


ISSUE No. 11.

APRIL – JUNE 2024

# RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

Periodic report based  
on monitoring materials from  
selected regions of Ukraine

2024



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**RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR.** Periodic report based on monitoring materials from selected regions of Ukraine. **ISSUE No. 11. APRIL – JUNE 2024** / Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research. Kyiv. August 2024. 42 p.

This report was drafted by the team of the Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Research (UCIPR) as part of the activities of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion (National Platform). This civic initiative was launched in February 2018 (formerly known as the National Platform “Dialogue on Peace and Secure Reintegration”).

The National Platform’s activities are geared towards strengthening the national resilience of Ukraine. This could be done through establishing dialogue practices in society, providing the authorities with proposals for developing relevant policies, particularly those on resilience and social cohesion, as well as ensuring public awareness of these processes. The initiative has been implemented with the financial support of the European Union as part of “Sustaining the Resilience of Ukraine towards the Emerging Risks and Consequences of the War” project.

The report is based on data on events in 11 oblasts of Ukraine which are important for shaping a policy of national resilience. The project target oblasts were selected based on analysis of changes in cohesion of local populations due to the outbreak of military operations and include Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv, and Zakarpattia oblasts. For data collection, we distinguish between the temporarily occupied areas, frontline and deoccupied areas, and relatively rear areas.

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The product content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

The text of the report is available for download on the websites of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion <http://national-platform.org/> and UCIPR [www.ucipr.org.ua](http://www.ucipr.org.ua).

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFU	Armed Forces of Ukraine
ASC	Administrative Services Centre
CMA	City Military Administration
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IE	Individual entrepreneur
IO	Influence Operation
HPP	Hydro Power Plant
MCA	Military and Civil Administration
OMA	Oblast Military Administration
RF	Russian Federation
SESU	State Emergency Service of Ukraine
SPP	Solar Power Plant
TPP	Thermal Power Plant
TOA	Temporarily Occupied Area
TRSSC	Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centre
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
WHO	World Health Organization
ZNPP	Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

# SUMMARY

## The situation at the front line

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been going on for the third year with very high combat intensity as of April 2024. In May, the Russians launched a second offensive in Kharkiv oblast following their expulsion by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in September–October 2022. Yet, the Russians' plan to occupy as much of Kharkiv oblast as possible in May–June 2024 failed. They expected to capture Vovchansk and Lyptsi in two days, to reach Kharkiv in five days, and to advance further. However, the Ukrainian defenders stopped them again. The Ukrainian militaries were maintaining active defence and holding their positions. The enemy was regrouping and withdrawing reserves in the north of the oblast; battles were reported near Vovchansk, and assaults were launched towards Kupiansk.

[According to](#) the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi, the Russian army has used more than 2,400 guided aerial bombs against Ukraine since early June, a third of which were launched in Kharkiv oblast. In an interview to [Guardian](#) on 17 April 2024, the Mayor of Kharkiv, Ihor Terekhov, [said](#) that foreign military aid was of critical importance for Ukraine to prevent Kharkiv being a "second Aleppo". In his words, the invaders have changed their tactics, attempting to destroy the city's power supply and to intimidate the population with strikes on civilian infrastructure facilities.

The incursion of Russians in Kharkiv oblast [stretched](#) the line of contact, which, according to the Ukrainian General Staff's July data, went for about 3,000 km across Ukraine's territory, with hostilities along about 1,000 km, and pinned down the Ukrainian forces. With the opening of several fronts and a significant advantage in resources, the Russians pressed on in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. In Donetsk oblast, the aggressor's troops attacked in several areas. Following a four-month offensive, the occupation of Avdiivka in February 2024 and the capture of adjacent Ocheretyne in May, the enemy moved towards Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka highway, the main supply route for the AFU in Donetsk oblast. The highway is about 10 km from Ocheretyne. Ukrainian government-controlled Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka were under the enemy's ongoing heavy shelling.

In June, the aggressor escalated their attacks and broke into the Ukrainian defence position near Toretsk, with the primary objectives to capture the cities of Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, to cross the Siverskyi Donets – Donbas Canal, and to reach Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka highway. This could open an opportunity to directly attack Pokrovsk, an important transport hub on the administrative border of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, and to proceed to the Ukrainian cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk in the north of Donetsk oblast. The blitzkrieg in Ukraine has failed, and now the main goal of the Kremlin is to reach the administrative borders of the four Ukrainian oblasts already declared by the aggressor as the RF's entities.

Heavy fighting continued along the entire front line in Luhansk oblast where the Russians occupied more than 95% of the territory. Russian troops attempted to break through the Ukrainian defences at Nevske, Makiivka, and Serebryansky Forest where the front line remained almost unchanged since 2022. Apart from attacks on Ukrainian positions, the so-called liberators carried out airstrikes on cities and villages of Luhansk oblast. Novoliubivka and Serebryansky Forest came under fire.

The AFU started to more often retaliate against legitimate military targets in the temporarily occupied areas. Specifically, on 7 June, deployment sites of Russian troops and infrastructure facilities in Luhansk [were attacked](#). Videos from the site of one of the strikes were found to be filmed near Hostra Mohyla. There are barracks of the former Luhansk Higher Military Aviation School of Navigators there, where the invaders were quartered, with an adjacent airfield, an aircraft repair plant, and a road to the Russian border. Luhansk-based oil depot was hit for the fourth time in the past two months.

In Zaporizhzhia oblast, the Russian militaries continued their attacks near Robotyne, Verbove, Mala Tokmachka, Novopokrovka, and Nesterianka, but the Ukrainian defenders held their positions. Observers believe that an increase in the intensity of attacks may indicate the intentions of Russian strategists to resume offensive operations in the area.

Russia's artillery continued to hit the southern population centres of Mykolaiv oblast from the territory of the occupied Kinburn Spit.

Kherson oblast was also a place of active hostilities. Communities of the oblast along the Dnipro suffered from daily bombardment. Moreover, the Russians launched rockets into more distant populated areas, killing civilians, seriously damaging critical infrastructure facilities, and destroying housing.

In May, the Russians carried out numerous missile and drone attacks on residential areas of Odesa. Notwithstanding Ukrainian air defence forces shooting down most of the drones, some did hit their targets, having caused serious civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction.

## Temporarily occupied areas

In April–June 2024, the process of integration into the system of the Russian government continued in the TOAs of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts. The occupying administration continued to pursue the policy of terror and intimidation, actively carried out forced Russification and militarisation of the oblasts, instilled new laws, and imposed coercive measures to retain control of these territories and to further assimilate the Ukrainian population.

The invaders plan to ramp up the transit potential of the occupied areas of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and to build a land corridor to Crimea. Specifically, they actively build a railway along the coast of the Sea of Azov, running from Russia's Rostov-on-Don to Crimea with the destination in Sevastopol. The road is considered as an alternative to the Kerch Bridge. It will make it possible to ship cargoes, including military ones. The proximity of the railway to the front line in Zaporizhzhia oblast determined the combat activity of the Russian militaries there. To manage the railway, in March 2023, Russia established Donetsk-headquartered company whose name reflects its conquering aspirations, Novorossiia Railways. In parallel to this, the existing motorway from Rostov-on-Don to Mariupol was under repair.

The occupying authorities obliged owners of housing located in the occupied territories to register the right of ownership in the Unified State Register of Real Estate of the Russian Federation, warning that the property would be confiscated if a relevant entry was missing, or the property had signs of being "abandoned".

The Russian Federation continued to allocate significant financial resources for changes in the social environment in the occupied areas, notably for forced Russification of the educational sector and the spread of propaganda narratives through all available communication means and channels. These funds were used for the purchase of Russian-language books for libraries, provision of the population with free set-top boxes for Russian World satellite television, and the wide spread of large-circulation official newspapers that publish propaganda materials.

The imposition of mandatory measures, such as lining up to the anthem of the Russian Federation and forming cadet classes of the Russian Guard, was aimed at the indoctrination and integration of children into the system of the occupying regime. This sparked conflicts between children and their parents who did not support the occupying authorities.

On 15 April, the spring conscription campaign was launched in the Russian Federation which for the first time extended to youths from the newly occupied areas of Ukraine.

## Frontline and deoccupied areas

The system of military administrations of Donetsk oblast continued to perform its functions and demonstrate its capacity to adapt and improve through the recruitment of new competent staff and active cooperation with the civil society sector. However, the population of the oblast was somewhat detached from the process of

administrative decision-making due to the lack of a representative level, i. e., local councils and local democracy tools. Furthermore, a significant part of the oblast's evacuated locals remained disconnected from the events on the ground which creates gaps in the practice of interpersonal communication of those who stayed and those who left.

The issue of evacuation might become very acute for those who stayed in Donetsk oblast because of the fighting approaching the densely populated Kramatorsk–Sloviansk agglomeration. The rapid evacuation of the population might create additional logistical problems and place burdens on social infrastructure of other oblasts that have been receiving displaced persons for two years and a half, as well as pose new challenges to social resilience and cohesion.

As a result of attacks and infrastructure destruction, the population of Kherson oblast was continuously decreasing – 65,000 persons, or approximately 20% of the previous number, remained in the oblast centre as of May 2024. Conversely, the population of Vysokopillia, Kalynivske, and Velyka Oleksandrivka communities, which were not shelled so often, was gradually growing.

Despite the systematic work of the SESU and other specialised structures, aid from international donors and business community, Kharkiv oblast remained the most mine-contaminated place in Ukraine. Although mine clearance operations are being intensified, up-to-date technologies are desperately needed.

The construction of underground schools was underway in Kharkiv to encourage the locals to stay.

Businesses that remained in or returned to Kharkiv oblast began once again considering relocation options in view of intensified shelling due to Putin's [idea](#) to create a "buffer zone" to make the territory of the Russian Federation inaccessible to the AFU.

The renaming of streets as part of decolonisation and de-Russification triggered different responses among local populations and polarised opinions in communities. Though in general, the populations welcomed the decolonisation campaign a sign of resistance to Russian aggression and an effort of retracing the events of the past, unfalsified by imperial narratives, which is important for the strengthening of national cohesion.

War fatigue has been growing among Ukrainians. The uncertainty of war outcomes and timeframe is taking its toll on social sentiments and situation. The thesis about the need to make peace at any price is perceived differently in different social contexts.

In May 2024, new laws came into force that strengthened the responsibility of Ukrainians and employers for non-compliance with the rules for military registration and mobilisation. Employers started to offer an option between dismissals or signing labour contracts to avoid reporting. Furthermore, the complex and lengthy procedure for military reservation created additional social tensions, as many companies faced difficulties in processing documents or failed to reserve key employees in due time.

The war causes permanent damage to the environment. Although the environmental impacts have yet to be assessed, the emissions from daily artillery and rocket attacks on civilian and industrial facilities, including those that work with chemicals, as well as burnt forests adversely affect the environmental situation in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries.

## Relatively rear areas controlled by the Ukrainian government

The enemy's missile strikes in May–June 2024 severely damaged critical infrastructure across the country, having caused an increase in power outages. Outage schedules varied depending on the situation in the energy sector. Hence, the issue of developing a network of small power plants operating on alternative energy sources is urgent.

