. Despite numerous meetings and active U.S. involvement, the negotiations produced no significant results.

Trump's return to office also had a substantial impact on U.S. foreign policy and its priorities. At the initiative of the new administration, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) suspended most of its projects worldwide, including in Ukraine, in early 2025. This was followed by the large-scale termination of USAID-funded programs and USAID's transition out of operating as an independent agency in July 2025. These developments dealt a severe blow to numerous programs and projects involving civil society organizations. Most Ukrainian CSOs faced serious financial difficulties following the termination of USAID funding, leading to substantial reductions in their activities and staffing.

An important development during the year was the civil society sector's response to the authorities' attempt to limit the independence of anti-corruption institutions. In July 2025, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law that substantially expanded the Prosecutor General's powers over NABU and SAPO. This prompted a strong response from CSOs, young people, journalists, activists, and Ukraine's international partners and, in turn, led to large-scale protests across Ukraine, known as the "Cardboard Maidan." Under pressure from the public and the EU, the authorities introduced new legislation and restored the independence of the anti-corruption institutions.

Despite the challenges and difficulties faced by Ukrainian CSOs described above, the overall CSO sustainability score in Ukraine did not change in 2025. However, there were changes in individual dimensions. Specifically, the legal environment and service provision scores improved by 0.1 point, primarily due to the adoption of several favorable laws and the overall intensification of European integration processes. At the same time, organizational capacity deteriorated by 0.1 point, while CSO financial viability deteriorated by 0.2 point. The main factors behind the deterioration in these two dimensions were the exhaustion of the civil society sector caused by the protracted war for Ukraine's independence and the effective suspension of extensive USAID funding in Ukraine.

According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 109,014 public organizations, 2,594 public associations, 28,791 trade unions and 179 trade union associations, 28,384 religious organizations, 32,923 charitable organizations, 1,869 population self-organized bodies, 41,641 homeowners associations (HOAs), and 325 creative unions had legal status in Ukraine as of 1 January 2026. These data exclude the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.⁵

2 <https://ukraine.ohchr.org/uk/2025-deadliest-year-for-civilians-in-Ukraine-since-2022-UN-human-rights-monitors-find>

3 https://t.me/U24_gov_ua/12063


4 <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/>

5 <https://stat.gov.ua/uk/explorer?md5=4666bff85d1f2e64ee8b9c17e54f3655>


THE DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEX IN 2025

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THE DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEX IN 2025



I. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.2



The CSO legal environment score was 3.2 in 2025, marking a 0.1-point improvement compared to 2024. Overall, legislative developments during the reporting year were favorable for CSOs, with a few minor exceptions.

The key laws of Ukraine governing the legal framework for CSO activities remained the laws “On State Registration of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs and Public Organizations”⁶, “On Public Associations”⁷, “On Charitable Activities and Charitable Organizations”⁸, “On Volunteering”⁹, “On Humanitarian Aid”¹⁰, and “On Social Services”¹¹, as well as the Tax Code of Ukraine.¹²

6 Law of Ukraine “On State Registration of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs and Public Organizations”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/755-15#Text>

7 Law of Ukraine “On Public Associations”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4572-17#Text>

8 Law of Ukraine “On Charitable Activities and Charitable Organizations”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5073-17#Text>

9 Law of Ukraine “On Volunteering”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3236-17#Text>

10 Law of Ukraine “On Humanitarian Aid”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1192-14#Text>

11 Law of Ukraine “On Social Services”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2671-19#Text>

12 Tax Code of Ukraine. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2755-17#Text>

Significant changes were made to registration procedures for public organizations. The main innovation in 2025 was the introduction of an option to register a public organization on the basis of a model charter.¹³ Although the service did not become fully operational in 2025 and remained at the beta-testing stage, this option represented an important development for civil society. It significantly simplified the process of establishing a public organization by eliminating the need to submit documents in person to justice authorities or a state registrar. Progress was also made on the draft Law “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine to Regulate the Activities and State Registration of Public Organizations”¹⁴, which aimed to create more favorable legislative conditions for the operation of public organizations.

CSO representatives working in the oblasts confirmed that the procedures for registering and re-registering public organizations were accessible and relatively straightforward. At the same time, focus group participants emphasized the need for online procedures and for expanding the range of entities authorized to register public organizations. As an example, they noted that charitable organizations could be registered by a broad range of state registrars, ASCs, and notaries, whereas public organizations could be registered only by the territorial bodies of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.¹⁵

Legislation governing public participation improved significantly following the President’s signing and enactment of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Democracy at the Level of Local Self-Government.”¹⁶ The law required local self-government bodies to ensure the adoption of community charters by the end of 2026. In 2025, the active phase of the law’s implementation began: communities started developing the local regulations necessary for participation mechanisms to function, and the first charters were adopted. Additional support for communities adapting to the new requirements was provided through the preparation by the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, with the support of civil society organizations, of Methodological Recommendations for Developing a Territorial Community Charter. Work on amendments to the legislation governing population self-organized bodies also continued in 2025.¹⁷

The Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine” to Ensure Transparency of Local Self-Government”¹⁸ was actively implemented in 2025. As of 1 April 2025, 99.1 percent of oblast councils and approximately 75 percent of communities and district councils published video recordings of their meetings. Although the law did not require mandatory livestreaming until the end of martial law, one in five local councils already used this format. Most local councils also incorporated provisions on video recording and livestreaming of meetings into their rules of procedure, while nearly 74 percent of citizens believed that livestreaming local council meetings increased the effectiveness of their work.¹⁹

In 2025, several important legal acts concerning humanitarian aid were adopted.

13 CMU Resolution “On the Implementation of a Pilot Project to Enable Public Organizations to Operate on the Basis of a Model Charter”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/460-2025-%D0%BF#Text>

14 Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine to Regulate the Activities and State Registration of Public Organizations”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/40561>

15 Report on the Study “Sustainability of Civil Society Organizations in 2025”. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research

16 Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Democracy at the Level of Local Self-Government”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3703-20#Text>

17 Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Population Self-Organized Bodies” to Improve the Procedures for the Establishment, Operation, and Termination of a Population Self-Organized Body”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/28346>

18 Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government in Ukraine” to Ensure Transparency of Local Self-Government”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3590-20#Text>

19 Practice of Application and Assessment of the Effectiveness of Legislation on Ensuring Transparency in Local Self-Government. The study was prepared by the U-LEAD with Europe Programme at the request of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Committee on State Building, Local Governance, Regional and Urban Development. URL: <https://komsamovr.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/44641.pdf>

Specifically, amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Humanitarian Aid” (the Law No. 4608 regulating the activities of humanitarian organizations²⁰) granted public, charitable, and religious organizations the right to import vehicles as humanitarian aid without paying VAT or customs duties and to use them for their statutory and humanitarian activities. At the same time, full implementation of this mechanism required the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to adopt the relevant secondary legislation.

Amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine introduced by the Law No. 4505²¹ were also important for the sector, as they exempted social services provided by public organizations from VAT. This decision addressed the longstanding problem of unequal conditions for public and non-governmental social service providers. Previously, services provided by CSOs were effectively more expensive because they were subject to taxation, which significantly reduced their competitiveness in procurement procedures and tenders.

In addition, amendments were made to secondary legislation governing humanitarian aid to simplify the procedures for importing, registering, and accounting for vehicles received as humanitarian aid²² and to expand the list of charitable aid goods and services exempt from personal income tax or military levy.²³

The legal framework governing volunteer activities also changed. Active work continued on developing the State Targeted Social Program for the Development of Volunteer Activities in Ukraine through 2030, in close cooperation with the civil society sector. Legislative efforts were also made to introduce state insurance covering volunteers’ lives, health, and ability to work. The relevant draft laws were registered and referred to the relevant parliamentary committees.^{24,25} In 2025, a draft law abolishing visa requirements for foreign nationals and stateless persons working as humanitarian workers or volunteers during martial law was also registered and adopted as a basis.²⁶ The civil society sector advocated for and supported the draft law, as it would significantly simplify the involvement of foreign volunteers in activities in Ukraine.

A landmark development in the legal environment for the civil society sector was the approval of the 2025–2026 Action Plan for the Implementation of the National Strategy for Promoting Civil Society Development. The plan provided for the implementation of 34 tasks through partnerships between public authorities and civil society.²⁷ The Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions and the Roadmap on the Rule of Law, prepared by

20 Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Humanitarian Aid” to Regulate the Activities of Humanitarian Organizations”. Electronic Cabinet of a Citizen. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4608-20#Text>

21 Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine and Other Laws of Ukraine to Expand Patients’ Access to Medicinal Products Procured by an Entity Authorized to Conduct Health-Care Procurement through Managed Entry Agreements”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4505-20#Text>

22 CMU Resolution “On Approval of the Procedure and Timeframes for the Transfer by a Service Member of the Original Personal Directive to the Commander of a Military Unit or the Commander/Head of a Subdivision of a Body (Service or Military Formation) for Storage in the Personnel File”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/550-2024-%D0%BF#Text>

23 CMU Resolution “On Approval of the List of Funds, Goods (Works and Services) for the Purchase of Which, or in the Form of Which, Charitable Assistance Is Provided without Including Its Amount (Value) in the Taxable Income of Personal Income Taxpayers”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/112-2016-%D0%BF#Text>

24 Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Volunteering” regarding Compulsory State Insurance of Volunteers’ Lives, Health, and Ability to Work”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/56841>

25 Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Volunteering” regarding State Insurance of Volunteers’ Lives, Health, and Ability to Work”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/56928>

26 Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Section IV “Final Provisions” of the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons” regarding the Exemption of Certain Categories of Foreigners and Stateless Persons from Visa Requirements for the Duration of Martial Law”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4816-IX#Text>

27 CMU Order “On Approval of the Plan for the Implementation in 2025–2026 of the National Strategy for Promoting the Development of Civil Society in Ukraine for 2021–2026”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-zatverdzh-spryannia-rozvytku-hromadianskoho-suspilstva-v-ukraini-na-20212026-roky-i-246?fbclid=IwY2xjawJcsiZleHRuA2FibQixMAABHZvAHwODjUu_WybbVjH2cENkPYwc15t61ciZcZ2TDc7ONZEm8zWgmariSQ_aem_JLrTK2HoPpaT5GtkaG7y5w

the government as part of the European integration process, were also important for CSOs. These documents included measures to develop participatory democracy, create favorable conditions for civil society activities, and strengthen democratic practices. Implementation of these measures had already begun, providing additional impetus for public authorities to step up their efforts to support civil society.²⁸

Several potentially threatening legislative developments nevertheless occurred in 2025. In particular, the Law of Ukraine “On Lobbying”²⁹ entered into force, and the Transparency Register³⁰ became operational. The Law’s broad interpretation of “commercial interest” and the absence of an explicit exclusion for CSOs created risks of pressure on the civil society sector and possible interference with the activities of public organizations. During the second half of 2025, 14 CSOs obtained the status of lobbying entities.³¹

Legislative initiatives posing risks to freedom of expression also raised concerns within the civil society sector. Among these initiatives was legislation intended to ensure compliance with guarantees for the practice of law, which had been adopted by the end of 2025 and was awaiting the President’s signature. The legislation prohibited identifying a lawyer with their client.³² Other concerns included legislation restricting access to certain information in public registers³³ and the recodification of Book Two of the Civil Code of Ukraine.³⁴

According to ZMINA Human Rights Center, 178 cases of persecution of and losses among civil society representatives were documented in government-controlled areas of Ukraine in 2025. More than 60 percent of these cases were related to Russian aggression. At the same time, the reporting year was marked by several high-profile cases of pressure on civil society activists. Anti-corruption and environmental activists, representatives of the Public Integrity Council, and LGBTIQ+ activists faced persecution.³⁵

Problems with banking services for CSOs continued to be reported in 2025. CSO representatives working in frontline areas reported being required to submit additional supporting documents when opening and maintaining bank accounts to prove that their registered address was in territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. Some POs were forced to change their registered address because their location in frontline areas made it difficult to obtain banking services. This undermined these organizations’ identities and weakened the civil society sector in frontline areas.³⁶

Uncertainty regarding the status of CSO founders remained a problem. CSO representatives working in the oblasts again reported difficulties in dealing with banking institutions, which required complete personal data on the founders of organizations established ten or more years earlier as part of their financial monitoring procedures, even

28 CMU Order “On Certain Issues Related to Ensuring the Negotiation Process on Ukraine’s Accession to the European Union under Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the Accession Process’”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/475-2025-%D1%80#Text>

29 Law of Ukraine “On Lobbying”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3606-20#Text>

30 Transparency Register. National Agency on Corruption Prevention. URL: <https://transparency.nazk.gov.ua/home>

31 Transparency Register. National Agency on Corruption Prevention. URL: <https://transparency.nazk.gov.ua/home>

32 Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, and the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine to Ensure Compliance with Guarantees for the Practice of Law”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/45435>

33 Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Civil Code of Ukraine and Certain Other Laws of Ukraine regarding the Specifics of Providing Information from Public Electronic Registers Maintained by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine and Certain Other Public Electronic Registers”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4576-20#Text>

34 Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Civil Code of Ukraine in Connection with the Updating (Recodification) of the Provisions of Book Two”. Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/57355>


35 Yuzyk, I., Roman, Kh., Deputat, D., and Martynchuk, A. The Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Civil Society Activists in Ukraine in 2025: Analytical Report. Edited by T. Pechonchuk and O. Syniuk. ZMINA Human Rights Center. Kyiv, 2026. 170 pp.

36 Working Despite the War: The Reality of CSOs in Frontline Territories. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research. URL: <https://ucipr.org.ua/ua/publikatsii/vydannia/pratsyuvati-popri-vijnu-realnist-ogs-na-prifrontovikh-teritoriyakh>

when the organizations no longer had any practical contact with them. This problem was particularly acute for CSOs operating in frontline areas and for relocated CSOs.

CSOs continued to have access to free legal consultations provided by other civil society organizations, government institutions, including Free Legal Aid Centers and Administrative Services Centers, and representatives of law firms. Specifically, UCIPR continued to operate a hotline, while the Lawyers' Move CF and the Legal Headquarters PO provided advisory support to volunteers and volunteer organizations.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.0



The CSO organizational capacity score was 3.0 in 2025, marking a 0.1-point deterioration compared to 2024, when the score was 2.9. This decline was driven by several interrelated factors, primarily the sharp reduction in donor funding following the suspension and subsequent large-scale termination of programs funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Ukraine, persistent staffing shortages, growing staff burnout, and structural disparities across the sector.

The sharp reduction in USAID support in 2025 had a significant negative impact on the organizational capacity of Ukrainian CSOs. For years, USAID had invested in the development of organizations’ internal processes, ranging from HR policies and management systems to staff training and leadership development programs, while also contributing to a degree of dependence on external funding. The loss of sustained USAID support further exposed the sector’s reliance on external donors and the limited diversification of its funding sources.³⁷ This loss of support substantially reduced the resources available for these processes. CSOs were forced to reduce staffing levels, discontinue professional development programs, and cut administrative expenses.³⁸

According to a study conducted by Open Space Works Ukraine and the Civil Society Initiatives of Ukraine Public Union in February 2025, 27 percent of the surveyed organizations had received direct or indirect support from USAID prior to February 2025, while 22 percent of respondents reported that the suspension of USAID-funded programs had directly affected their work. Overall, 34 percent of the surveyed CSOs described the situation as catastrophic, while 51 percent characterized it as difficult but manageable.³⁹

It is also worth noting that some donors, including the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), indicated that providing direct funding to civil society in Ukraine was difficult and instead focused on energy and infrastructure programs.⁴⁰

In light of the reduction in U.S. support, some donor institutions continued to contribute to organizational development. East Europe Foundation, ISAR Ednannia, and the International Renaissance Foundation remained key donors in this area, providing grants for the development of internal policies, digitalization, strategic planning, and institutional resilience.

In 2025, the International Renaissance Foundation and East Europe Foundation, with the support of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and in partnership with

37 Civil Society in Ukraine after USAID Cuts: Back to the Roots? Kyiv. March - April 2025. Special Edition URL: <https://www.aida-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Civil-Society-in-Ukraine-after-USAID-cuts-back-to-the-roots.pdf>

38 How Ukrainian NGOs Survive After the Closure of USAID. 2025. URL: <https://hnh.news/32806/yak-ukrayinski-nuo-vyzhyvayut-pislya-zakryttya-usaid/>

39 The Impact of the Termination of USAID Funding on Ukraine’s Civil Society Sector. Open Space Works Ukraine and the Civil Society Initiatives of Ukraine Public Union. February 2025. URL: <https://www.prostir.ua/?news=vplyv-prypynennya-finansuvannya-usaid-na-hromadskiy-sektor-ukrajiny-rezultaty-doslidzhennya>

40 Japan’s JICA Aims to Replace USAID in Ukraine’s Energy and Infrastructure Projects. URL: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/3967153-aponska-agencia-jica-v-ukraini-hoce-zaminiti-usaid-v-energetichnih-ta-infrastrukturnih-proektah.html>

Sweden, launched the three-year project “Empowering Civil Society for Ukraine’s Resilience and Recovery.” The project aimed to strengthen the capacity of Ukrainian CSOs to set and achieve development goals that would contribute to Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, early recovery, and democratic governance reforms in Ukraine. It was designed to address challenges faced by CSOs, including limited resources and skills, low levels of engagement and visibility, and weak networking. As a result of the grant competition, approximately 30 organizations received institutional grants for periods ranging from 26 to 28 months, with an average budget of UAH 5.5 million per project.⁴¹

Under the “Strong Civil Society of Ukraine – A Driver of Reforms and Democracy” project, funded by Norway and Sweden, ISAR Ednannia continued to provide monthly organizational development grants. In 2025, ISAR Ednannia awarded 193 grants to strengthen the organizational development of CSOs in Ukraine.⁴² Applications for organizational development grants through the Civil Society Home Marketplace were accepted on a rolling basis throughout 2025, while the selection committee met monthly.⁴³ Under the EU-supported “Phoenix: Power of Communities” project, East Europe Foundation implemented a grant competition for CSO service providers working in community recovery, with grants ranging from UAH 1.1 million to UAH 1.6 million.⁴⁴

The Capacity Building for Local Organizations program, implemented by the Right to Protection CF, continued its work to strengthen the strategic and operational capacity of a network of local civil society organizations to respond effectively to humanitarian needs and address urgent social problems. In 2025, the organization continued to provide local organizations with microgrants, organizational capacity assessments, and organizational development mentoring.