A threat of a man-made disaster remained in Burshtyn urban territorial community, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. When determining a general algorithm for the construction of heat supply infrastructure facilities, the issues of the beginning and funding of the construction remained unresolved.

The export of agricultural products via Odesa ports was at a fairly high level (87% of Ukraine's agricultural exports) which evidenced the important role of the oblast in global food security. An increase in the



volume of cargo handling in seaports demonstrated its economic stability and the capacity to adapt to the wartime context. The opening of an oblast business support office meant efforts for economic development and support for entrepreneurs.

The dynamics of social environment development of the rear oblasts was influenced by complex political and socio-economic processes of martial law. On the one hand, fatigue from the war and numerous casualties, inefficiency of administrative decisions on important issues and social differentiation was growing in society. Ambiguous attitudes towards mobilisation and its methods, as well as a drop in financial support for the AFU were recorded. On the other hand, various groups and communities became more active, the processes of establishing civic identity crystallised amid the revision of ideologems of the Soviet era, and cultural life intensified.

Most Ukrainians were negative about mobilisation practices, and various legal and illegal forms of evasion of military service spread. The activities of authorities have only eroded trust in them.

The number of people who needed treatment and rehabilitation increased because of the war. New and available health care and rehabilitation centres for military and civilian victims of the war were opened and expanded, new classrooms were arranged for medical and military training of children, funds were allocated for projects on rehabilitation and reintegration of the militaries into civilian life, opportunities were expanded for war veterans to start their own business.

Authorities, charitable foundations, and international organisations coordinate efforts to help IDPs. Housing and household problems, health care services and psychological support remain relevant for the population. Getting a job or starting their own business helps displaced persons integrate into a new environment and recover.

Throughout the great war, a new symbolic space has started to take shape in which heroes of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as anti-Russian and anti-imperial narratives, play a dominant role. Ukrainians are especially sensitive to the memory of those killed in this war: they opened alleys of glory, unveiled memorial plaques, etc.

# I. TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS

A process of integration into the Russian system of governance was ongoing in the TOAs. The occupiers continued their policies of terror and intimidation, along with activities aimed at absorbing the areas under their control and making return of Ukrainians impossible. The Russification and militarisation policies were in full swing; new laws were adopted, and enforcement actions were taken to keep the TOAs under Russia's control.

## 1. Changes in the system of governance

Following the sham election of the President of Russia in the occupied areas of Ukraine's Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts on 15–17 March, political and administrative life in those areas slackened, with no significant events taking place in spring 2024. The occupying authorities primarily made statements related to Russia-wide context. The system of occupying authorities remained unchanged, with gradual integration into the Russian system of governance.

In the occupied areas of Donetsk oblast, the process of dissolving the so-called public authorities of the Donetsk People's Republic went on – those being replaced by the offices and bodies of Russian central authorities.

A decision to dissolve the so-called occupying government was made following Russia's statement on the annexation of Luhansk oblast. To that end, relevant "decrees" of the "Head of the Republic" dissolved the so-called [Ministry of Information](#), the [Ministry of Culture](#), the [Ministry of Education and Science](#), the [Ministry of State Security](#), the [Ministry of Health Care](#), and the [Administration of the Head of the Republic](#). All these make-believe "authorities" of the above quasi-state have to be replaced with new "authorities" as provided for by Russian legislation. Meanwhile, the occupying authorities put their decision on the dissolution of the "regional government" **on hold** at least until 1 September 2024. The reason for the postponement was "explained" as follows: "There was a need to extend the timeframe of the dissolution of the "government" of the "LPR".

As reported by the Head of Berdiansk CMA, Viktoriia Halitsyna, the Russian Federation **intended** to have a so-called new federal district in the TOAs of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts established until the end of 2024. "These plans of the occupiers highlight their desire to legitimise aggression and cement control of the Ukrainian lands through their efforts to erase Ukrainian identity and culture," she added.

The **process of replacement** of local collaborators with Russian officials continued in the so-called LPR. The Head of the breakaway LPR, Leonid Pasichnyk, announced that a Russian, Yegor Kovalchuk, introduced by the Deputy Chief of Staff of Putin's Administration, Sergey Kiriienko, will become a new "Prime Minister". Earlier, Kovalchuk was Mayor of the city of Miass and Deputy Governor of Chelyabinsk region. He replaced Serhii Kozlov, a local official from Sorokyne occupied since 2014.

In May, Rostov region's Governor, Vasily Golubev, **announced** the establishment of a buffer zone with a special regime between Russia's Rostov oblast and Russia-occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (the so-called LPR and DPR). Having ID documents has now become mandatory to enter the above zone. To approach the border at a distance of 100 m, one should receive in advance a permit from the FSB. Similar measures were in place when there was the state border between Ukraine's Luhansk oblast and Russia's Rostov region.

### 1.1. Decisions of occupying authorities

#### >> **FORCED PASSPORTING**

**According to** Luhansk OMA, persons without Russian citizenship are allowed to live in the self-proclaimed LPR based on their available documents until 31 December 2024. After expiry of that period, they

will be recognised as foreigners and will have to apply for residence permits.

*“Forced passporting is out of whack. Earlier, it was established that Ukrainians could live in these territories without Russian ID documents only until 1 July. After that, the invaders threatened to enforce deportation,”* Luhansk OMA said in a commentary.

#### >> ZAPORIZHZHIA NPP

On 21 June, the IAEA [reported](#) a serious damage to Luch substation in temporarily occupied Enerhodar after a drone attack resulting in power outage in the city where most ZNPP staff live. According to the IAEA team, power supplies to the substation were not directly affected this time, as it does not receive off-site power.

On 28 June, representatives of the temporarily occupied ZNPP informed the IAEA experts that an external radiation monitoring station had been destroyed by shelling and fire. The Agency’s experts, however, were not allowed there to confirm the damage caused. *“The loss of one radiation monitoring station does not have a direct impact on safety at the ZNPP, but it forms part of a continuous erosion of a range of safety measures during the war that remains a deep source of concern,”* IAEA Director General, Rafael Grossi, [emphasised](#).

#### >> BUSINESSES

The redistribution of Ukrainian assets [continued](#) in Russia-occupied areas. In April, the occupying authorities of Donetsk oblast announced granting a lease of four mines to a certain “investor”. Among those were Komsomolets Donbasa and three mines owned by Torezanratsyt Association. Komsomolets Donbasa mine is located in the city of Khrestivka (Kirovske prior to 2016) and is owned by DTEK Corporation, part of Rinat Akhmetov’s SCM Holding, one of the largest coal mining enterprises in Ukraine. Torezanratsyt Association is a state-owned Ukrainian enterprise which owns three mines in the city of Torez. The steps taken by the breakaway authorities in the occupied areas actually mean the capture of Ukrainian state- and privately-owned coal mining assets. A new Russian company, Impex-Don, established in Rostov-on-Don in 2015 and engaged in coal mining and trade in rolled metal products, will be the figurehead “owner” of the above businesses.

According to the National Resistance Center, the enemy [has been withholding](#) salary payments at some mines in Luhansk oblast’s TOAs since February which aggravated the social crisis. The population became more dependent on the occupying authorities which recover arrears by handing out humanitarian aid in exchange for obtaining passports. Since 2022, a significant number of mines in these areas have remained closed. This caused additional problems for locals left without a stable source of income and forced them to adapt to the conditions created by the occupying authorities.

The occupying authorities continued to demonstrate their intention to restore industrial production in the newly conquered cities, but these statements were not backed up with action. Specifically, the so-called Head of the breakaway DPR, Denis Pushylin, [claimed](#) that several billion roubles were needed to restore Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant. However, these funds must be provided by investors who have not even been found yet. The final assessment can be given only following the restoration of the city’s power supply. Pushylin also underscored that the prospects for Avdiivka’s recovery will depend on the plant’s ability to resume operation.

A similar situation [is reported](#) in Bakhmut whose demining has not been even launched, because to do that, the invaders allegedly needed to move the frontline 20–25 km away of the city, which implies the capture of Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, and Kramatorsk. Despite this, the so-called leadership of the Republic announced their readiness to [resume](#) the operation of Artemivsk Champagne Wine Factory.

Overall, throughout the entire full-scale invasion, the occupying authorities only declared that there were the possibilities for and prospects of restoration of the occupied cities. More or less systematic construction took place only in Mariupol. However, it was primarily transport infrastructure necessary for the war effort that was restored there, whereas the construction of housing only aimed at making an impression of intense activity and accommodating representatives of the occupying authorities.

At the same time, such cities as Soledar, Popasna, Bakhmut or Avdiivka were virtually in ruins. Following the bombardment and capture of these cities, the situation unfolded according to a standard scenario: authorities pretended to be busy with restoring life, locals were leaving their homes, and population centres were becoming deserted. In February 2024, as few as up to 15 people lived in Soledar and about 200 people out of its 22,000 pre-war population remained in Popasna. Avdiivka, which once had the population of 30,000, was almost completely levelled to the ground.




Avdiivka, Donetsk oblast. February 2024. Photo: [Reuters](#)

In Russia-occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk oblast, the invaders carried out an [inventory](#) of entrepreneurs' real estate. Owners of shops, cafés, gas stations, hotels, warehouses, land plots, and residential buildings converted for commercial or office use, as well as street vendors selling from kiosks – all had to submit relevant documents to the occupying authorities until 1 June 2024. In the event of their absence, the occupiers threatened to launch the procedure for recognising the above assets as “municipal property”.

## >> **INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION**

The occupying authorities planned to increase the transit capacity of the occupied areas of Donetsk oblast to build a land corridor to occupied Crimea. Specifically, the construction of a railway branch going through the newly occupied territories of Ukraine from Rostov-on-Don to occupied Crimea was underway.

According to [journalists' investigation](#), part of that railway route in Donetsk oblast was 80% ready. The occupying authorities [officially stated](#) that the main goal of the development of these transport corridors was to “integrate all trade ports of the Sea of Azov into a single transport network.” When put in operation, the railway will enable the occupiers to transport cargo, including military goods, and save time due to improved logistics.



Railway route from Rostov-on-Don to Crimea through the occupied areas of Ukraine

Along with that, the construction of a motorway between the Russian territory (Rostov-on-Don) and occupied Crimea was actively discussed. The absence of a bypass highway around Mariupol prevents the use of this route for military cargo shipping. Due to that, cargo is to be moved through the city centre which attracts unnecessary attention of the civilian population. For this reason, the occupying authorities [planned](#) to accomplish the construction of the bypass highway around Mariupol by the end of 2026.

#### >> **PROPERTY**

As reported by ZMINA Human Rights Centre, in early March 2024, the Russia-installed authorities [announced](#) that owners of residential housing located in the TOAs of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Kherson oblasts of Ukraine had to register ownership of residential real estate in the Unified State Register of Real Estate of the RF. If a relevant entry is missing in the Register or where the residential premises have signs of being “abandoned” (non-used, with utilities being left unpaid for the year), they are to be confiscated by the so-called municipal authorities of the Russian occupying regime.

#### >> **ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS**

Kinburn Peninsula has been under occupation for almost three years now. [According to](#) the Department of Ecology and Natural Resources of Mykolaiv OMA, 60% of the land has burnt there because of over 180 fires. The situation is also complicated by the fact that since the beginning of the occupation, the Russians have looted all property of the natural reserves, including even fire-fighting equipment.