Nevertheless, the overall situation in the area of organizational development remained difficult. East Europe Foundation’s study on the sustainability and engagement of CSOs in the recovery of territorial communities identified a key vulnerability: amid heavy workloads, organizations did not have sufficient time to focus on their own development, while team burnout became increasingly pronounced.⁴⁵

Among the positive trends in 2025 was the sector’s continued adaptability despite these challenges, as reflected in organizations’ ability to adjust quickly to available resources and emerging needs. In 2025, 507 organizations submitted applications to a small grant competition organized by the Civil Society Hubs Network Public Union, indicating that demand for support remained strong, particularly among small local CSOs.

Financial support for organizational capacity building was available both to a broad range of CSOs and to specific categories of organizations based on the nature of their activities. Specifically, some programs targeted veterans’ associations, local humanitarian initiatives, and CSOs involved in community recovery.

Demand for strategic planning among civil society organizations remained high. Many CSOs reviewed their strategies in an effort to address new challenges, including the reintegration of IDPs and veterans and the recovery of local communities. At the same time, there was a need for additional expert support and training opportunities in these areas. This was particularly true of newly established organizations, which often did not recognize the

41 Institutional Grant Competition under the Project “Empowering Civil Society for Ukraine’s Resilience and Recovery.” URL: <https://www.irf.ua/contest/institutioanal-norad-sida-2024/>

42 Organizational Development for CSOs within the Civil Society Home Ecosystem. URL: <https://ednannia.ua/our-programs-and-activities/pidtrymani-proieky/13126-proekt-z-organizatsijnogo-rozvitku-dlya-organizatsij-gromadyanskogo-suspilstva-v-mezhakh-ekosistemi-rozvitku-ta-pidtrimki-ogs-dim-gromadyanskogo-suspilstva>

43 Organizational Development Grant Competition. ISAR Ednannia. URL: <https://ednannia.ua/tryvaiut-hrantovi-konkursy/hrantovi-konkurs-z-orhanizatsiino-rozvytku>

44 Grants for the Recovery of Territorial Communities. East Europe Foundation. August 2025. URL: <https://chaszmin.com.ua/do-1-600-000-grn-granty-na-vidnovlennya-terytorialnyh-gromad-fond-shidna-vevropa/>

45 Level of Sustainability and Engagement of CSOs in the Recovery and Reconstruction of Territorial Communities. East Europe Foundation. URL: <https://eef.org.ua/report/stijist-ta-uchast-ogs-u-vidnovlenni/>

importance of organizational development or lacked the necessary knowledge, administrative capacity, and financial resources. Although long-term planning became somewhat more common compared to the previous year, it remained difficult because of the ongoing war. As in 2024, CSOs preferred concise strategic plans outlining their key objectives and missions.⁴⁶ Planning horizons were shortened to one or two years, representing a compromise that enabled organizations to maintain their strategic direction while remaining sufficiently flexible. Strategic planning remained a challenge for many local CSOs because of limited resources, staffing shortages, and rapidly changing external conditions. Organizations operating in frontline areas often acknowledged that even their existing strategies were largely formal documents and could not always be implemented amid constant security threats. Overall, the organizational capacity of many CSOs required further strengthening, primarily through stronger strategic planning, funding diversification, and more professional management.⁴⁷

A general trend in 2025 was an increase in the number of new organizations, particularly those involved in humanitarian response. However, the growth in the number of CSOs was not accompanied by a proportional increase in their institutional capacity.⁴⁸ A significant share of newly established organizations operated as humanitarian aid providers, which enabled them to mobilize resources quickly but did not necessarily contribute to the development of long-term management practices, strategic planning, or systematic human resource management. As a result, the sector became more segmented: strong organizations with well-developed management structures remained stable, while medium-sized and small CSOs faced risks associated with exhaustion, staff turnover, and resource shortages.

According to the 2025 REACH study “The Impacts of Sudden Decreased Funding on Ukrainian Civil Society Organisations,” nearly one-third of the surveyed CSOs reduced their workforce. Of these, 85 percent reduced the number of paid staff and expected to lay off an average of 34 percent of their employees.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, disparities within the sector remained substantial. Large humanitarian response organizations that received substantial international funding continued to expand their budgets and teams while increasingly assuming the role of quasi-governmental service providers. This divide between expanding humanitarian organizations and small advocacy and analytical organizations operating on the brink of survival represented one of the key risks to the quality and future potential of civil society.⁵⁰ Interest in digital tools, artificial intelligence, and new event formats also increased, enabling organizations to partially compensate for staffing shortages.

Work in civil society organizations in 2025 was often accompanied by considerable psychological strain, as staff members were continuously exposed to complex social challenges and high expectations regarding results. This frequently led to emotional exhaustion and professional burnout, negatively affecting team effectiveness and motivation. One positive development in 2025 was growing recognition of the lack of systematic mental health support policies, which contributed to widespread burnout, insufficient recognition of psychological difficulties, a shortage of specialists, and a weak culture of seeking support. Respondents emphasized the need to develop and implement clear strategies both at the state level and

46 Assessment of the Impact of Civil Society Organizations on Local Self-Government Bodies: Methodology and Findings of a Pilot Study. Vox Ukraine NGO. 2025. URL: https://zminytut.com/w/f/vector/oczinka_vplyvu_organizacij_gromadyanskogo_suspilstva_na_organy.pdf

47 Assessment of the Impact of Civil Society Organizations on Local Self-Government Bodies: Methodology and Findings of a Pilot Study. Vox Ukraine NGO. 2025. URL: https://zminytut.com/w/f/vector/oczinka_vplyvu_organizacij_gromadyanskogo_suspilstva_na_organy.pdf

48 Civil Society in Ukraine During Wartime, 2022–2025. Report on a Comprehensive Sociological Study. 2025. URL: https://api.home.ednannia.ua/upload/kch/25/10/29/zvit_UA_Hromadianske_suspilstvo_v%20umovakh_vivny_2022-2025.pdf

49 The Impacts of Sudden Decreased Funding on Ukrainian Civil Society Organisations. REACH. 2025. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/impacts-sudden-decreased-funding-ukrainian-civil-society-organisations-march-2025-enuk>

50 Resilience or Survival: How Ukraine's Civil Society Sector Weathered the Crises of 2014–2024. Media for Change. August 2025. URL: <https://cs.detector.media/ability/texts/186554/2025-08-15-stiykist-chy-vyzhyvannya-yak-gromadskyy-sektor-ukrainy-proyshov-kryzy-20142024-rokiv/>

within CSOs. Such policies should focus on preventing burnout and supporting staff mental well-being. An important priority was the introduction of programs aimed at reducing the risk of emotional exhaustion among staff across all sectors, particularly where stress levels were critically high.⁵¹

Organizations remained well equipped with technical resources, with no significant change from the previous year. However, the sector faced certain operational difficulties in 2025. Following the sudden reduction in USAID funding, CSOs operating in frontline areas were forced to leave office premises equipped with bomb shelters and seek less expensive alternatives, exposing staff and beneficiaries to greater risks.⁵²


A positive trend was the support provided to CSOs by local authorities following the reduction in U.S. assistance. In 2025, funding from the community's local budget enabled Veteran Hub to continue operating its support hotline for war veterans and its center in Vinnytsia.⁵³

51 Post-Forum "What Do We Need to withSTAND?" URL: https://api.home.ednannia.ua/upload/kch/25/03/12/%D0%9F%D1%96%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%8F%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%BC_%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%8F%D1%82%D0%B8.pdf

52 The Impacts of Sudden Decreased Funding on Ukrainian Civil Society Organisations. REACH. 2025. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/impacts-sudden-decreased-funding-ukrainian-civil-society-organisations-march-2025-enuk>

53 US Funding Cuts Hit Peacebuilding Initiatives in Ukraine. URL: https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/us-funding-cuts-hit-peacebuilding-initiatives-in-ukraine/?location=ukraine&theme=refugees-and-idps&utm_source

III. FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 3.9



The financial viability score was 3.9 in 2025, marking a 0.2-point deterioration compared to the previous year. This deterioration was associated with the suspension of USAID support for most CSO programs and projects, followed by USAID's transition out of operating as an independent agency. These developments negatively affected the sector, particularly organizations that had relied on U.S. grant funding.

According to expert estimates, international technical assistance accounted for only 25.4 percent of Ukrainian CSO income in 2025. As the sector met more than 74 percent of its needs through other funding channels, it would be inaccurate to characterize it as entirely dependent on external funding. The resulting financial instability affected organizations unevenly, with the greatest impact on those whose operating models relied primarily on U.S. funding.⁵⁴

Human rights organizations and independent media proved particularly vulnerable to this challenge. According to monitoring conducted by the Institute of Mass Information, 59.2 percent of media community representatives regarded the scaling back of U.S. grant programs as a critical threat to the continued operation of independent media. Meanwhile, only approximately one-sixth of respondents reported that they had never received funding from U.S. sources.⁵⁵ Specifically, the multimedia platform Ukraïner publicly stated that U.S. funding had accounted for approximately 80 percent of its overall budget.⁵⁶

According to the study "Civil Society in Ukraine During Wartime, 2022–2025," 35 percent of surveyed CSOs had received direct or indirect support or direct funding from USAID before February 2025. A total of 22 percent of respondents reported that the suspension of USAID-funded programs had negatively affected CSO funding.⁵⁷ However, reactions to the suspension of USAID funding in 2025 were mixed. A 2025 KIIS survey found that Ukrainians had conflicting views on the issue. On the one hand, 69 percent acknowledged that it would have some or significant negative consequences for Ukraine. On the other hand, 59 percent viewed it as fair to some extent because they believed that some projects had wasted money or supported unnecessary activities.⁵⁸

In 2025, the Ukraine Facility became the largest support instrument for Ukraine, including its civil society. Under the Ukraine Facility, the European Union launched the 2025 EU4CSOs

54 How Ukrainian NGOs Survive After the Closure of USAID. URL: <https://hnh.news/32806/yak-ukrayinski-nuo-vyzhyvayut-pislya-zakryttya-usaid/>

55 59.2% of Journalists Predict Catastrophic Consequences from the Suspension of U.S. International Grants: IMI Survey. URL: <https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/59-2-zhurnalstiv-prognozuyut-katastrofichni-naslidky-vnaslidok-zupynky-mizhnarodnyh-grantiv-ssha-i66433>

56 How Ukrainian NGOs Survive After the Closure of USAID. URL: <https://hnh.news/32806/yak-ukrayinski-nuo-vyzhyvayut-pislya-zakryttya-usaid/>

57 22% of CSOs Reported Being Affected by the Cessation of USAID Operations: Study. URL: <https://cs.detector.media/community/texts/186604/2025-10-29-22-gromadskykh-organizatsiy-vidchuly-vplyv-zupynky-diyalnosti-usaid-doslidzhennya/>

58 Attitude Towards the Suspension of USAID Project Funding. URL: <https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1474&page=1>

in Ukraine call for proposals, with a total budget of EUR 17 million. The call aimed to support partnerships among CSOs that would contribute to the implementation and monitoring of reforms, policymaking and decision-making, cooperation with public authorities, and citizen participation in democratic processes.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, donor funding remained an important source of support for CSOs, particularly through emergency grants. In 2025, the EU Delegation to Ukraine stepped up its support for civil society and the media by launching 21 new grant projects, of which 12 included subgranting. Overall, the EU portfolio in this area comprised 69 active projects with total funding of EUR 123.82 million. The International Renaissance Foundation supported approximately 400 CSO projects worth more than UAH 700 million in 2025. These projects focused on human rights protection, the recovery of territorial communities, support for veterans, analytical work, and assistance to people affected by the war.⁶⁰

Even CSOs that did not work directly with U.S. grants faced substantially increased competition for funding from other donors in 2025. More than 120 organizations could compete for funding for approximately 20 projects. Donors also needed additional time to mobilize resources for the sector and establish priorities for new grant competitions.

According to the study “Civil Society in Ukraine During Wartime, 2022–2025,” supported by the Askold and Dir Fund of ISAR Ednannia, financial pressure on the sector continued to grow. While nearly 70 percent of organizations received donations or membership fees in 2023, this share fell to 46 percent in 2025.⁶¹

According to a nationwide sociological study of charitable giving conducted for Zagoriy Foundation and the Giving Tuesday initiative, one important trend that became more pronounced in 2025 compared with 2024 was Ukrainians’ gradual shift from ad hoc and emotionally driven giving toward more planned and consistent support. The authors suggested that this change was driven by resource depletion, emotional fatigue, and personal loss, which had become common features of life during the war. The study also emphasized that despite a crisis of trust in charitable organizations, donations remained widespread and systematic in the fourth year of the war.⁶² In 2025, Ukrainian donors increasingly focused on foundations that demonstrated transparency and effectiveness through clear reporting and tangible results.⁶³

Public funding remained one of the sources available to CSOs. At the national level, CSOs could obtain project funding from the Social Protection Fund for Persons with Disabilities under the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine, which provided UAH 4 million in total funding for 10 projects delivering social services to persons with disabilities⁶⁴. The Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine provided UAH 9 million⁶⁵ for 21 projects promoting Ukrainian national and civic identity and UAH 13.6 million for 27 projects developed by youth

59 EU4CSOs In Ukraine - Call for Proposals 2025 URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/prospect-details/184490PROSPECTSEN>

60 Top 25 Projects by the Foundation and Its Partners That Changed the Country in 2025. URL: <https://www.irf.ua/25-of-2025/>

61 22% of CSOs Reported Being Affected by the Cessation of USAID Operations. Askold and Dir Fund / ISAR Ednannia. October 2025. URL: <https://cs.detector.media/community/texts/186604/2025-10-29-22-gromadskykh-organizatsiy-vidchuly-vplyv-zupynky-diyalnosti-usaid-doslidzhennya/>

62 Nationwide Sociological Study of Charitable Giving for Zagoriy Foundation and the Giving Tuesday Initiative. URL: <https://zagoriy.foundation/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/blagodijnist-v-ukrayini-2025-1.pdf>

63 Nationwide Sociological Study of Charitable Giving for Zagoriy Foundation and the Giving Tuesday Initiative. URL: <https://zagoriy.foundation/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/blagodijnist-v-ukrayini-2025-1.pdf>

64 Final and Financial Reports. Social Protection Fund for Persons with Disabilities. URL: <https://www.ispf.gov.ua/diyalnist/monitoring-zahodiv-vgoi-perelik-profesij-utos-utog/konkurs-proektiv-dlya-go/konkurs-2025-120325/pidsumkovi-ta-finansovi-zviti-konkurs2025>

65 Order of the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine No. 3050 of 16 May 2024 “On Approval of the Conditions for Selecting Candidates for Competition Commissions to Select Programs (Projects and Activities) Developed by Civil Society Institutions for Which Financial Support Is Provided”. URL: <https://mms.gov.ua/npas/pro-zatverdzhennia-umov-vidboru-kandydativ-do-skladu-konkursnykh-komisii-z-vyznachennia-prohram-proektiv-zakhodiv-rozroblenykh-instytutamy-hromadianskoho-suspilstva-dlia-vykonannia-realizatsi>

and children's public organizations.⁶⁶

At the local level, grant competitions for CSOs were held in Cherkasy, Ternopil, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts. Supported initiatives included projects protecting the rights of persons with disabilities and war veterans, youth projects, and projects promoting national-patriotic education and Ukrainian national and civic identity.⁶⁷

Meanwhile, funding remained unevenly distributed. A large share of available resources went to humanitarian organizations, while CSOs working in advocacy, anti-corruption monitoring, research and analysis, and human rights protection faced disproportionately large funding cuts. Some donors also continued to exclude organizations supporting the Armed Forces of Ukraine from funding opportunities, despite clear public demand for this work.⁶⁸

Business support for CSOs remained still far less common than funding from international donors. In Zhytomyr oblast, a study found that CSOs ranked first among the types of organizations businesses were willing to fund, indicating that the business community continued to trust the sector. However, systematic corporate support for CSOs remained underdeveloped nationwide.

In 2025, a growing number of organizations sought to diversify their funding sources through crowdfunding, social entrepreneurship, fee-based services, and partnerships with businesses. The Ukrainian Social Venture Fund actively supported the development of social entrepreneurship through its StartUp4Good #2 incubation program, which selected 40 teams for support.⁶⁹ However, these mechanisms remained accessible to only a limited number of organizations.

One example of a successful partnership among business, public authorities, and CSOs was support for adaptive sports. Intellias signed a memorandum with Lviv City Council and the Ukrainian Para Ice Hockey Federation, invested UAH 1 million in the development of the Unbroken team, provided equipment and uniforms for 15 players, and supported the development of the team's visual identity. Intellias also helped organize a nationwide tournament and a training camp.⁷⁰

According to the REACH study⁷¹, 40 percent of CSOs planned to continue operating on a volunteer basis in 2025 despite financial difficulties, while 42 percent considered engaging volunteers. Meanwhile, 61 percent of CSOs actively sought alternative funding sources to secure urgent support.

The development of internal financial control systems, regular reporting, and auditing in the CSO sector was driven primarily by external requirements. Compliance requirements imposed by international partners and donors remained the main factor driving the adoption of advanced financial management practices.