## 1.2. Access to public information

The Russian occupying regime has created a powerful propaganda machine in an effort to target the domestic audience and to control those living in the occupied areas. A free package of [Russian World satellite television](#) was used as one of the key propaganda tools. It is intended for those living in the occupied areas of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts. The package, which includes federal and regional channels, will be free for users until 31 December 2026.



The occupying authorities continued reformatting the information space. Within the reporting period, a new media outlet covering the TOAs of Ukraine was launched. [Novoe.Media](#) has sections devoted to the occupied parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Registered by Roskomnadzor in April 2024, the outlet actively promotes the Russian authorities' official information policy by providing coverage of the "recovery of the occupied areas" and advertising the advantages of life in Russia.

In the occupied areas of Kherson oblast, FM-radio Tavria was in operation, as well as six official print publications distributed free of charge. All newspapers came from the joint editorial office of Naddnieprianska Pravda whose circulation currently reaches 80,000 copies and was much larger at the time of the sham referendum and elections. Newspapers are printed in Simferopol, Crimea. Furthermore, all Russia-installed authorities have Telegram channels. Various Telegram channels fuel a powerful propaganda narrative aimed at controlling the vision and perception of the situation by the populations of the occupied areas.

### 1.3. Actions of occupying authorities regarding recruitment into armed formations

On 15 April 2024, the spring conscription campaign was launched in the RF. For the first time, young people from the newly occupied areas of Ukraine will also be conscripted into military service. The Decree of the President of Russia No. 222 of 31 March 2024 does not provide for any exceptions for these areas, the Center of Journalistic Investigations [reported](#). Representatives of military conscription offices can either personally serve conscription notices on locals of the occupied areas or send them via the State Services portal. Persons who failed to appear at military conscription offices will be sentenced to a fine of RUB200,000.

Authorities of the temporarily occupied parts of Kherson oblast placed entrepreneurs [under obligation](#) to compile lists of employees subject to military registration. That concerned nationals born in 2007 and older. It was planned to increase recruitment to the so-called volunteer battalions.

The occupiers [stepped up](#) their mobilisation effort in the captured cities of Zaporizhzhia oblast – Melitopol, Berdiansk, Enerhodar, and Tokmak. Local leaders, together with the Russian militaries, organised door-to-door inspections of locals: they checked documents and enquired whether men were on the military register. *"In most cases, men are served conscription notices on the spot and are required to immediately arrive at military conscription offices to be further sent to the front. Such inspections are now becoming even more frequent and aggressive,"* a message by Anti Z Movement reads.

In mid-April, the Gauleiter of Zaporizhzhia oblast, Yevgeny Balitsky, [established](#) so-called draft committees in the occupied areas. *"Drafting locals of the occupied areas to serve in the army of the occupying state is a violation of international law,"* the Head of Zaporizhzhia Oblast State Administration, Ivan Fedorov, said in a commentary. He reminded that the Russian authorities earlier claimed that they would not draft conscripts from the captured areas for at least another five years.

At the end of the academic year, the Russians held advocacy events in occupied Luhansk oblast targeting school graduates, their parents, and teachers. They attempted to persuade adolescents to opt for military educational institutions, notably for the naval school in Mariupol. *"The occupiers need personnel at the front. The invaders think the youths of the breakaway LPR are suitable for this,"* sources in Luhansk OMA said.

## 2. Work on identity

The occupying authorities continued to actively work with young people in the occupied areas. At the time of writing of the report, all key ideological youth organisations [started operating](#) there, beginning with the Movement of the First which is, in fact, a rebirth of the Soviet pioneer organisation, and ending with the Young Guard of United Russia, a modern version of the Soviet Young Communist League, the Komsomol of the incumbent party of power.

The organisations attempted to reach as many youths as possible and used the most primitive methods of manipulation, giving those from the back of beyond a feeling of being engaged in large metropolitan

processes. To that end, headliners' press-tours to the occupied areas were regularly organised, and they often tried to personally take young people to large events held in Russian cities. Specifically, this year's graduation ceremony for graduates of the so-called Donetsk Institute of State Fire Service of the Ministry of Emergency Situations established in 2017 [was held on Red Square in Moscow](#). Such events had only a propaganda purpose and served to strengthen the youths' sense of Russian identity.

[According to](#) the National Resistance Center, more than 2,500 children aged 13 to 17 from the TOAs of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts will receive military training in Volgograd region of the RF. In the summer of 2023, a number of so-called Warrior military and sports centres began to open their doors in Russia to train adolescents for further participation in military operations upon reaching the age of majority. Local collaborators select candidates for such training on their own. First and foremost, they pay attention to the physical development of children and then brainwash them.

In May, the first graduation of cadets took place in Kherson-based office of the Warrior centre which operates on the basis of Henichesk Construction College. Teenagers aged 14 to 17 years [were given](#) marching drills, firearms and medical training under the guidance of advisers from Kalmykia. The training programme also covered the basics of drone control, the study of types of weapons, military equipment and munitions in service of the Russian Armed Forces, and regulatory acts of the Ministry of Defence of the RF.

The occupiers continued to establish pseudo non-governmental organisations of various kinds in the occupied areas of Kherson oblast, and to engage Ukrainian youths in their activities. In June, massive propaganda events were dedicated to Pushkin Day, Russia Day and the date commemorating the beginning of the so-called Great Patriotic War.

The breakaway authorities of the temporarily occupied areas of Kherson oblast spent RUB50 million for the purchase of Russian-language books for 110 local libraries. In the words of the occupiers, many works of literature were banned and the available library funds were not updated in the areas when controlled by the Ukrainian government. Therefore, the occupiers believe Russian literature should be actively disseminated. This was presented as a "cultural renaissance".

## 2.1. Changes in education standards

Russia's T-invariant [reported](#) on the situation of higher education in the occupied areas of Ukraine. According to the authors, higher education institutions are characterised by weak teaching capacity and provide poor education, but issue Russian-style diplomas to all those who have graduated therefrom since 2014. The rules for admission to these higher education institutions are much more lenient than those to Russian universities: until 2027, the applicants will be able to enrol based on exams that the institutions conduct independently rather than by passing the Unified State Exam mandatory in Russia.

At the same time, higher education institutions in the occupied areas offer a disproportionately large number of state-funded places. For example, last year, educational institutions in the occupied areas of Ukraine offered almost 30,000 state-funded places, although there were about 620,000 of them reserved throughout Russia. The above trend will continue.

In 2024, about 9,500 entrants will be able to [qualify](#) for free tuition in higher education institutions of the so-called DPR. Moreover, they will receive various grants for so-called scientific research which often have nothing in common with.

From September onwards, school children of 5<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> grades in temporarily occupied Luhansk oblast [will study](#) using an updated textbook on the history of their native land. "*On Putin's personal instructions, a local history course for school children consisting of three volumes was developed for children's accelerated immersion in the distorted paradigm of pro-Russian social, cultural, and historical memory,*" the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmytro Lubinets, said.

## 2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum activity, holidays and their celebration

In Berdiansk, Zaporizhzhia oblast, the occupiers [renamed](#) streets, having returned them their Soviet names. According to the CMA Head, Viktoriia Halitsyna, the so-called Head of the Russia-installed administration of Berdiansk, Oleksandr Saulenko, signed a resolution that provides for the return of “historical place names” to 69 streets, boulevards, and lanes renamed in 2016. All those renamed streets reflect the ideological pathos of the USSR, for example, the streets of the 50th anniversary of the USSR, streets bearing the names of outstanding figures of the Communist Party and of what was called in the Soviet Union the “international communist movement”: the Chekists, Lazo, Engels, Lenin, and others.

Along with that, in Berdiansk, the occupiers put local entrepreneurs [under obligation](#) to replace, at their own expense, signs with Russian-language ones. The occupiers threatened to prosecute for violating the relevant provision of Russian law.



## II. FRONTLINE AND DEOCCUPIED AREAS

### 1. Changes in the system of governance

The Parliament of Ukraine [is going](#) to dissolve Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast Councils. *“Donetsk and Luhansk have been occupied for 10 years, though we continue to spend money on maintaining the relevant Oblast Councils. The staff of the Oblast Councils is downsized, but they still function. Some members of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast Councils have become collaborators and are running for offices in the Russian Federation. Therefore, the Verkhovna Rada will have to address this issue,”* said Oleksandr Kornienko, First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

On 23 April, the President of Ukraine [established](#) military administrations in eight population centres of Zaporizhzhia oblast and appointed their heads.

On 2 May, the process of downsizing of Zaporizhzhia Oblast Council [was completed](#). According to the Head of Zaporizhzhia OMA, Ivan Fedorov, 36 out of the 90 staff members were left. Some resigned voluntarily, some got laid off, whereas others were sent on unpaid leave.

#### 1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

##### >> POWER FACILITIES

From April through June, the RF intensified shelling of critical infrastructure, in particular power facilities. As a result of massive strikes by the Russians, the equipment of power generation (TPP, HPP, etc.) and transmission facilities was damaged.

On 5 June, passenger vehicle traffic through Dnipro HPP dam’s causeway [resumed](#). The dam was damaged by massive strikes [in March](#) and on the night of 1 June when the plant was hit. A speed limit of 30 km/h was established for vehicles. Lorries were still moving through Khortytsia Island.

The power supply situation in Zaporizhzhia oblast was difficult. The Head of Zaporizhzhia OMA, Ivan Fedorov, [said](#) that Dnipro HPP was in critical condition. [According to](#) the power distribution company, Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo, about a third of power production was lost as a result of Russia’s strikes on power grid facilities compared to December 2021. Local authorities of Zaporizhzhia planned to install alternative power sources to have at least critical infrastructure in operating condition in the autumn and winter. The use of gas generators and gas fuel stations, as well as large diesel generators, was considered.

Since 18 June, Zaporizhzhia was switched to energy-efficient street lighting to reduce power consumption. And since 22 June, new power outage schedules were applied in the city and in the oblast according to which daily power outages lasted from 12 to 15 hours.

The damaged power grid remained a serious challenge for Kharkiv oblast and required significant financial resources and innovative solutions. The situation was complicated by the fact that the enemy neither stopped shelling nor gave an opportunity to properly restore the grid.

[According to](#) Kharkiv OMA, the oblast, as before, received help from other oblasts of Ukraine to remove the critical consequences for the power sector caused by Russia’s attacks. At the time of writing of the report, more than 1,000 generators of various capacities were handed over to Kherson, Vinnytsia, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Sumy oblasts. Aid continued to flow from other Ukrainian oblasts. The Heads of Khmelnytskyi, Volyn, and Kyiv OMAs visited Kharkiv and granted a considerable

amount of aid for the needs of Kharkiv oblast from oblast centres, raions, communities, benefactors concerned, volunteers, and common Ukrainians. Despite the difficult situation, Kherson oblast was the first to respond and sent a batch of necessary equipment.

On the night of 20 June, a missile strike on [Sloviansk TPP](#), Donetsk oblast, killed an employee and damaged part of the process equipment. The TPP, located 25 km away from the front line, has suffered less damage from Russian attacks compared to other generating facilities that were either destroyed or occupied.