Despite widespread recognition of the importance of transparent accounting, small, newly established, and oblast-level CSOs remained highly vulnerable for several reasons. These included the lack of stable funding to cover the ongoing costs of accountants and financial specialists; a shortage of qualified professionals in the oblasts who were familiar with the tax and accounting rules applicable to the nonprofit sector; and the high market cost

66 Order of the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine No. 1993 of 1 April 2025 "On Approval of the List of Projects Developed by Youth and Children's Public Organizations That Will Receive Financial Support for Implementation in 2025". URL: <https://mms.gov.ua/npas/pro-zatverdzhennia-pereliku-proiektiv-rozroblenykh-molodizhnymy-ta-dytiachymy-hromadskymy-orhanizatsiamy-dlia-realizatsii-iakykh-nadavatymetsia-finansova-pidtrymka-u-2025-rotsi>

67 <https://grants.vzaemo.diia.gov.ua/projects?®ional=1>

68 Working Despite the War: The Reality of CSOs in Frontline Territories. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research. URL: <https://ucipr.org.ua/ua/publikatsii/vydannia/pratsyuvati-popri-vijnu-realnist-ogs-na-prifrontovikh-teritoriyakh>


69 StartUp4Good #2: 40 Teams Embark on 2.5 Months of Transformation. URL: <https://www.usv.fund/post/startup4good-2-1>

70 Nezlamni: Supporting Adaptive Sports by Intellias. URL: <https://gc.partnership.in.ua/language/uk/portfolio/nezlamni-pidtrimka-adaptivnogo-sportu-vid-intellias/>

71 The Impacts of Sudden Decreased Funding on Ukrainian Civil Society Organisations. REACH. 2025. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/impacts-sudden-decreased-funding-ukrainian-civil-society-organisations-march-2025-enuk>

of outsourcing professional financial services, which was prohibitive for CSOs with limited budgets.

IV. ADVOCACY: 2.1



The advocacy score was 2.1 in 2025 and remained unchanged compared to 2024. The advocacy capacity of the civil society sector continued to be affected by war, limited funding and the resulting constraints on organizational development, as well as frequent personnel changes within public authorities, which hindered effective cooperation. Notwithstanding these challenges, CSOs were able to advocate successfully for changes that benefited the sector, participate in European integration processes, and help prevent initiatives that posed risks to society.

The protests in July 2025 were a key public advocacy development for the sector. Under pressure from civil society, the changes introduced by the draft Law No. 12414, which effectively deprived the anti-corruption institutions of their institutional independence, were reversed. Just a few days after mass protests across Ukraine, the President of Ukraine submitted a new draft law to reverse the threatening changes and said that “everyone heard what people have been saying these days—on social media, to one another, and in the streets. None of this was in vain.” The events of July 2025 demonstrated that civil society in Ukraine could influence major policy changes. The draft Law No. 12414 was described by NABU and SAPO as legislation that would de facto dismantle their independence and subordinate their activities to the Prosecutor General. A subsequent presidential draft law restored the institutional independence of the anti-corruption bodies.⁷²

Meanwhile, several potentially dangerous trends intensified. These included the growing tendency to limit civil society advocacy to relatively “safe” issues, the largely formal involvement of the sector in dialogue with public authorities, and the dependence of local advocacy efforts on the positions of individual heads of territorial communities. Civil society representatives were generally invited to public consultations only on issues directly related to the sector. These included, for example, a discussion of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the National Strategy for Promoting Civil Society Development for the next year, as well as matters in which civil society participation was required as part of the European integration process. However, CSOs were not involved in discussions of strategic issues such as budget planning, reforms of law enforcement agencies and the prosecution service, or tax increases. Advocacy on issues unrelated to European integration was also not always successful, as such issues were not considered priorities by public authorities.

These problems were compounded by staffing shortages, insufficient organizational development, the shift in donor attention toward humanitarian response and charitable assistance, the resulting decline in the financial viability of advocacy CSOs, and the political crisis caused by martial law. Personnel changes within the executive branch were another significant factor: frequent reorganizations of ministries and the replacement of ministers and their teams further hindered the development of the sector’s advocacy capacity.

In 2025, platforms for dialogue with public authorities continued to operate, including

⁷² Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Zelenskyy Announces a New Draft Law in Response to Criticism of Changes Affecting NABU and SAPO. URL: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zelensky-zakonoproiekt-u-vidpovid-na-krytyku-shchodo-nabu-i-sapo/33482067.html>

meetings between Iryna Vereshchuk, Deputy Head of the Office of the President, and CSO representatives. No large-scale official meetings were held in 2025 between President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy and a broad range of civil society representatives, apart from several working meetings and award ceremonies honoring volunteers.⁷³

Work on European integration reforms continued throughout 2025. The government approved roadmaps in three key areas: the rule of law, public administration reform, and the functioning of democratic institutions. The approval of these roadmaps was a prerequisite for opening the first cluster of Ukraine's EU accession negotiations.⁷⁴ CSO representatives were actively involved in developing the roadmaps and participated in all 36 working groups established to prepare Ukraine's negotiating positions as part of the EU accession process.

International advocacy also remained an important area of work. In 2025, CSOs continued their advocacy efforts at the international level, including participation in the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025 in Rome⁷⁵, the OSCE Warsaw Human Dimension Conference⁷⁶, the Munich Security Conference 2025⁷⁷, and international EU and NATO events. Ukrainian CSOs participated in international events focused on security, anti-corruption, recovery, and other issues.

No significant involvement of the civil society sector in developing comprehensive recovery programs for territorial communities was reported in 2025. For example, according to a study by the Against Corruption NGO, respondents believed that only 24 percent of recovery projects had been financed by charitable foundations. In addition, fewer than one-third of surveyed citizens used the DREAM platform as a source of information about recovery procedures.⁷⁸

The entry into force of the Law of Ukraine "On Lobbying" raised concerns within the civil society sector about the potential impact on its advocacy capacity. Civil society advocacy significantly reduced the law's potential negative impact on CSO activities. However, certain risks remained, including the possible application of the concept of "commercial interest" to CSO advocacy and the imposition of fines for carrying out such activities without registration in the Transparency Register. At the same time, awareness of lobbying among CSOs working in the oblasts remained relatively low. Most surveyed CSOs were either unaware of what lobbying involved or did not fully understand the concept.⁷⁹

Advocacy campaigns also continued in 2025 in support of the draft Law No. 8084⁸⁰ on regulating the activities and state registration of public organizations, the draft Law No. 11082⁸¹ "On Appeals", and the draft Law No. 6319⁸² "On Population Self-Organized Bodies".

73 Office of the President of Ukraine: Volodymyr Zelenskyy Met with the Volunteers of the Uniters Foundation and Honored Its Founder with the "Golden Heart" Award. URL: <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-pospilkuuvav-sya-z-volonterami-fondu-unite-102117>

74 Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. Ukraine Approved Roadmaps as Part of the EU Accession Process: The Documents Have Been Published. URL: <https://minjust.gov.ua/news/ministry/ukraina-zatverdila-dorojni-karti-v-mejah-vstupu-do-es-opublikovano-teksti-dokumentiv>

75 Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025. URL: <https://ua.urc-international.com/urc-2025/urc2025>

76 "In a Zone of Lawlessness, Every Day of Delay Means New Victims": Kateryna Rashevskaya at the OSCE Human Dimension Conference in Warsaw. Regional Center for Human Rights. URL: <https://rchr.org.ua/publications/u-zoni-bezpravva-kozhen-den-zvolikannya-oznachaye-novi-zhertvy-kateryna-rashevskaya-na-varshavskij-konferenciji-obsye/>

77 Munich Security Conference 2025. International Center for Ukrainian Victory. URL: <https://ukrainianvictory.org/uk/publications/miunkhenska-konferentsiia-z-bezpeky-2025/>

78 Putria, Yu., Rahulina, Yu., and Tymoshenko, V. Public Investment Management Reform and the Role of Civil Society. Edited by A. Prylutska. URL: <https://home.ednannia.ua/analytics/data-catalog/492>

79 Report on the Study "Sustainability of Civil Society Organizations in 2025". Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research

80 Draft Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine to Regulate the Activities and State Registration of Public Organizations". Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/40561>

81 Draft Law of Ukraine "On Appeals". Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/43836>

82 Draft Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Population Self-Organized Bodies" to Improve the Procedures for the Establishment, Operation, and Termination of a Population Self-Organized Body". Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/28346>

All campaigns remained incomplete in 2025 and continued into 2026.

Advocacy activities also continued in different oblasts of Ukraine in 2025. CSOs working in the oblasts engaged in advocacy both within their communities and at the national level, including by providing expert comments on the draft Civil Code. The effectiveness and influence of local advocacy varied. There were successful national and local advocacy initiatives, but in some cases, advocacy was hindered by a range of barriers. Challenges in cooperation with local authorities included the lack of openness of military administrations and some territorial communities, a largely declarative approach to cooperation on the part of public authorities, the unwillingness of some territorial communities to cooperate, the absence of an established culture of cooperation with the civil society or regular practices for engaging with CSOs, a lack of transparency in public consultations, and difficulties in advocating on certain issues, including those concerning IDPs and war veterans.⁸³

As of August 2025, an analysis by the CHESNO Movement indicated significant improvements in the transparency of local council activities, which were directly linked to the entry into force of the Law of Ukraine No. 3590 on transparency of local self-government. Most oblast councils published recordings of their plenary sessions, while 43 percent livestreamed them. Notably, all oblast councils published videos of their standing committee meetings.⁸⁴

The situation in city councils also improved. According to Transparency International Ukraine, as of August 2025, 78 out of 100 city councils had published recordings or livestreams of more than 80 percent of their sessions, while another 7 had published recordings of between 50 and 79 percent of their sessions. Of the 20 oblast centers reviewed, only 1 had failed to ensure proper and timely video recording of its meetings.⁸⁵

The effective suspension of public council activities raised concerns within the civil society sector. Meanwhile, youth councils, IDP councils, and coordination councils on identity issues were established at an increasing rate.

A landmark development for advocacy in 2025 was the resumption of live broadcasts of Verkhovna Rada sessions on the Rada TV channel. Although regular live broadcasts resumed in September 2025, the first broadcast took place on 31 July under public pressure, during the vote on draft legislation restoring the independence of NABU and SAPO.⁸⁶

According to the Department for Citizens' Appeals of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the overall number of appeals to parliament decreased in 2025. A total of 227,817 appeals were received through electronic communications, down 145,158 from 2024. Meanwhile, the number of appeals received by telephone increased to 15,779, up 8,010 from 2024. A total of 328 electronic submissions were initiated through the electronic petitions system.^{87 88 89}

83 Report on the Study "Sustainability of Civil Society Organizations in 2025". Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research

84 Transparency During the War: How Local Councils Comply with the Law on Openness. Study. Kyiv, December 2025. CHESNO Movement. URL: https://cdn.chesno.org/web/media/projects/investigations/pdf/ua/%D0%B7%D0%B2%D1%96%D1%82_%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%96%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C_%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%B4_%D1%87%D0%B0%D1%81_%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8_%D1%8F%D0%BA_%D0%BC%D1%96%D1%81%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%96_%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8_%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%83%D1%8E%D1%82%D1%8C_%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE.pdf

85 A Year of Mandatory Video Recordings of City Council Sessions: Are Cities Complying with the Law? Transparency International Ukraine. URL: <https://transparentcities.in.ua/news/rik-oboviazkovykh-videozapysiv-zasidan-miskoi-rady-chy-dotrymuiutsia-mista-zakonu>


86 <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-rada-transliatsia-zasidan/33531778.html>

87 Brief on the Work of the Department for Citizens' Appeals of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine with Electronic Petitions in 2025. URL: https://vzvernen.rada.gov.ua/documents/ast_v/Dov_telefon/74390.html

88 Brief on the Work of the Department for Citizens' Appeals of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine with Electronic Petitions in 2025. URL: https://vzvernen.rada.gov.ua/documents/ast_v/Dov_petic/74391.html

89 Brief on Citizens' Appeals Received through Electronic Communications by the Department for Citizens' Appeals of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2025. URL: https://vzvernen.rada.gov.ua/documents/ast_v/Dov_Elektr/74389.html

V. SERVICE PROVISION: 2.8



The service provision score was 2.8 in 2025, marking a 0.1-point improvement compared to 2024, when the score was 2.9. Some CSOs made a deliberate shift toward fee-based services and social contracting in response to both reduced grant funding and legislative changes.

A key regulatory incentive was the entry into force of Law of Ukraine No. 4505, which exempted social services provided by public and charitable organizations from VAT. Previously, CSO services offered through tender procedures were 20 percent more expensive than those provided by municipal institutions, effectively excluding CSOs from the competitive market. Removing this barrier was crucial for expanding CSOs' access to the social contracting market⁹⁰.

According to the Register of Providers and Recipients of Social Services⁹¹ maintained by the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine, the number of registered CSO service providers continued to grow. According to data from the Social Service Providers Dashboard,⁹² as of May 2026, 1,063 CSOs were registered in the Register of Providers and Recipients of Social Services and operated at 1,056 social service delivery locations. Compared to March 2025, the number of registered CSO service providers increased by 30 percent. Respondents also noted that the state's efforts to ensure equal access to the social services market and eliminate discriminatory pricing conditions for non-governmental social service providers had encouraged greater participation.

The pilot project to organize the delivery of a comprehensive social service aimed at building resilience through the establishment of centers for psychological support, the adaptation of displaced persons, assistance to vulnerable groups, and the development of volunteering in territorial communities proved successful in 2024. As a result, in February 2025, the National Social Service of Ukraine launched a call for territorial communities to participate in the Resilience Centers project.⁹³

As of September 2025, 326 Resilience Centers were operating in Ukraine. Over the course of the pilot project, the centers recorded more than 2.5 million interactions with people and held more than 1.5 million activities. The network involved more than 1,500 specialists who had completed training under certified programs.⁹⁴ As part of the Resilience Centers initiative, the state continued to procure services from non-governmental organizations, thereby expanding CSOs' opportunities to provide social services and improve their quality.

The participation of 305 communities across 24 oblasts and Kyiv in the Resilience Centers project, including 17 communities relocated from temporarily occupied areas,

90 Law of Ukraine No. 4505 "On Amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine to Exempt Social Services from VAT". URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4505-20#Text>

91 Data on Social Service Providers. URL: <https://soc.gov.ua/edata/providers-list>

92 Social Service Providers Dashboard of the State Enterprise Information and Computing Center. URL: <https://www.ioc.gov.ua/analytics/nadavachi-sotsialnykh-posluh>

93 Call for Communities to Participate in the Resilience Centers Project. National Social Service of Ukraine. URL: <https://nssu.gov.ua/news/vidbir-hromad-dlia-uchasti-u-proiekti-stvorennia-tsentriv-zhyttiistiikosti>

94 The Government Plans to Allocate UAH 1 Billion to Resilience Centers in 2026: Denys Uliutin. URL: <https://www.msp.gov.ua/press-center/news/u-2026-rotsi-na-tsentry-zhyttivestivkosti-derzhava-vydilyt-1-mlrd-hryven-denys-ulyutin>

along with more than UAH 421.9 million in funding and the opening of 21 additional centers with support from businesses and international partners⁹⁵, demonstrated the scale and effectiveness of this model. For CSOs, this broadened their cooperation networks and created new opportunities to implement socially important programs.

According to information published by the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine, more than 19,000 service members, war veterans, and members of their families, as well as more than 23,500 IDPs, sought support from Resilience Centers in 2025.⁹⁶

The Ministry's positive assessment of the effectiveness of the Resilience Centers and the allocation of UAH 1 billion⁹⁷ for their support in the 2026 state budget created favorable conditions for the development of civil society organizations. This decision not only provided greater financial stability for the centers but also strengthened their institutional standing and created new opportunities for partnerships between CSOs and public authorities. Public funding enabled the centers to expand the range of services they provided, reach broader groups of beneficiaries, and invest in organizations' internal processes. In the long term, this was expected to strengthen the sector's institutional capacity and increase public trust in CSO activities.

However, systemic administrative barriers continued to hinder CSOs' efforts to become more active in the social services market in 2025. CSOs seeking social service provider status had to amend their charters, the risk of losing their nonprofit status if they generated income from services, a lack of accessible and inclusive premises, and uncertain access to municipally owned premises. At the oblast level, there were cases in which local self-government bodies required CSOs to change their legal form to that of a municipal enterprise as a condition for entering into social contracting agreements, although such requirements had no legal basis.

The diversification of services became more pronounced in 2025. CSOs explored opportunities to provide fee-based consulting, training, and other services to businesses as a means of increasing their financial independence. However, the introduction of such models was constrained by a lack of start-up resources and persistent ethical concerns about the commercialization of their activities during martial law. Given that most CSOs in the EU are involved in social service provision, gradual movement in this direction was a natural part of the sector's strategic development.