Despite this, power supply in Donetsk oblast was better than in the country in general. There were several reasons for this. First, due to the absence of heavy industry and a smaller population, the oblast needs less power. Second, due to the large number of military units, this territory was a priority in the context of power supply.

The Energy Efficiency Fund of Ukraine [will provide](#), under the GreenDIM programme, irreversible assistance to those who plan to use alternative power sources, in particular solar panels. The Fund will partly reimburse the cost of equipment and materials, as well as energy efficiency certification of the buildings before the allocation of funds and following the completion of works. However, not everyone will be eligible to receive these funds, because homeowners' associations, which are among potential recipients, have not been established everywhere and they must pay for work. The programme does not apply to the following three types of areas considered as dangerous for living: a) TOAs and areas of active hostilities, b) temporarily non-government controlled population centres, c) frontline population centres. The [lists](#) for the two latter categories were established by the government in 2014 and were last changed on 2 February 2022, prior to Russia's large-scale invasion. As of now, the listed population centres are under Russian occupation.

## >> CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENCE FORTIFICATIONS

In April, the government of Ukraine [added](#) another UAH 5.6 billion to UAH 20 billion already allocated for the construction of defence fortifications in Ukrainian oblasts. According to the Prime Minister, out of this amount, UAH 1.1 billion was intended for Donetsk, over UAH 1 billion for Zaporizhzhia, UAH 1.5 billion for Sumy, UAH 300 million for Mykolaiv, and UAH 400 million for Kherson oblast.

Since 10 May, following active offensive operations of Russian troops in Kharkiv oblast, many people on social networks have been outraged by a lack of fortifications and mine contamination of areas bordering the RF. Also, posts were saying that the funds allocated for the construction of fortifications were stolen and that fortifications were not built.

[According to](#) various journalistic materials, the areas of Kharkiv oblast bordering the RF had unused elements of defence fortifications, dragon's teeth, scattered here and there. Earlier, this information, together with photos of abandoned defence fortification elements, was posted by the analytical Telegram channel, Deep State.

The Head of Kharkiv OMA, Oleh Sinehubov, said that the photos on social networking sites show the remains of construction materials *"taken out by the contractor for further installation at the request of one of the teams"*, which is *"0.4% of the total works performed on the construction of fortifications of that type"*, and therefore cannot theoretically influence the course of hostilities.

Oleh Sinehubov claimed that some fortification construction works were launched in 2024 according to the plan. However, due to ongoing shelling in some areas, the construction works had to be suspended. He assured that the works will be resumed as soon as physically possible. He also said that Kharkiv OMA built and was responsible only for the third line of fortifications and that all the rest was part of the IO to misinform and demoralise the population.

## >> DEMINING

The recovery and development of almost all spheres of life was impeded by [mine contamination](#) of Kharkiv oblast's areas. According to the Head of Kharkiv OMA, Oleh Sinehubov, combat engineer units of the SESU and police worked at the limit of their capabilities. Heavy civilian casualties were also reported: 274 bomb blast incidents were recorded, of which 73 resulted in deaths. The authorities of Kharkiv oblast [planned](#) to expand the number of groups of foreign demining operators. At the time of writing of the report, four teams of the country office of the Swiss Mine Action Fund (FSD) were demining the oblast, while another two were marking contaminated areas. The number of demining teams is to be increased to 11 until the end of this year.

They will be joined by about eight teams of canine experts. The number of demining machines, soil screeners, and vegetation clearance machines is expected to grow.

In Zaporizhzhia, a team of volunteers [developed](#) special anti-mine footwear for mine clearance experts with protective effect against landmines. The anti-mine footwear was tested and waited for certification from the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to go into serial production.

## >> INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES

Law enforcement agencies continued to hold accountable those who collaborated with the enemy during the temporary occupation. Notwithstanding a social demand, the information is scattered, because such cases are dealt with by different bodies. Furthermore, there were fears that those sentenced by a court for collaboration with the enemy might continue their subversive activities against the state.

Throughout 2023, law enforcement officers of Mykolaiv oblast [brought](#) to court 89 cases regarding unlawful actions against national security and international law. Courts rendered verdicts in 57 cases of that kind.

## >> HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

As before, members of deoccupied and war-affected communities of Kharkiv oblast received humanitarian aid, including food and hygiene kits. For example, in Tsyrukun community, bread [was provided](#) by the UN World Food Program and Peaceful Sky CO. The Polish humanitarian organisation, Polish Medical Mission, and the Ukrainian-Israeli medical volunteer mission, Frida Ukraine, [operated](#) in communities of Kharkiv oblast. Through U-Lead with Europe, war-affected communities [were provided](#) with generators and tools to help ensure uninterrupted operations amid possible power outages.

Locals of frontline population centres of Donetsk oblast regularly received humanitarian aid at their place of residence. The aid included food products, household chemicals, and construction materials needed for primary repairs of damaged buildings. Some 600 tons of aid of that kind [were distributed](#) on a weekly basis in May.

Along with that, the humanitarian aid distribution system in the oblast was arranged with a view to different security levels. In safer communities, humanitarian aid was distributed by international organisations, under local civic initiatives, and by authorities. Representatives of authorities delivered goods to less secure population centres, whereas military and security units, i. e. the SESU and police, provided frontline population centres with everything they needed.

Such system of humanitarian aid distribution covered not only frontline, but also more remote population centres. For example, Kramatorsk locals had the opportunity to register, if necessary, for humanitarian aid distributed approximately once every few months.

Russia's armed aggression created serious humanitarian problems for Ukrainians. Frontline communities of Donetsk oblast faced a lack of drinking water due to ongoing shelling. It has not been possible to resolve the problem of drinking water decontamination in Kramatorsk so far. The occupying forces destroyed a water chlorination plant (this method of water disinfection is often used in Ukraine) in February 2024, and locals could receive only technical water. As a result of the shelling of [Druzhkivka](#) on 24 June, a pumping station and a water pipeline were damaged. This resulted in a stoppage of water supply in the city. Later, water was supplied only for a few hours a day at certain intervals.

50 frontline population centres of Zaporizhzhia oblast, notably Huliaipole, Orihiv, and Stepnohirsk, [have been left](#) without water, electricity, heat, and gas for more than two years.

## >> EVACUATION

Due to the enemy's intensified offensive operations towards Toretsk, Donetsk oblast, the evacuation of the population has intensified to a certain extent. According to estimates of the oblast authorities, at least 500 people [were evacuated](#) from the city in the last week of June, whereas about 5,500 remained in the city (more than 32,000 lived there prior to the full-scale invasion). Emergency services managed to evacuate all families with children from the city.

Free evacuation of the population of Donetsk oblast to [Volyn oblast](#) was launched in May. A total of four evacuation runs were organised within the month. However, they were not particularly in demand among

the population of the oblast, as just 120 people, including 53 children, [were evacuated](#) during the first three runs. For the most part, socially vulnerable residents of frontline communities were evacuated from the oblast.

In late June, the mandatory evacuation zone from four raions of Kharkiv oblast was expanded for families with children. At a meeting of the Oblast Defence Council, a decision was [made](#) to forcibly evacuate families with children from unsafe population centres of Iziium, Bohodukhiv, Kupiansk, and Chuhuiv raions of the oblast.

Authorities of Zaporizhzhia oblast [helped](#) evacuate people from the frontline areas. According to the OMA Head, Ivan Fedorov, six people, notably those with mobility limitations, have left the oblast since early May. It was also possible to leave the oblast from its centre. *“The evacuation from Zaporizhzhia takes place by rail free of charge, and international partners provide financial assistance to evacuees,”* Mr Fedorov underscored.

## >> INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The third annual Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin on 11–12 June 2024 has become an important platform for cooperation of Ukrainian and international governments, politicians, representatives of communities, business and civil society sectors. [According to](#) the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 110 international agreements were concluded and financial aid estimated at over EUR16 billion was announced at the conference.

### UKRAINE RECOVERY CONFERENCE-2024 KEY AGREEMENTS

**€7** bln

Launch of the SME Resilience Alliance

**€1,4** bln

Guarantee and grant agreements as part of the Ukraine Facility's Investment Framework

**€824** mln

Energy support package from the U.S.

**€560** mln

14 agreements between Ukrainian, German, and international business partners

**€700+** mln

Retraining programmes

**€350+** mln

Risk insurance agreements

**€35+** mln

Extra funds for humanitarian demining

Source: the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine

The signed agreements confirmed the readiness of international partners to support Ukraine in restoring housing, enhancing resilience, developing logistics, strengthening critical infrastructure, and preparing for the winter. Ukrainian communities started new partnerships and got useful contacts and information for the future which will contribute to further development and recovery.

As part of the Berlin conference, an event titled [“Restoration of Kharkiv: Main Goals and Plans”](#) was held where the parties signed many agreements important for providing Kharkiv with heating in the winter. Specifically, according to the Memorandum of Understanding with the German Corporation for International Cooperation, GmbH (GIZ), four cogeneration units will be transferred to Kharkiv as soon as in July and August. Another two units of that kind will be transferred to the city by the Czech government. Kharkiv will also receive a EUR47 million grant from the World Bank and a EUR25 million loan facility with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to ensure the city's energy sustainability. These funds will be used to purchase new equipment and to decentralise heat, water, and power supply systems.

The Ministry of Justice of Ukraine [has started](#) to digitise the archives of vital records of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Over 3 million documents such as birth, death, marriage, divorce, and name change records are to be converted into digital files within six months. The project was launched at the initiative of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine with the support of the United Nations Development Programme in Ukraine and technical support of the Sweden-funded Action Support Project.

27 out of 52 communities of Mykolaiv oblast had experience of international cooperation. *“Our international partners have specialisations. For example, demining, health care, support for displaced persons, and humanitarian aid. They help communities with what they are best at,”* the Head of Mykolaiv OMA, Vitalii Kim, [said](#). In 2023, Denmark earmarked more than USD100 million for the recovery of Mykolaiv oblast. In 2024, the aid [tranche](#) was meant to put in place the following measures: demining of agricultural lands, supply of cogeneration units, and reconstruction of the dormitory of Mykolaiv State Agrarian University with safety considerations in mind.

The Ambassador of Denmark to Ukraine, Ole Egberg Mikkelsen, said that Denmark, which has taken patronage over Mykolaiv oblast, keeps an eye on the use of financial resources. The [fight against corruption](#) is a priority task in cooperation with the city. The risk of corruption can be mitigated through an approach under which there is no local procurement, it is all being done through international organisations, primarily the UN system procurement agency. Transparent use of international aid and accountability should be [ensured](#) via the International Aid Monitoring Web Portal, developed with the support of the European Anti-Corruption Initiative, which helps cities report to the public and foreign partners.

## >> INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION

Interregional cooperation has flourished.

Odesa and Kharkiv Raion Councils [signed](#) a Memorandum of Cooperation. More than 11,000 people relocated from Kharkiv oblast live in Odesa oblast.

## >> eRECOVERY PROGRAMME

In Kharkiv oblast, 19,669 out of 35,190 people who [applied](#) for compensation for damaged housing under the eRecovery programme have already received financial assistance worth a total of over UAH 1.8 billion for housing repairs. Another 1,008 oblast locals were granted compensation of almost UAH 232 million, and 532 applicants were paid more than UAH 40.8 million.