In 2025, the EU4CSOs EmpowerUA project, implemented by the Network of 100 Percent Life Rivne Charitable Organization, made significant efforts to advance social services in territorial communities. As a result, UAH 29.6 million was allocated to social service development, both for activities carried out during the year and for long-term support programs. This included funding to improve access to social services in Bohorodchany territorial community, allocations for social prevention programs in Kropyvnytskyi, and the launch of funding for social support services for pregnant women and young mothers in Dubrovysia. In several territorial communities, social service provision received funding from local budgets for the first time, rather than relying solely on donor-funded programs. Through its subgranting system, the project supported initiatives implemented by public organizations providing direct assistance to people. A total of 40 organizations also received financial support to develop social services. These initiatives assisted 8,225 people facing difficult life circumstances. In late 2025, the third subgrant competition was launched, resulting in support for another 15 organizations implementing new initiatives.⁹⁸

In 2025, the number of CSOs providing mental health and psychosocial support services increased. This was driven by both growing public demand and the development

95 The Government Plans to Allocate UAH 1 Billion to Resilience Centers in 2026. URL: <https://rubryka.com/2025/09/07/u-2026-rotsi-na-tsentry-zhyttyestiykosti-derzhava-planuye-vydilyty-1-mlrd-gryven/>

96 More Than 19,000 Service Members and Veterans Sought Support from Resilience Centers in 2025. URL: <https://www.msp.gov.ua/press-center/news/veterany-tsentry-zhyttyestiykosti>

97 The Government Plans to Allocate UAH 1 Billion to Resilience Centers in 2026. URL: <https://www.msp.gov.ua/press-center/news/u-2026-rotsi-na-tsentry-zhyttyestiykosti-derzhava-vydilyt-1-mlrd-hryven-denysh-ulyutin>


98 How EU4CSOs EmpowerUA Is Developing Ukraine's Social Services System. URL: <https://eu4csos.org/about-2025/>

of government mental health policy, particularly through the All-Ukrainian Mental Health Program “How Are U?”, an initiative of the First Lady of Ukraine. CSOs were actively involved in implementing support programs for veterans, service members, and their families, making this one of their key areas of work in 2025.

Social service provision continued to receive substantial support from the international donor community in 2025. Key partners included United Nations entities, governmental and non-governmental organizations from Germany, Canada, France, and the Netherlands, as well as international humanitarian organizations such as Save the Children, Mercy Corps, ACTED, IREX, the Danish Refugee Council, and the Norwegian Refugee Council. Their support provided substantial financial and technical resources for the development of services supporting vulnerable groups.

Other types of CSO services, including training, were provided only on a limited basis. Their scale and funding remained significantly lower than those of social services. Local organizations reported that they were considering fee-based cooperation with businesses as a means of raising funds and strengthening their financial independence. However, these intentions had not yet moved beyond the planning stage. The main constraints included a lack of start-up capital for launching new services, difficulties recruiting staff, and internal ethical concerns about generating income during martial law and amid the ongoing need for humanitarian response.

VI. SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.0



The sectoral infrastructure score was 3.0 in 2025 and remained unchanged compared to 2024. Positive developments were recorded in certain areas, including advisory bodies and networking. However, the overall environment remained difficult because of reduced donor funding and the absence of large-scale structural changes.

Aid localization efforts continued in 2025, with local organizations receiving more resources directly rather than through organizations engaged in regranting and grant management. In 2025, the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund (UHF), managed by OCHA, made a major strategic shift toward localization, substantially increasing the financial and operational role of Ukrainian organizations.⁹⁹

Aid localization through the UHF in 2025 was characterized by several key developments, including a record increase in direct funding, a shift in priorities toward small and inclusive public organizations, and the development of a comprehensive Localization Action Plan.¹⁰⁰ In 2025, almost 70 percent of UHF funding was channeled directly to national organizations. While national organizations received approximately 60 percent of UHF funding, or \$96 million, in 2024, the UHF increased this share to nearly 70 percent in 2025, allocating approximately \$134 million to Ukrainian non-governmental organizations. This was one of the highest localization rates among comparable UN pooled funds worldwide.¹⁰¹ In 2025, the first targeted funding allocation to increase the involvement of local teams was launched. The initial allocation in January amounted to \$70 million, rising to \$88.6 million by summer 2025.¹⁰²

The UHF shifted its focus from large nationwide hubs toward grassroots and specialized organizations. Priority funding was provided to women-led local initiatives; local teams capable of conducting inclusive evacuations and providing specialized care directly in frontline communities; and local groups representing Roma and LGBTQ+ communities in affected areas.¹⁰³

In 2025, work continued to develop and implement a comprehensive Localization Action Plan intended to strengthen the leadership of Ukrainian public organizations in decision-making and reduce bureaucratic burdens. Localization enabled local volunteer networks to

99 Ukraine Humanitarian Fund: 2025 First Standard Allocation Dashboard. URL: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-fund-2025-first-standard-allocation-dashboard-30-june-2025-en>

100 Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026. URL: <https://humanitarianaction.info/document/ukraine-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2026/article/23-humanitarian-response-strategy-2>

101 Ukraine Humanitarian Fund: 2025 First Standard Allocation Dashboard. URL: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-fund-2025-first-standard-allocation-dashboard-30-june-2025-en>

102 Ukraine Humanitarian Fund: Humanitarian Coordinator for Ukraine Launches \$70 Million Allocation to Support 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-fund-humanitarian-coordinator-ukraine-launches-70-million-allocation-support-2025-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-enuk>

103 Ukraine Humanitarian Fund: 2025 First Standard Allocation Dashboard. URL: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-fund-2025-first-standard-allocation-dashboard-30-june-2025-en>

rapidly deliver assistance, including food, medicines, repairs, and winterization support, in frontline areas of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts.¹⁰⁴

Despite progress in funding, localization continued to face challenges in 2025 that could not be fully addressed during the year. Local teams operated under constant shelling, resulting in casualties and organizational exhaustion. For many small charitable foundations working in the oblasts, the UN's OneGMS registration and reporting system remained difficult to navigate. As a result, a substantial share of funding continued to be channeled through consortia, with an international organization acting as an intermediary and guarantor and a Ukrainian organization serving as the direct implementer. Donors also often lacked sufficient staff and tools to manage large numbers of small grants for local initiatives effectively. They therefore tended to fund a limited number of large international implementers, which subsequently subgranted funds to local organizations. This approach reduced risks for donors but limited direct capacity building within the Ukrainian sector and reduced the share of funding channeled directly toward addressing local needs.¹⁰⁵

Consortia between international humanitarian organizations and Ukrainian foundations became a core operating model in 2025. International donors provided funding and technical expertise, while local teams ensured rapid access to people in frontline areas that foreign missions were often unable to enter for security reasons.¹⁰⁶ One example of successful cooperation was the Dorijka Consortium, which brought together five nonprofit, nonpolitical, and nonreligious international non-governmental organizations: Première Urgence Internationale, which served as the lead organization; Action contre la Faim; Humanity & Inclusion; Triangle Génération Humanitaire; and Solidarités International. The consortium implemented projects in 13 oblasts to help address the consequences of the conflict. Its work covered multiple sectors, including health care, protection, temporary shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, multipurpose cash assistance, nutrition, and humanitarian assistance.¹⁰⁷ The Help Localisation Facility (HLF) was also based on the principles of an equitable consortium and devoted considerable attention to strengthening the capacity of the Ukrainian sector in 2025. Rather than simply engaging Ukrainian organizations as subcontractors, the Facility provided local public organizations with direct funding for the reconstruction of infrastructure, including schools and outpatient clinics, as well as for evacuation missions, while also training them in international financial reporting standards.¹⁰⁸ The NGO Resource Center consortium, an international platform working with the UHF, launched subgrant programs for small Ukrainian organizations in the Protection Sector. Larger organizations assumed responsibility for bureaucratic compliance requirements, while funding was channeled to local teams providing psychological support and promoting inclusion in communities.¹⁰⁹

Furthermore, donors' traditional concerns about corruption risks and the possible misuse of funds were often cited as reasons for the limited direct funding available to local organizations.

CSOs working in the oblasts described 2025 as a year of intensified cooperation within the sector and a shift from ad hoc collaboration toward more sustainable forms of cooperation.

104 Humanitarian Response Strategy. URL: <https://humanitarianaction.info/document/ukraine-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2026/article/23-humanitarian-response-strategy-2>

105 Expectations and Challenges of Grantmakers in Ukraine. URL: <https://philanthropyinukraine.org/knowledge-hub/research/ochikuvannya-vyklyky-grantodavtsiv-ukrayina>

106 Localization in Action: The Participation of National Civil Society Organizations in Ukraine's Recovery Architecture. URL: <https://www.posmishka.org.ua/lokalizatsiia-u-dii-uchast-natsionalnykh-orhanizatsij-hromadianskoho-suspilstva-v-arkhitekturi-vidnovlennia-ukrainy/>

107 Official website of the Dorijka Consortium. URL: <https://dorijka.org/uk/newsletter>

108 The Strength of Local Organizations: How Their Role Is Being Expanded in Ukraine and Why It Matters During the War. URL: <https://epravda.com.ua/projects/sila-svoji-821708/>

109 Grants for Local Protection Organizations: Strengthening Partnerships and Humanitarian Capacity (Ukraine). URL: <https://www2.fundsforngos.org/democracy-good-governance/grants-for-local-protection-organizations-strengthening-partnerships-and-humanitarian-capacity-ukraine/>

The vast majority of focus group participants reported actively cooperating with other CSOs. Respondents noted that this cooperation took place through associations, hubs, specialized alliances, coalitions, networks, and partnership initiatives, as well as through joint projects, jointly organized events, and other formats.

Well-known CSO coalitions continued to operate in 2025. These included the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR) Coalition¹¹⁰, which focused on European integration and democratic governance, and the RISE Ukraine Coalition¹¹¹, which worked on Ukraine's reconstruction and modernization. The Alliance of Ukrainian CSOs worked to improve aid localization and humanitarian response.¹¹² In 2025, the Coalition of Social Service Providers was also established with support from the EU4CSOs EmpowerUA project. It brought together 56 POs from different oblasts of Ukraine that worked in social protection and supported people facing difficult life circumstances. The Coalition was expected to enable CSOs to jointly influence policymaking, develop the social services market, and introduce modern standards of support.¹¹³

At the oblast level, networking increasingly took place through informal arrangements and social partnerships. Some respondents noted that they did not see a need to formalize their cooperation with other CSOs.

One of the largest networking platforms, the 14th Annual Civil Society Forum organized by ISAR Ednannia, deserves particular mention. In 2025, the Forum was held under the slogan “withSTAND” and brought together representatives of civil society, donors, and volunteers for networking, training, and advocacy. The Forum reaffirmed its role as a unique cross-sectoral platform where CSOs coordinated their efforts with government bodies, including the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry for Veterans Affairs, as well as international partners such as UNDP, GIZ, IREX, and UNICEF. The event provided a space for extensive networking between civil society and the technology, legal, health care, and cultural sectors.

Education and training programs for the sector continued to be available. Within the Civil Society Home ecosystem, ISAR Ednannia ran organizational development schools and provided grants for training. Established educational programs continued to operate, including the Ukrainian Catholic University program “Management of Nonprofit Organizations,” the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy program “Anti-corruption Studies,” and courses offered through Prometheus, Zrozumilo, Diia.Education, GURT, and other platforms. However, the overall decline in funding reduced the availability of training programs.

In 2025, cooperation between CSOs and public authorities in Ukraine was marked by growing practical importance and stronger regulatory support, but also by considerable unevenness and insufficient institutionalization.¹¹⁴ Despite the emergence of new legal and programmatic opportunities for civil society engagement, the effectiveness of this cooperation depended largely on local conditions, political will, and the development of a culture of partnership. This highlighted the need to further strengthen structured dialogue and integrate CSOs more fully into public policy development and implementation.

¹¹⁰ RPR Coalition website. URL: <https://rpr.org.ua/>


¹¹¹ RPR Coalition website. URL: <https://www.rise.org.ua/about-ua>

¹¹² Alliance of Ukrainian Civil Society Organizations website. URL: <https://allianceuacso.com/uk/>

¹¹³ EU4CSOs EmpowerUA Project website. URL: <https://eu4csos.org/about-2025/>

¹¹⁴ Assessing the Impact of Civil Society Organizations on Local Self-Government Bodies: Methodology and Results of a Pilot Study. Vox Ukraine PO. 2025. URL: https://zminytut.com/w/f/vector/oczinka_vplyvu_organizaczi_gromadyanskogo_suspilstva_na_organ_y.pdf

VII. PUBLIC IMAGE: 2.9



The public image score was 2.9 in 2025 and remained unchanged compared to 2024. Despite the numerous challenges facing CSOs, public trust in the sector remained consistently high.

According to November 2025 data from Razumkov Centre, 81 percent of Ukrainians trusted volunteer organizations, while 64 percent trusted public organizations.¹¹⁵ A survey by KIIS also found a high level of trust in volunteers, at 79 percent.¹¹⁶ A study by Zagoriy Foundation pointed to declining trust in large and corporate charitable foundations. Given that support for service members was the main priority for donors, Come Back Alive and Serhiy Prytula Charitable Foundation were the clear leaders in public recognition and financial trust. The study identified visibility, transparency, and accountability as the main factors shaping the public image of charitable organizations in 2025.¹¹⁷

In 2025, the public image of CSOs among public authorities generally improved, although perceptions varied across different areas of cooperation. At the national level, CSOs were viewed as partners of the government because of their involvement in developing reforms and strategies for European integration and civil society development.¹¹⁸ This image was further reinforced by international programs such as EU4CSOs, which were explicitly designed to promote cooperation between CSOs and public authorities.¹¹⁹

In frontline and war-affected communities, CSOs developed a reputation as responsible implementers and capable partners. Cooperation between public authorities and CSOs in these communities produced tangible results, including the establishment of veteran support centers and the implementation of energy resilience projects.

Examples of joint policy planning also had a positive impact. These included CSO participation in the development of local open government action plans.¹²⁰ This helped reinforce the image of CSOs as effective implementers and capable partners. At the same time, some public authorities remained cautious toward CSOs, citing insufficient awareness of the sector's activities and concerns about transparency and accountability, as well as the wartime context, which made it more difficult to balance security and openness.

¹¹⁵ Assessment of the Situation in the Country, Trust in Social Institutes, and Assessment of Problems Faced by Ukrainian Society (November 2025). URL: <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-sytuatsii-v-ukraini-dovira-do-sotsialnykh-institutiv-otsinka-problem-shcho-isnuut-v-ukrainskomu-suspilstvi-lystopad-2025>

¹¹⁶ Trust in Public Institutions. Press Release. URL: <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1578&page=2>

¹¹⁷ Nationwide Sociological Study of Charitable Giving for Zagoriy Foundation and the Giving Tuesday Initiative. URL: <https://zagoriy.foundation/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/blagodijnist-v-ukrayini-2025.pdf>

¹¹⁸ Mobilizing 'Team Ukraine' for a Successful Recovery. How the State, Communities and Citizens Can Rebuild the Country Together. Incorporating the 2025 Chatham House survey of Ukrainian CSOs. URL: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-07-04-mobilizing-team-ukraine-lutsevych.pdf>

¹¹⁹ EU4CSOs In Ukraine – Call for Proposals 2025. URL: <https://www.alda-europe.eu/call/eu4csos-in-ukraine-call-for-proposals-2025-europeaid-184490-dd-act-ua/>

¹²⁰ Strengthening Cooperation Between Local Governments and Civil Society for Ukraine's Recovery. Report. URL: <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/Brovdiiy%20-%20Ukraine%20local%20government%20-%20paper.pdf>

An analysis of CSO communications in 2025 identified several factors that contributed to positive changes in the sector's public image. According to the CSO Meter, the expansion of digital ecosystems and the publication of data by more than 800 verified organizations helped mitigate reputational risks and demonstrate the sector's high level of financial accountability.¹²¹ The strategic nature of cooperation with public authorities and international institutions was illustrated by the RD4U Coordination Platform. The Platform supported public outreach related to the Register of Damage for Ukraine, reaching a potential audience of more than 10 million citizens, and reinforced the position of CSOs as a flagship source of expertise in Ukraine's European integration.¹²²

The Social Business Forum, held in Kamianets-Podilskyi in June 2025, helped challenge the stereotype that the sector was dependent on grants.¹²³ Active communication about CSO social enterprise practices helped strengthen their reputation as effective agents of social change.

Organizations continued to actively use social media and messaging applications, personal contacts, telephone calls, and their websites for external communications. Compared with nationwide CSOs, local CSOs were less likely to use websites, email newsletters, and traditional media.¹²⁴

The active use of Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, and TikTok helped raise the public profile of CSOs. Young people also showed growing engagement, with the establishment of a public organization increasingly seen in youth circles as an expression of civic identity.

Support from traditional media in the oblasts continued to decline. Media outlets in the oblasts were increasingly reluctant to publish CSO materials free of charge, focusing instead on commercial content or stories likely to attract wider attention. Informal media partnerships gradually gave way to paid placements, making it harder for small organizations to reach broader audiences.

At the national level and in the capital, civil society representatives remained an important source of expert analysis and commentary for the media. They continued to contribute through expert columns, articles in online and print outlets, television appearances, and appearances on YouTube. In Kyiv, KyivFM periodically aired a dedicated radio program, "Third Sector," on the role of civil society in Ukraine's development.¹²⁵ In 2025 alone, the program aired 51 episodes featuring representatives of different CSOs.

CSOs continued to publish annual and financial reports and comply with public reporting requirements, including those set by donors. Large organizations mapped out their own communications strategies and maintained partnerships with leading media outlets. Communications capacity, however, remained weak in most small and medium-sized organizations, many of which lacked dedicated public relations specialists, social media managers, and digital communications staff.

121 CSO Meter 2025: Ukraine. Country Report. URL: <https://api.home.ednannia.ua/upload/kch/26/04/20/2025%20Ukraine%20Country%20Report%20UKR.pdf>

122 Coordination Platform. URL: <https://rd4u.coe.int/uk/the-register-s-civil-society-coordination-platform>

123 We Invite You to the Social Business Forum. URL: <https://social-change.com.ua/zaproshuyemo-na-forum-sotsialnogo-biznesu/>

124 Civil Society in Ukraine During Wartime, 2022–2025. Report on a Comprehensive Sociological Study. August 2025. URL: https://api.home.ednannia.ua/upload/kch/25/10/29/zvit_UA_Hromadianske_suspilstvo_v%20umovakh_vivny_2022-2025.pdf

125 Third Sector. Information Program. URL: <https://radio.kyiv24.news/programs/tretij-sektor>



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