5,215 out of 8,176 locals of Donetsk oblast who submitted applications for compensation for damaged housing have already [received](#) a positive decision. Also, 630 out of 1,143 owners of destroyed housing received a positive decision on compensation. The government allocated UAH 1.4 billion to residents of Donetsk oblast under the eRecovery programme as of early June.

Since the launch of the eRecovery programme in Mykolaiv oblast, 6,999 applications for compensation for damaged property [have been filed](#) with commissions on issues of compensation for damaged or destroyed property. Out of that number, positive decisions were made on 4,203 applications, with the due amount of compensation estimated at over UAH 443.427 million.

Over UAH 1.350 billion [has been paid](#) in compensation in Kherson oblast under the eRecovery programme within 14 months since its launch. Almost 4,000 residents of Kherson oblast received funds for the repair of houses damaged by Russia's strikes or for the purchase of new ones.

As of May, 672 people in Zaporizhzhia oblast have received financial compensation for damaged housing under the eRecovery programme, and 75 people have received housing certificates for destroyed property – documents confirming the state's guarantee to provide funding for the purchase of housing in the specified amount. Housing certificates are valid for up to 5 years.

## >> INTERNATIONAL REGISTER OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE AGGRESSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE

At the international conference titled “Restoring Justice for Ukraine” in The Hague, it [was announced](#) that the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (RD4U) will be opened for applications. The Register of Damage is the first component of a global Compensation Mecha-

nism, initiated by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine in May 2022 in cooperation with international partners. The Compensation Mechanism comprises the Register of Damage, the Compensation Commission, and the Fund.

The Register has started accepting applications for compensation from only one category of applicants – those whose homes were damaged or destroyed. The Register will encompass more than 40 categories of claims. Claims submitted to the international Register of Damage will serve as a basis for future reparations which the aggressor state is expected to pay for all destruction.

From June onwards, owners of destroyed housing, including those whose homes are located in the TOAs or in the combat zone, can file applications to the international Register of Damage via Ukraine's Diia app (in a test mode).

### >> ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION DURING THE RECOVERY PROCESS

Journalists who covered corruption cases during the war played an important role, which has a painful effect on and affects the level of trust in authorities. Specifically, an investigation by [Bihus.info](#) titled “Embezzling millions on reconstruction in Kherson oblast: friends of the OMA Deputy Head, proxy IEs and inflated prices” was the most high-profile example. Investigative journalists claim that, despite ongoing shelling, hundreds of millions are allocated from the budget for the reconstruction of various facilities – schools, village councils, roads. Companies and non-profits close to local high-ranking officials participate in the reconstruction which inflate their prices for construction materials several times. Journalists exposed the conflict of interest of Anton Samoilenko, OMA Deputy Head.

Serhii Nikitenko's investigation [revealed](#) that proxy entrepreneurs from other cities, e. g. a washing machine repairman from Kharkiv, received large contracts for the repairs of bomb shelters in Kherson. Other materials [pointed](#) to contractors' ties with shady politicians, as in the case where a proxy entrepreneur received UAH 3 million for repair works from a former MP, and with [companies involved in criminal cases](#). Investigations also [detected](#) grossly inflated prices in design estimate documentation, e. g., as in the case of sewage repair performed by a Mykolaiv-based company.

The above series of investigations raised important issues of the transparent and efficient use of budget funds in the process of reconstruction of the oblast which needed to be urgently addressed.

### >> INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PUBLIC SERVICES

The number of public services for the population increased in Donetsk oblast. In late May, the State Migration Service of Ukraine [resumed](#) processing documents for obtaining foreign passports and ID cards in Sloviansk. Since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion, all units of the State Migration Service of Ukraine in Donetsk oblast have ceased providing such services, and locals could get them only in neighbouring oblasts. Specifically, a unit in deoccupied Izium, Kharkiv oblast, processed documents and issued passports.

The ASC of Sievierodonetsk urban territorial community, Luhansk oblast, [increased](#) the number of services to 32, including the following: submission of an information notice about damaged/destroyed real estate objects to Diia Unified Portal of Public Services, submission of an application for entering information into the State Register of Damaged and Destroyed Property, registration/deregistration of the declared/registered place of residence, issuance of an extract from the Territorial Community Register, acceptance of applications for the provision of financial assistance to members of Sievierodonetsk territorial community within the framework of Turbota comprehensive target programme, etc. The ASC is temporarily located in the Dnipro-based humanitarian hub. Its administrators also receive applicants at remote workplaces in humanitarian hubs of Luhansk oblast, as well as in Kyiv, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Rivne, and Cherkasy.

## 1.2. Access to public information / information security

Mykolaiv City Council [imposed](#) new access rules for journalists, according to which media representatives can enter the building only upon invitation of officials. The new rules are regulated by the Instruction on organising security and ensuring access control, approved by the Mayor's Order on 3 February 2022. Pursuant to the Instruction, media representatives can enter the building according to the lists of events prepared by

the organisational division of the Department for Ensuring Activities of Executive Authorities of Mykolaiv City Council. Media representatives should get an appointment from officials, enter in their company the building of the City Council, and register in the visitor log. Meetings of members of Mykolaiv City Council, meetings of deputy commissions, and meetings of the Council's Executive Committee have been held online for the third year since the onset of the full-scale war.

## 2. Work on identity

On the occasion of celebration of the 210th anniversary of the birth of Taras Shevchenko, a nationwide book collection project, Free People Read in Ukrainian, [was launched](#) to replenish library funds, create mobile library corners and book shelves in shelters of Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts. More than 100 institutions and organisations from 20 Ukrainian oblasts and the city of Kyiv joined a campaign for collecting Ukrainian-language books. The largest number of book collection locations were arranged in Odesa, Zakarpattia, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts.

The State Language Protection Commissioner, Taras Kremen, [claimed](#) that about 20,000 books have already been collected. Among them there are textbooks, scientific and fiction literature.

The largest number of books went to Kherson (over 8,000) and Mykolaiv (almost 5,000) oblasts.

### 2.1. Changes in education standards

According to different sources, teachers and administrations of schools in communities of Kharkiv oblast called on parents, who relocated to other oblasts of Ukraine or abroad, not to transfer their children to other schools so that to avoid a downsizing in the teaching staff. The number of students in schools, even in safe communities of Kharkiv oblast, has decreased significantly, sometimes by 2–3 times. A drop-off in student numbers could lead to the loss of jobs for teachers.

Notwithstanding ongoing shelling, higher education institutions of Kharkiv oblast did not evacuate, demonstrating their resilience and invincibility. Students continued their studies online, administrations of HEIs worked offline, and teachers delivered lectures in a mixed format. However, the number of students at higher education institutions in the oblast has decreased.

The only exception was the situation with the registration for the Unified Entrance Examination (UEE), for which about 1,500 students of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University alone filed applications for post-graduate programmes. This is likely due to the opportunity to get a draft exemption for postgraduates.

In June, 40 centres [were opened](#) in Zaporizhzhia oblast with the support of UNICEF to help children overcome learning gaps. 3<sup>rd</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup>-grade school children will have the opportunity to cope with learning losses due to the ongoing war. Classes will be held offline and in shelters for safe learning, if necessary. This format helps children socialise.

### 2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum activity, holidays and their celebration

In Mykolaiv, a memorial in memory of the fallen soldiers [has started](#) to be designed. The Architecture Department noted that the memorial *"is like a large book where the names of heroes who gave their lives for Ukraine are inscribed"*.

A memorial [was unveiled](#) in Zaporizhzhia in memory of soldiers of Safari special forces regiment of the National Police of Ukraine killed as a result of a Russian missile attack on the suburbs on the night of 22 May 2022.

The Executive Committee of Kharkiv City Council [made](#) a decision to install memorial plaques to the fallen defenders of Ukraine – guards of the 5th Slobozhan Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, Vladyslav Tytarenko, a former surgeon, and Vitalii Mukhin, an employee of Zhytlokomservice UE.

The process of deimperialisation and decolonisation of place names continued in Kharkiv oblast. The metro stations Pushkinska and Pivdennyi Vokzal (Southern Railway Station) in Kharkiv [were renamed](#) as Yaroslava Mudroho and Vokzalna, respectively. Kharkiv is located in the north-east of Ukraine; it was considered as a southern city in relation to the capital of the Russian Empire, St. Petersburg. Earlier, the city authorities renamed the Southern Railway Station itself, to which the metro station leads, as Kharkiv–Pasazhyrskiy. Another 370 place names [are to be renamed](#).

Kherson sociologists [carried out](#) a representative survey which showed that 63% of Kherson residents are satisfied with the renaming of streets. At the same time, Kherson residents who left the city (68%) were more positive about renaming than those who stayed (58%). 72% of respondents believed that their opinion was taken into account in the process of renaming. Positive ratings are due to a wide discussion initiated by local activists. In other communities, the renaming within the framework of decolonisation was accompanied by conflicts and clashes.

## 2.3. Freedom of religion

An event that might affect the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate took place in Donetsk oblast. On 24 April, the Security Service of Ukraine served a notice of suspicion of subversive activities and leakage of information on checkpoints of the Defence Forces on Metropolitan Arseniy (Ihor Yakovenko), Abbot of the Holy Dormition Sviatohirsk Lavra in Donetsk oblast. The next day he was taken into custody in a detention centre of the city of Dnipro. The Sviatohirsk Lavra, which remains under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, is an important cultural monument in the eastern part of Ukraine and a place of permanent pilgrimage. However, its priests serve the ideological interests of the “Russian World” in times of Russia’s armed aggression. Throughout ten years of war, Abbot Arseniy and priests of the Lavra repeatedly called, in line with Kremlin narratives, the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “fratricidal conflict” or “civil conflict”, and the walls of the Lavra served as a hiding place for Russian special forces. The defence [considers](#) the accusations to be speculative and the Abbot’s custody to be excessive restriction measure.

## 3. Joint action

### 3.1. Cooperation at the community–authority level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

#### >> CREATION OF ADVISORY BODIES AND HOLDING OF JOINT CONSULTATIONS

A dialogue with war veterans has been initiated at the level of Kherson OMA. On [20 June](#), a meeting of the Council of War Veterans and Families of the Fallen under the OMA was held. Among the outcomes of activities of the Council was the initiation of the opening of a “one-stop-shop” services for the military personnel, support for families of ex-combatants and families of the fallen militaries. The Defence Council of Kherson oblast [considered](#) the issue of repairing the premises of the future veterans’ hub.

Cooperation with international organisations has facilitated greater openness of authorities. City authorities of Kherson [reinstated](#) the youth council through establishing an initiative group that started preparations for a founding meeting. The council was reinstated with the [support for youth activism](#) on the part of international sponsors.

Locals of Beryslav, Tiahynka, and Vysokopillia were involved in discussions on the preparation of recovery plans as part of the implementation of international projects.



**>> STEPPING UP PROJECT INITIATIVES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS**

The revival of public life was recorded in the government-controlled part of Donetsk oblast. As a result of relative stabilisation of the front line, some civil society organisations not only returned to the oblast but also resumed activities in areas unrelated to the provision of humanitarian aid. They adapted to the current situation, operating on the basis of humanitarian hubs in the oblast and beyond. The oblast administration also began to more actively develop cooperation with civic initiatives through participating in various civil society forums and organising joint events with civil society organisations.

**>> MASS RALLIES**

In May and June, rallies in support of the captured defenders of Mariupol and peaceful pickets campaigning for the right to [demobilisation](#) were regularly [held](#) in Zaporizhzhia.

## 4. Changes in the social structure

### 4.1. Challenges related to the situation of women and children, people with disabilities

Three vehicles, purchased by the UNICEF with the financial support of international donors, [were transferred](#) under the Care from Birth at Home programme to centres of primary health and sanitary care in Chuhuiv, Pischyn, and Valkivsk communities of Kharkiv oblast. The new vehicles will help home nurses be more mobile and visit families with children in communities.

### 4.2. Needs of displaced persons. Response

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Mission in Ukraine [shared](#) a report on internal displacement in Ukraine (April 2024). The report provides the main findings, including detailed insights into population figures, displacement flows and mobility intentions, demographic profiles, household composition and vulnerabilities, and needs of the returnee population. Data cited in the Ukraine Displacement Report were compiled from Round 16 of the General Population Survey. According to IOM [estimates](#), 3,548,000 de facto IDPs reside in Ukraine. The main areas of origin of IDPs are those previously or currently occupied by forces of the Russian Federation and comprise 75% of the total IDP population, equivalent to 2,679,000 people.

Many people – 4,734,000 – returned to their previous places of residence. The main areas of return are the city of Kyiv (22%), Kyiv (15%), Kharkiv (15%), and Dnipropetrovsk (6%) oblasts.

Ukrainians were primarily displaced to Dnipropetrovsk (14% of the total IDP population) and Kharkiv (12%) oblasts. Also, a relatively large share of IDPs live in the capital and in Kyiv oblast (10% and 8%, respectively). Perception of an improved security situation (45%) and proximity to family and friends (24%) were the most commonly reported reasons for people's choice of these places of displacement. The majority of IDPs come from Donetsk oblast (22%).

The largest displacement flows within the same oblast are recorded in Zaporizhzhia (91%) and Kharkiv (85%) oblasts.

## INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN UKRAINE AS A RESULT OF THE WAR OF 2014–2024

4.734 million

IDPs returned to their previous places of residence

3.548 million

the number of IDPs in Ukraine

Source: the International Organization for Migration. Data as of April 2024.

To shape a cohesion policy, it is worth considering that more than half (57%) of de facto IDPs expressed their intention to stay in the place of their displacement. Two-thirds of 31% of those planning to return said they intend to return to their places of origin *“after the war is over”*.

In Kharkiv, an adaptation space for IDPs, [was opened](#) where people could receive information and services from representatives of international foundations and organisations, ASCs, legal experts, and psychologists. People will be able to register there for financial aid or accommodation in a dormitory, get food, and apply for employment.

Since 10 May, when the enemy intensified offensive operations in the border areas, Kharkiv [has hosted](#) more than 11,000 evacuees from Kupiansk, Lypetsk, and Vovchansk areas.

Since February, the second wave of creation of humanitarian offices of Kherson oblast in other cities of Ukraine to help Kherson IDPs has broken. Hub staff members will provide humanitarian assistance, legal, social, and psychological support, as well as assistance with employment. The first offices of that kind were established in 2022. In June, the Global Empowerment Mission in Ukraine, in partnership with Howard G. Buffett Foundation, opened offices in [Kyiv](#), [Dnipro](#), and [Mykolaiv](#).

More than 1,800 Zaporizhzhia locals [joined](#) the Recovery Army. Those who became unemployed for various reasons, including 106 forced migrants, participate in this government-led project on the country's recovery.

### 4.3. Needs of volunteers of Territorial Defence Forces. Response. Mobilisation. Military reservation

In Kharkiv oblast, AFU volunteers will receive a one-time cash payment from local communities. This [initiative](#) is geared towards supporting and encouraging people to join the AFU and marks an important step for maintaining the country's defence capability and national security. Incentive cash payments ranging from UAH 10,000 to UAH 50,000, depending on the community's financial capacity, are paid as part of social support programmes for military personnel, combatants, and their family members.

Two centres for recruiting into the Ukrainian army [were opened](#) in Kharkiv oblast. *“Today, a large number of vacancies are available in military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service, and the Territorial Defence Forces. These are UAV operators, drivers, equipment repair specialists, doctors, etc. All vacancies are open to both men and women. The minimum salary is UAH 20,000 plus [approximately EUR440. – editor]. Furthermore, an additional remuneration is paid depending on a place of military service,”* the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine's Commissioner for Recruitment, Oleksii Bezhevets, said.

In May 2024, new rules for military registration and mobilisation [came into effect](#). Specifically, the responsibility of employers to submit to relevant authorities lists of their employees liable for military service has been strengthened. This triggered a decrease in the economic and social activity of some men. In response to

the above changes, some of them began to resign from official positions so that not to come under scrutiny of recruiters. Employers started to offer an option between dismissals or signing labour contracts to avoid reporting.

Along with that, the procedure for military reservation proved to be complex and lengthy which creates additional social tensions, as many companies face difficulties in processing documents or fail to reserve key employees in due time.

# III. RELATIVELY REAR AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

## 1. Changes in the system of governance

From April through June, local authorities of the rear areas focused their activities on ensuring the livelihood of territorial communities, supporting the AFU, arranging mobilisation activities in connection with changes in legislation, and mitigating the consequences of missile strikes and potential threats to power supply.

### 1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

#### >> ENERGY FACILITIES

Damage to energy infrastructure as a result of shelling by the RF required the implementation of alternative solutions. One of them was the development of a network of small power generating stations which will be difficult and expensive to attack because of their number.

Since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion, there have been 12 missile attacks on Burshtyn TPP supplying heat to the city of Burshtyn, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, as a result of which the plant was completely destroyed. As it will not be possible to restore the TPP prior to the beginning of the heating season, it is planned to install modular boiler houses and cogeneration units provided by charitable foundations. The Mayor of Burshtyn asked for UAH 15 million to be allocated from the oblast budget for their installation, but oblast authorities have not yet made a decision on funding for the reconstruction of the city's infrastructure.

Homeowners associations (HOAs) and housing societies (HSs) of Lviv had the opportunity to [be awarded](#) a grant for the installation of SPPs or heat pumps under a new programme of the Energy Efficiency Fund, GreenDIM. The programme provides for compensation of 70% of the cost of the installation of a SPP or a heat pump. This will enable residents of multi-apartment buildings to save on utility bills and increase energy independence in the event of power outages.

[According to](#) the information provided by the OMA, Zakarpattia oblast takes a lead in Ukraine in terms of the ratio of the number of units generating power from solar panels in private households to the number of domestic consumers. 4,836 SPPs with a total capacity of 138 MW were installed in private households of the oblast as of 1 March 2024. Also, there were companies that operated 65 SPPs with a capacity of 244 MW.

A return of power outages had the worst effect on public sentiments within the monitoring period. In June, emergency power outages were cancelled, and hourly power outage schedules came into effect in Chernivtsi oblast. At the end of the month, the population was without electricity for 8–12 hours a day. Apart from the scheduled blackouts, several emergency power outages were also reported during the month. The lack of electricity caused problems with the Internet which further complicated the daily life of the oblast's population.

However, the past year's experience made it possible for people to adapt to power outages and provide themselves with a backup power supply. The above did not give rise to strong social tensions.

In connection with hourly power outage schedules, residents and guests of Lviv [were reminded](#) of an interactive map of places where they can plug in their gadgets in the event of a lack of electricity at home or

in office. According to Lviv City Council, the map covers cafés, restaurants, and co-working spaces equipped with power generators or shelters or with both.

## >> INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Six border crossing points (BCPs) on the Ukrainian-Romanian border, located in Chernivtsi oblast, [were included](#) in a master plan for the development of border infrastructure at vehicle checkpoints jointly developed by Ukraine and Romania. The project is designed to increase trade turnover and passenger traffic, and further boost cargo export and import operations between Ukraine and the European Union. The plan identified Porubne – Siret and Bila Krynytsia – Klimeuts BCPs as high priority. On the basis of the master plan, applications to the European Commission for funding will be made.

Reni border crossing point [has started operating](#) in Odesa oblast. It was opened after the renovation. From now onwards, Ukrainian and Moldovan customs and border control services will work together at the BCP. This is the first step towards the implementation of the green corridor initiative between Ukraine's Reni BCP, Moldova's Giurgiulești BCP, and Romania's Galați BCP. Apart from lorries, buses will be subject to joint control, with a separate lane and a terminal at the border crossing point. This will reduce the waiting time for passengers.

## >> RAILWAY

The passenger flow on Kyiv–Chop railway [increased](#) by 221% compared to the same period of the previous year due to the development of Chop railway station, Zakarpattia oblast, as a transfer hub for Ukrainian and international trains. Lutsk/Kyiv – Chop and Chop – Vienna new trains, as well as the already-launched Czech night train connecting Prague, Košice, and Chop have surged the popularity of the route.

## >> OPERATION OF PORTS

On 14–16 June, Odesa [hosted](#) the Black Sea Security Forum 2024 dedicated to maritime security in the Black Sea region. About 350 representatives from the EU, the US, and Australia took part in the event. The region's security was among the most pressing geopolitical problems, since the ports of Greater Odessa play a key role in ensuring global food security. Forum participants noted that Russia is aiming to inflict a global food crisis by destroying, with its continuous attacks, the ports through which Ukraine exports agricultural products.

An important aspect of the event was a discussion on ensuring the security of the marine grain corridor. The Acting Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, Taras Vysotskyi, [emphasised](#) that the port capacities are sufficient to cover the needs of Ukraine's exports. However, there are two main problems that need to be urgently addressed – the military vulnerability of Ukraine's port infrastructure and the security of the grain corridor.

The location of port infrastructure in high-risk areas involves a significant strengthening of air defence systems. The problem of the grain corridor's security is particularly urgent, since the restoration of free navigation in the Black Sea remains a difficult task in the context of war. Without effective resolution of the above issues, it will be impossible to ensure the predictability and stability of global food security.

In May 2024, Ukrainian seaports [reported](#) a hike in the volume of cargo handling. The total cargo turnover amounted to 8.265 million tons, almost twice as much as in the same period of 2023. The shares of grain and ore cargoes were the largest in freight traffic. In May 2024, cargo turnover via the Ukrainian corridor was 6.7 million tons, of which 4.5 million tons were products of Ukrainian farmers.

From January through May 2024, the Ukrainian ports handled almost 46 million tons of cargo, which significantly exceeds the volume of 26.6 million tons in the same period of 2023.


## >> PERMIT SYSTEM IN THE BORDER ZONE

From March 2024 onwards, a permit system [has been launched](#) for those willing to stay in the border zone outside populated centres (a 5-kilometre zone from the state border). In Zakarpattia oblast, permits were issued by territorial divisions of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, notably by Mukachevo and Chop border guard units. Chop border guard unit is responsible for the population centres of Uzhhorod raion, while Mukachevo border guard unit is responsible for Berehove, Khust, Tiachiv, and Rakhiv raions.

Locals [complained](#) about significant delays in permit issuance. Specifically, Chop border guard unit issued about 4,500 permits out of 16,500 permit applications. This affected seasonal occupations such as mushroom and berry picking, livestock grazing, horticulture, and tourism. Despite criticism, the public was in general tolerant of restrictions, including because some individuals attempted to cross the state border outside the official border crossing points.

#### >> RELOCATED BUSINESSES

According to the Unified State Register, almost 19,000 companies [have relocated](#), primarily to Kyiv and Zakarpattia oblasts, since the beginning of 2022.



Source: Opendatabot

According to the State Tax Service of Ukraine, 297 business entities relocated to Zakarpattia oblast as of March 2024. Among the main difficulties faced by businesses are the lack of information about free land plots and industrial premises, high housing rent, and insufficient qualifications of local labour force, including those engaged in construction. Furthermore, problems with access of IDPs to kindergartens and schools were reported, although the last problem concerns locals as well. Another problem was a lack of funding to renovate old buildings to be offered by their owners on a long-term lease to relocated businesses.

#### >> eRECOVERY PROGRAMME

[As reported](#) by the First Deputy Mayor of Odesa, Oleksandr Filatov, 466 out of 717 applications filed by the locals for compensation for damaged property under the [eRecovery](#) programme were examined. As for the remaining 333 applications, a decision was made to provide compensation worth a total of around UAH 16.5 million, or approximately EUR367,000. 793 applications were rejected, and 40 applications were under examination.

Oleksandr Filatov pointed out that Odesa locals also receive additional financial support from the city budget. In 2023 and 2024, more than UAH 52 million (approximately EUR1.16 million) was channelled for the renovation of housing for 1,800 Odesa locals.

As part of the eRecovery programme, 115 owners of damaged and destroyed private houses and apartments (residential premises) in Lviv oblast received compensation estimated at a total of over UAH 14.8 million (approximately EUR330,000).

## >> COOPERATION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR

Various international missions actively operated in Ukraine, providing not only financial support, but also quality health care. One of the most striking examples is [Face the Future](#) Foundation whose fourth mission ended in Ivano-Frankivsk on 26 April. During the mission, American and Canadian plastic surgeons, in partnership with Ukrainian specialists, performed free face and neck reconstructive surgeries for the Ukrainian militaries.



Photo: surgeons of the “Face the Future” Canadian-American mission in Ivano-Frankivsk. April 2024. Source: [Galka.lf.ua](https://galka.lf.ua)

## 2. Work on identity

### 2.1. Language politics

On 15 March, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine [approved](#) the State Target National Cultural Programme for ensuring the comprehensive development and functioning of Ukrainian as the state language in all spheres of public life until 2030.

In late April, members of Odesa City Council [approved](#) the Ukrainian language development programme for 2024–2025 with a budget of UAH 1.8 million (EUR40,000). The programme is targeted at expanding the use of Ukrainian among children and youths, meeting national, cultural and language needs through artistic practices, educational, cultural and awareness-raising activities.

Although City Council members supported the programme, a deputy Olha Kvasnytska drew attention to the lack of support for Ukrainian literary activities and book publishing by reminding that Odesa has been a UNESCO city of literature since 2019.

## 2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum activity, holidays and their celebration

Since the [adoption](#) in March 2023 of the Law of Ukraine “On Condemnation and Prohibition of Propaganda of Russian Imperial Policy in Ukraine and Decolonization of Place Names” until 27 April 2024, two districts, 210 streets and lanes, as well as ten place names, including alleys, city gardens, and squares [have been renamed](#) in Odesa.

Some places however never received new names due to the large number of place names to be renamed and the extensive discussion surrounding some of them. At a session, members of Odesa City Council removed Lev Tolstoy Street and Square, Bunin and Zhukovsky Streets, Gagarin Avenue and six other place names from the list for renaming despite their approval in the committee for history and place names and at public hearings.

30 streets and lanes whose names are associated with the Soviet past [were to be renamed](#) in Rukshyn community, Chernivtsi oblast. The Village Council proposed to rename the streets in honour of the fallen soldiers from among community members.

According to the Law, if local self-government bodies fail to make a decision on renaming or dismantling imperial symbols within the specified timeframe, the powers for renaming are to be transferred to higher-level authorities. Following the Law, after 27 April 2024, the powers for renaming streets and dismantling monuments were transferred from mayors of cities and towns to heads of oblast state administrations.

### WHO AND WHEN WILL MAKE DECISIONS?

On renaming place names within population centres and dismantling monuments and memorial plaques which are not subject to legislation on the protection of monuments

- **27 July 2023 – 27 January 2024**  
Local self-government bodies of population centres – village, settlement, city councils or military and civil administrations  
*If no decision is made at this stage, the powers are to be transferred to*
- **27 January – 27 April 2024**  
Village, settlement, city mayors or persons exercising their powers  
*If no decision is made at this stage, the powers are to be transferred to*
- **27 April – 27 July 2024**  
Heads of oblast state administrations or persons exercising their powers  
**A decision on renaming population centres is to be made by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine**



According to the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory

Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast State Administration set up a working group on decommunisation and decolonisation. Decommunisation in the Oblast section has appeared on the website of the Oblast State Administration, with proposals for dismantling monuments and renaming streets collected via Google Form.

Many communities of the oblast actively participated in this process and renamed most streets. The situation surrounding monuments and memorials was more difficult. 27 out of 98 monuments were disman-



tled as of 1 April. Some raions have completed this process: decommunisation has been fully completed in Verkhovyna raion, while all streets have been renamed in Kosiv raion.

## 2.3. Freedom of religion

On 5 April, Bishop Theognost of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna [called on](#) priests of Romanian-speaking communities to join the Orthodox Church of Ukraine together with their parishioners. Following the conversion, Bukovyna locals could preserve all customs, traditions, and the language of worship. At the same time, he noted that if a parish makes a relevant decision and a priest refuses, there is a priest in Chernivtsi and Bukovyna Diocese of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine who takes services in the Romanian language.

[According to](#) C4 media outlet, there are at least two dozen territorial communities in Chernivtsi oblast where the Romanian-speaking population lives. In none of them, did the religious communities convert from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

More than 40 priests of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna Diocese of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine [were engaged](#) in military chaplaincy. Some of them were officially attached to military units, but many others, who had become chaplains in 2014, worked as volunteers.

Officers of the National Police in Zakarpattia oblast [blocked](#) a channel for the distribution of propaganda literature inciting enmity among members of national minorities and parishioners of different religious groups. Publications were distributed through a network of church shops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Uzhhorod. Similar materials were also found during searches in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Mykolaiv. This Russian propaganda literature justified the aggression of the RF against Ukraine.

## 2.4. National minorities

In her address at the first Intergovernmental Conference on Ukraine's EU accession on 25 June, Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine and head of the Ukrainian delegation in negotiations on the country's accession to the European Union, [confirmed](#) Ukraine's readiness to meet 11 demands of Hungary regarding the protection of the rights of national minorities.

Ukraine [received](#) the list of demands from the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Péter Szijjártó, back in January. Since then, negotiations have been ongoing, but the Hungarian side has always opposed making the list public.

On 29 May, a roundtable discussion [was held](#) for the first time in Chernivtsi with the participation of the Ombudsmen of Romania and Ukraine. More than 140 representatives of civil society organisations of the Romanian national community accepted the invitation to the event, along with representatives of public and local authorities. During the event, the Head of Chernivtsi Oblast Council initiated the creation of a standing commission on the rights of national minorities.

The Ombudsman of Romania, Renate Weber, and the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Dmytro Lubinets, visited communities and educational facilities of the oblast where national minorities live and jointly identified priorities for the protection of their rights in Ukraine.

On 29 April, a public discussion titled "Chernivtsi as a dialogue platform for national communities of Central Europe" [was carried out](#) at Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University. Participants discussed a new law on national minorities, the specifics of inter-ethnic cooperation in the oblast, prospects for the development of inter-ethnic and inter-governmental relations between Ukraine and Romania. Nataliia Nechaieva-Yuriichuk, oblast coordinator of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion, took part in the event.

## 3. Joint action

### 3.1. Cooperation at the community–authority level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

#### >> NEEDS OF WAR VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES

In 2023–2024, 20 persons in Chernivtsi oblast [won grants](#) under the [programme](#) titled “Grants for veterans and their families”. Winners, including active servicemen, those demobilised, and their family members, received grants worth a total of almost UAH 10 million. In 2024, business ideas regarding opening and expanding business will be implemented, including a store selling children’s toys, a sports club, cafés, grocery stores, fast-food points of sale, cultivation of vegetables and greens in greenhouses, etc.

On 13 June, a public space for military personnel, Vybir (Choice), [was opened](#) in Lviv. It is located in the House of Military Officers and is intended for military personnel, war veterans, and their family members. The project was implemented with the support of the Foundation for Military Medical Support, the House of Military Officers, the Crisis Service of Lviv, and the Center of Military Chaplaincy of Lviv Archdiocese of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Assistance for the space’s arrangement was provided by Ukrainian ethnic communities abroad.

The public space consists of renovated and specially adapted inclusive spaces consisting of an exhibition hall and large spaces for co-working, holding workshops, meetings, conferences, watching movies, and doing sports. Besides, the space has a shelter.

War veterans of Chernivtsi oblast [got access](#) to 95 services. Most services are free, and some are provided at a reduced cost. The Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine has developed an electronic map for the convenience of obtaining information about services available in each community.

The e-map contains information about available services provided by governmental, charitable, civil society, and international organisations to war veterans, their families, and family members of the fallen militaries. The map covers such services as psychological and health care support, housing programmes, financial aid, employment, and business development. The map also has a list of prosthetics and rehabilitation services providers.

A special chatbot, Veteran Brothers-in-Arms of Bukovyna, [was developed](#) for war veterans and their families. It contains information relevant and useful for the defenders and their relatives. Veterans can ask questions and get information about benefits, legal counselling, useful links to services, etc.

#### >> ARMY OF DRONES

Training of UAV operators [was actively developed](#) in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. A school of UAV operators, Black Raven of Ivano-Frankivsk, a branch of the same-name school in Kyiv, is part of a governmental initiative, Army of Drones. Students can master drone piloting and acquire basic engineering skills in two weeks of intensive training. The course lasts for two weeks, with daily four-hour classes. Within three months, about a hundred students of various ages, ranging from 15 to 57 years, received training. Upon completion of the course, students receive a certificate enabling them to apply for positions in troops that use First-Person-View unmanned aerial vehicles (FPV troops).

#### >> PROGRAMMES TO SUPPORT BUSINESS

Ivano-Frankivsk community [provided support](#) for small and medium-sized businesses amid power outages. Entrepreneurs could receive partial compensation for the cost of generators and satellite communication systems from the city budget. 27 applications were processed, of which 25 were approved as of 17 June. The city has already paid UAH 684,150.

To be eligible for compensation, a business must have at least 20 square metres of free area to accommodate ten people, as well as an equipped bathroom and operational sockets. This is needed for using the

premises as a heating point for community members when electricity is unavailable for more than 12 hours. 50% of the cost of power generators or uninterruptible power supply systems is compensated in the amount worth no more than UAH 30,000 (approximately EUR885).

## 3.2. Cooperation at the level of society. Initiatives. Trust between groups

### >> AID FOR THE AFU

A team of IT specialists of Chernivtsi-based Strong Boys PO [produced](#) and handed over a hundred drones to the militaries in almost half a year. They started with 3D-printing drone parts and now can produce up to ten drones a week. The team is currently working on a more cost-effective solution to reduce costs and to raise production to ten drones per day.

A walking tour by Valerii Manara, a man with disabilities from Putyla who raised UAH 426,536 by doing so to purchase electronic warfare equipment and drones for the unit where his military friend Mykola Teren served, [was](#) a landmark event for the city of Chernivtsi and Chernivtsi oblast.

### >> MASS RALLIES

At a rally [carried out](#) in Odesa's Derybasivska Street on 15 June, some hundred relatives and friends of the captured militaries demanded a release of Russia's captives. In the words of Anna Pazhera, who organised the action, similar events have been conducted almost every week since the autumn of 2023. She emphasised the importance of initiatives of that kind for enhancing public awareness of the destiny of the fighters, who have been in captivity for two years, and called for further support and publicity.

## 4. Changes in the social structure

### 4.1. Challenges related to the situation of women and children, people with disabilities

Six geriatric and psychoneurological boarding houses of Kharkiv oblast [are planned to be evacuated](#) to Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. Residential care facilities, which serve up to 400 persons each, will be relocated together with their wards, staff, and equipment.

A rehabilitation centre for children, UNBROKEN KIDS, [was opened](#) in Lviv. It provides free health care services ranging from diagnostics to extremely complex surgeries, prosthetics, and full rehabilitation. The centre aims to help victims of Russian aggression and those who have complex childhood disorders.

In April, a new modern shelter, with an area of 700 square metres, [was arranged](#) in Lviv State Regional Clinical Perinatal Center. The shelter operates as a miniature perinatal centre equipped with everything necessary for providing health care: a delivery room, an operating room, intensive care wards for mothers and newborns, as well as post-intensive care wards. The centre's staff will be able to work in the shelter that meets up-to-date requirements for safety and inclusiveness, as well as health care and construction standards.

This year, one of the problems was a lack of camps for improving the health of children of privileged categories. Dniester Plus and Near the Forest camps in Bukovyna [were identified](#) as unsuitable for living due to a number of violations discovered in the course of inspection. At the time of writing of the report, Chernivtsi had no other alternative for improving the health of children of privileged categories.

## 4.2. Needs of displaced persons. Response

### >> HOUSING FOR IDPs

On 19 June, the Head of Chernivtsi Oblast Council, Oleksii Boyko, [signed](#) a grant agreement with the International Finance Corporation which provides for funding for the renovation of municipally-owned buildings as temporary housing for those forcibly displaced.

### >> EMPLOYMENT OF IDPs

*“33% of IDPs living in temporary accommodation facilities of the oblast have been already employed. 900 people found a job through the employment centre. 24 internally displaced persons have already received government micro-grants for starting or expanding businesses in Chernivtsi oblast, and 155 entrepreneurs have received grant assistance under programmes of international partners,”* Chernivtsi OMA [reported](#).

### >> SUPPORT AND ADAPTATION OF IDPs

A Sustainability Centre, an inclusive space for IDPs and locals, was opened in Odesa. The project, part of a nationwide mental health programme, “How are you?”, initiated by the First Lady Olena Zelenska, is implemented by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine in partnership with Caritas Odesa UGCC CO and Odesa City Council. The Centre offers a full range of psychosocial support services and can also provide legal and employment counselling, support for veterans, etc. International partners of the project, UNICEF and WHO, provide training for teams of specialists.

The integration of IDPs into local communities remained an important issue on the agenda. IDP councils operated in communities and various projects focused on IDP integration were carried out. Special attention was paid to cultural interactions and education. Specifically, a [marathon of pysanka \(Easter egg\) painters](#) was held in Bukovyna ahead of Easter by Mariupol IDPs who celebrated Easter far from their homes for the third time.

On 20 June, Ivano-Frankivsk [hosted](#) the Roads of Hope craft fair where IDP entrepreneurs presented their goods and services. The programme participants, who receive a six-month training on the preparation and implementation of business plans, successfully implement their projects with the support of grants won from Caritas Ukraine. For example, Kharkiv locals, Nataliia Vasylenko and her husband, used a USD10,000 grant to purchase equipment and launch production of furniture and decorations. A couple of Ivan Savchenko and Lyudmila Madaminova, who fled their native Crimea due to the occupation, opened an online Uzbek cuisine restaurant, University of Pilaf, in Ivano-Frankivsk. They were also looking for premises for a food outlet where they could recreate the cozy atmosphere of home for the visitors.

## 4.3. Needs of volunteers of Territorial Defence Forces. Response. Mobilisation

To increase incentives for mobilisation, Verenchanka community, Chernivtsi oblast, [offered](#) its residents a reward for concluding a contract with the AFU. Members of the Village Council made a decision according to which community residents will be paid UAH 20,000 for joining the ranks of the AFU.

The practice of getting military units engaged in the mobilisation campaign through extensive advertisement of military service has expanded, with an emphasis on various positions, guaranteed training, and decent financial support. On 14 June, a new recruitment centre of the Ukrainian army, the 24th in Ukraine, [opened](#) in Ivano-Frankivsk. This is a pilot project of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine tasked to ensure the selection of vacancies for the Defence Forces, to advise candidates on service in various units of the Ukrainian army, and to provide them with referrals from the application to the centre to the appointment in the AFU.

In the border areas of Chernivtsi oblast, illegal border crossings by men of mobilisation age who attempted to dodge service in the AFU posed a serious problem. The cost of a relevant “service” on the “market” was steadily [increasing](#), in parallel to growing demand and supply. Various illegal border crossing schemes

were used, often with the participation of intermediaries, including law enforcement officers. In May, the State Bureau of Investigation of Ukraine (SBI) [apprehended](#) a law enforcement officer who transported people past checkpoints to the border by his own vehicle and then gave them instructions for crossing the border with Romania on foot. The “service” costed EUR6,500.

According to official [information](#), the number of men who illegally crossed the northern border with Romania totalled around 11,000. 19 persons were killed in an attempt to illegally cross the border.

Social discontent with methods used by local TRSSCs [was growing](#) which caused resistance and aggression. In the village of Chornohuzy, Vyzhnytsia raion, a local attacked a TRSSC representative. The latter had to use weapons for self-defence.

The course of the war and mobilisation campaign increasingly affected the labour market. *“Human resources pose a serious problem. Our utility companies need additional 282 employees. Now, this number increased by another 16 employees who have been recently mobilised,”* [claimed](#) Ruslan Martsinkiv, Mayor of Ivano-Frankivsk.


The Mayor of Chernivtsi, Roman Klichuk, [said](#) that in recent weeks, military summons were served on 52 employees of the water supply company, 25 employees of the Transport Department of Chernivtsi City Council, and 70 employees of Kalynivskyi market. The Mayor noted that, notwithstanding the City Council’s support for mobilisation, such a situation poses a threat to municipal infrastructure facilities. He also suggested that the number of tourists in the city decreased because of “thoughtless mobilisation” which, in his words, was primarily enforced at Chernivtsi Railway Station. He characterised the mobilisation process as a “hunt for people, for city guests”.

“Specific” approaches to mobilisation raised questions about the reasonableness of such actions. 100% Life CO, the largest network of HIV-infected people, [proposed](#) to develop an algorithm for ensuring uninterrupted work of drivers transporting medical and humanitarian cargos. The reason was that officers of Mukachevo TRSSC took a 23-year-old driver out of a truck with medications for HIV-infected people and sent him to a physical evaluation board. As a result, the medications were not delivered on time to Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil.

# DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

## Conceptual framework of the approach of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion

**RESILIENCE** means a social practice at the national, oblast, and local levels that offers opportunities to overcome challenges and adapt to transformations.



We measure resilience in the following three dimensions:

- **adaptive capacity** of social systems and institutions to crises and sudden environmental changes,
- **self-recovery** that means mobilisation of citizens, institutions to jointly solve various humanitarian, social, and security tasks,
- **resistance** means stabilisation of models of cooperation between the government, business community, and civil society which contributes to increasing the level of cross-sectoral trust in the course of transformation.

**SOCIAL COHESION** means the state of relationships in society between social groups (horizontal cohesion) and between society and the authorities (vertical cohesion). It is measured by the levels of trust and norms of reciprocity (development of positive social capital); the strength of civil society; and conflict management institutions being in place (e. g., responsible democracy, independent judiciary, etc.).

**RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL COHESION ARE BASED** on common approaches, shared values, and versatile models of cooperation.

### >> FOCUS

- on actors, changes in the governance, assessment of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and transformation as opposed to return to the previous state.

### >> DATA COLLECTION:

- temporarily occupied and frontline areas – Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv oblasts
- Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place – Odesa, Mykolaiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Zakarpattia, and Chernivtsi oblasts.

**DATA SOURCES:** publications in the media, decisions of authorities, draft decisions of authorities, data of surveys and public opinion polls, data of social networking sites, reports of non-governmental organisations, and any other publicised information. The data are collected by coordinators of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion in 11 oblasts, based on data sources, their own understanding of the state of affairs and involvement in local cohesion processes.

**>> PROBLEMS**

In the temporarily occupied areas:

- Dynamics of occupation. The advance of Russian troops, the situation in occupied population centres; opinion of the population of the oblast / community / political forces regarding Russia's occupation and military actions.
- Changes in the system of governance. Decisions and information of the occupying authorities; cases of collaborationism; seizure of property; expropriation of products by the occupying administrations.
- Humanitarian situation. Filtration measures of the occupying authorities; forced deportation and its routes; hostage taking; recruitment into armed formations; nature of evacuation; destruction; access to health care services.
- Work on identity. The operation of educational facilities; relocation of school children, students, and teachers; forced Russification; Russian state education standards; politics of memory: place names, museum activity, holidays and their celebration; activities of religious organisations.
- Changes in the social structure. Challenges related to the situation of women, children, and people with disabilities.

In the Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place:

- Dynamics of military operations. Shelling and attacks / weapons used against the civilian population; destruction.
- Changes in the system of governance. The organisation of activities of authorities and access of citizens to decision-making at the local level; access to public information; coordination of actions of volunteers and authorities, as well as actions between authorities at a variety of levels, authorities and the militaries, volunteers and the militaries, etc.
- Humanitarian situation. The accessibility of drinking water, food, communication, electricity; access to health care services; provision with humanitarian aid at the oblast level.
- Changes in the social environment. The attitudes in communities to changes in symbols, calendars (holidays, memorial days); renaming of streets and other public places; operation of educational facilities, relocation of school children, students, and teachers; civil society and business community, labour market.
- The situation of internally displaced persons. The availability of housing and employment; integration into the host community; networking.

**>> THE PUBLISHING FREQUENCY OF THE REPORT**

The initial monitoring report covers the first four months of the large-scale invasion (from February through June), starting on 24 February 2022; and each of the follow-up reports has a two-month timeframe. Issue No. 11 covers the period from April through June 2024.



## ABOUT UKRAINIAN CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL RESEARCH

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# RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

Periodic report based on monitoring materials from selected regions of Ukraine  
Issue No. 11. April – June 2024

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